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Abstract
Some governments tackle poverty and inequality by creating well-functioning,
rules-based distributive programmes. Others redistribute selectively, showering their
loyal supporters with goods, services, and money while denying these things to other
citizens, even when those other citizens are very poor. What explains this contrast? Why
do some governments prefer politically neutral rules-based forms of redistribution while
others prefer highly selective clientelistic redistributive arrangements? This dissertation
answers the question by developing a new line of theory. I also test that theory against
evidence from a number of Latin American countries, most notably Brazil.
Although rules-based social policies are a cornerstone of the modern welfare state,
we know surprisingly little about the politics behind these policies. In this dissertation I
show how, in much of Latin America, the development of rules-based programmes can
be traced to the electoral incentives of politicians, and of presidents in particular. Forging
clientelistic deals with favoured constituents may be a winning strategy for legislators
and local officials, but presidents cannot play that game as well and so tend to prefer less
particularistic forms of redistribution.
Over the past few decades, rules-based social programmes have emerged for the first
time in much of Latin America. However, the reason why these countries have been
embracing programmatic redistribution now is not yet clear. Some studies have stressed
that the spread of electoral democracy has created incentives for politicians to shift
distribution away from powerful groups and towards the poor. For these scholars the
emergence of rules-based programmes is a reflection of weakening clientelistic linkages
between politicians and voters. Others have argued that, as societies get wealthier, voters
have the means to rebel against clientelistic schemes and vote for politicians that favour
programmatic distribution. Others still make the point that the rise of left-wing parties is
what is driving these transformations. Leftist parties organise and mobilise the poor, who
in turn pressure for effective, rules-based distribution.
In contrast with these explanations, my analysis attributes the new emphasis on rules
to the shifting balance between the powers of legislators and those of presidents in much
of Latin America. My argument is that clientelism remains a useful electoral strategy
mainly for legislators and in local politics, where the support of well-organised networks
of clients can make a difference between winning and losing public office. Presidents, on
the other hand, have much larger and more heterogeneous constituencies, which makes
investing in small networks of clients prohibitively expensive for them. Furthermore,
presidents strive to be seen as strong leaders that are capable of designing effective policies
that will be considered fair by the majority of citizens. In the case of presidents, creating
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rules-based social programmes is the most efficient way to redistribute income in a way
that is compatible with their political priorities.
I test this theory using a unique dataset of social spending in each of Brazil’s 5,570
municipalities. Employing different identification strategies, I find broad support for the
argument that legislators and presidents prefer very different kinds of social policies.
These differences are systematic and do not depend on a legislator’s or on the incumbent
president’s party affiliation. Even legislators who hail from ‘pro-poor’ parties on the left
of the political spectrum seem to prefer clientelistic forms of redistribution, despite the
fact that clientelistic practices can be quite regressive. At the same time, presidents
almost always prefer programmatic distributive policies, which are famously
progressive, even when they hail from parties on right of the ideological spectrum.
These results – the product of numerous interviews and extensive fieldwork conducted
in four states over the course of two electoral cycles – help explain why Brazil and other
young democracies in Latin America have seen conditional cash transfer programmes and
other rules-based income distribution schemes proliferate in the recent decades. As my
analysis reveals, these schemes were largely driven by presidents. As presidents gained
control over the design and the funding of social policies, they used these powers to create
the kinds of programmes that furthered their own electoral interests.
That said, inefficient spending on clientelistic arrangements remains a problem in
Brazil, as it does in much of the region. This, too, can be explained by my theory:
clientelism’s staying power reflects the fact that, despite recent reforms, legislators
remain powerful. Exploiting that power, legislators have continued to do what they
always do, rewarding clients and punishing dissenters, as illustrated by my analysis of
the case of Argentina. Latin American presidents may now be gaining the upper hand,
but until the power balance shifts decisively in their favour, we are unlikely to see
rules-based distribution completely replacing traditional clientelistic arrangements in
Latin American or, for that matter, anywhere else.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this dissertation I provide a theory of why politicians sometimes move away from
clientelism and towards more programmatic distributive strategies, illustrating it with
evidence from Brazil. I argue that the transformation from clientelism to rules-based
income redistribution requires a shift of power from politicians concerned with
particularistic goals to those with a universalistic outlook. Specifically, in presidential
democracies like Brazil, presidents are the main players in the political system who have
a clear incentive to abandon clientelistic practices. Not only are they more sensitive to
the costs of maintaining the localistic networks of brokers on the ground necessary to
make clientelism work, their position as national leaders – accountable to the majority of
voters, including both welfare recipients and the taxpayers that fund the system – pushes
them to design centralised policies that can be seen as effective and fair by most voters.
In this dissertation, I also discuss how presidents’ ability to accomplish their
universalistic goals will be affected by the institutional incentives that shape the party
structure.
Clientelism is a distributive strategy that exists throughout the world, and in both
developed and developing countries. It is at its core a political exchange: a patron – i.e.
the politician – provides goods or access to services to a client – usually a voter – in
exchange for political support. In rational models of electoral behaviour, politicians
strategically plan government spending to maximise their chances of retaining office.1
Models of clientelism are similar – patrons and clients are rational actors seeking a
mutually beneficial arrangement. What sets clientelism apart from what most would
consider the normal responsiveness of politicians to the demands of voters for income
redistribution is its conditional character: in clientelistic exchanges, the access to goods
or services by citizens is conditional on personal political support or votes to specific
politicians. Consider some examples.
In Venezuela, the government has for decades used its enormous oil revenues to
provide free housing to the poor. Under President Hugo Chávez’s misiones programme,
hundreds of thousands of homeless people have been assigned government-built
apartments at the height of the commodities super-cycle of the 2000s. As Francisco Toro
explains, ‘[t]he catch is that the apartments never really become yours. All units are
‘communal property’ and the people who live in them cannot sell, rent, sublet or divide
1Schlesinger (1966); Mayhew (1974); Meltzer and Richard (1981).
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them. With no clear title and often no paperwork of any kind to prove their right to
remain, residents here live at the community’s pleasure.’2 Penfold-Becerra study of the
misiones describes how community leaders actively monitor residents’ statements and
relationships in order to gauge their political allegiance and use the ambiguous
legislation governing the right to social housing to punish those they might consider too
close to opposition politicians.3
In the deprived London borough of Tower Hamlets, just a half-hour’s walk away
from the London School of Economics campus, mayor Lutfur Rahman used £3.6 million
from the government’s social budget to create a Mayor’s Fund designed to support local
charities and individuals in need.4 Rahman’s electoral use of the fund came under close
scrutiny in 2014, when an investigation ordered by the High Court found that grants
were strategically targeted at organisations and individuals that had supported Mr.
Rahman’s political campaign. In a decision filled with descriptions of flagrant corruption
reminiscent of 19th century rotten boroughs, the court found that in Tower Hamlets
‘considerable money was paid to organisations (including media organisations)
operating within [Rahman’s ethnic] community by way of grants, with the corrupt
intention that those who belonged to or benefited from those organisations would be
induced to vote for him and for [his party]’.5 The Queen’s Bench Division eventually
impeached Rahman for illegally using public funds to reward his political supporters.
In order to combat rising poverty in Mexico during the 1980s Latin American debt
crisis, President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) established the Programa Nacional de
Solidariedad6 (or Pronasol). It provided funds directly to municipalities based on
applications by local organisations. To run Pronasol, Mexico’s central government asked
community organisations in each municipality to submit proposals to a panel that would,
in turn, choose which cities and states would receive funds. Díaz-Cayeros and his
co-authors show that municipalities governed by the opposition were much less likely to
receive Pronasol funds regardless of the levels of poverty they exhibited.7
As part of her 2008 campaign for the mayoralty of Campos dos Goytacazes, an oil-rich
municipality in the southeast of Brazil, candidate Rosinha Garotinho promised voters that
she would recreate the Cheque Cidadão (Citizen’s Cheque), a conditional cash transfer
2Francisco Toro. Free Homes, Gracias Chávez. The New York Times, 24 Jan 2012.
3Penfold-Becerra (2005).
4Ware (2014).
5Richard Mawrey QC. In the Matter of the Representation of the People Act 1983 and the Matter of a
Mayoral Election for the London Borough of Tower Hamlets. Technical Report M/350/14, The High Court
of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, 2015, p. 43.
6National Programme of Solidarity.
7Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni (2012).
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(CCT) programme that her husband had first established as governor of the state of Rio
de Janeiro in 1998, but that had later been scrapped away amid allegations of corruption.
In campaign events, she and her daughter (who was running for a seat in the federal lower
House) distributed ATM-style cards to voters and promised that, if they were elected,
cardholders would be able to use them to make monthly withdraws of 100 reais8 – if they
were elected.9 The courts later invalidated Rosinha Garotinho’s candidacy on the grounds
that this and other similar initiatives implied a promise to reward political supporters and
violated legal requirements of impartiality and transparency for government policy.10
Similar situations are well-documented in countries as diverse as Italy,11 India,12
Austria,13 Mexico,14 Argentina,15 the Philippines,16 Sierra Leone,17 Tunisia,18
Colombia,19 the United States,20 Sweden,21 Paraguay,22 and many others. All share a
common feature: in all these cases, citizens’ ability to access public funds or benefits is
primarily conditional. To gain access, a citizen (i.e., the client) is required to support a
particular person or political group (the patron or patrons). Citizens can still live in these
boroughs, cities, districts, states and countries without supporting the patrons who
preside over them, but this is a costly proposition. For again, loyal clients – and only
loyal clients – are rewarded with services and benefits. The patrons make sure of that.
In one form or another, clientelism is a defining feature of the relationship between
voters and their political representatives in many countries. It has persisted for decades
in some communities and even shaped citizens’ views of what authority and government
look like.23 Yet in some places new social policies have disrupted this logic through the
creation of enforceable rules about who is entitled to which government benefits, while at
the same time making sure these regulations are designed to favour the poor irrespective
8Roughly £29 in 2015.
9Polícia Apura uso Eleitoreiro de Programa para Beneficiar Garotinho e sua Filha Clarissa. O Globo,
28 Sep 2010.
10Justiça Eleitoral cassa mandato de Rosinha Garotinho, prefeita de Campos (RJ). UOL Noticias, 16 Jul
2015.
11Tarrow (1967); Chubb (1982).
12Weiner (1967).
13Treib (2012).
14Cornelius, Craig and Fox (1994); Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni (2012).
15Auyero (2001); Weitz-Shapiro (2014).
16Landé (1965).
17Clapham (1982).
18King (2003).
19Schmidt (1980).
20Camp, Dixit and Stokes (2014).
21Dahlberg and Johansson (2002).
22Finan and Schechter (2012).
23For clientelism as a macro-sociological phenomenon, see Banfield (1967); Bendix (1976) and
De Swaan (1988).
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of their political affiliation. This is an important change that de-personalises income
distribution and improves systems of democratic accountability.
Take the Mexican programme known today as Prospera. Previously named Progresa
(from 1997 to 2002) and Oportunidades (from 2002 to 2014), Prospera provides
monthly cash payments to Mexican citizens whose earnings fall below a certain
pre-determined level. To make this system work, designers did not just transfer money to
local governments and then let them hand-pick beneficiaries according to their
definitions of who needs government support. Instead, they created a lengthy and
complex set of rules. These rules define what counts as income. They set forth income
thresholds. They address the kinds of measurement problems that can arise in economies
where most workers are employed informally and thus do not receive regular payslips.
The rules also established and empowered a new federal bureaucracy staffed with agents
whose job is to objectively assess each Mexican applicant’s economic conditions and to
process his or her application accordingly. The Mexican programme that set forth all of
these rules was both an economic and a political success. No wonder other countries
have tried to copy it.24 Prospera has been credited with helping lift millions out of
extreme poverty, increasing health standards and improving school enrolment25. It also
reconfigured Mexican politics, empowering the presidents and the technocrats who
brought the programme into existence.26
Rules-based social programmes like Prospera are not an entirely new phenomenon.
Britain and the United States – two societies that pioneered the extension of voting rights
to the majority of their adult male populations in the 19th century – are also well-known
to historians as early examples of the distribution of public resources through clientelistic
networks. Indeed, clientelism in these societies existed decades before the emergence of
the modern welfare state. In New York in the 1930s, for instance, party officials
routinely screened applicants for the New Deal’s Civil Works Administration jobs
programme for their party affiliations.27 Similarly, in Victorian Britain it was common
for business owners to hire and fire selected workers in concert with local party officials
in order to boost their preferred candidates’ chances to gain a seat in Parliament.28 In
most countries of continental Western Europe, early public bureaucracies were
dominated by powerful party machines that allocated jobs in exchange for political
24Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni (2012).
25Fernald, Gertler and Neufeld (2009).
26See Chapter Five and De La O (2001). Cf. Imai, King and Rivera (2016), who analyse Mexican data
using different model specifications and find no significant relationship between CCT spending and voting
behaviour.
27Erie (1988).
28Stokes (2011).
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support.29 Despite all the contemporary gloom and doom about falling social spending
and rising inequality in the developed world, no party brokers could dream of
intermediating access to food stamps in America, council housing in Britain, or public
sector jobs in Western Europe today in the way they did with the incipient anti-poverty
programmes that those countries had in the late 19th and early 20th century.30
Understanding why transitions from clientelism to programmatic policies take place
is important. Rules-based social programmes help countries target scarce resources
efficiently. They also enhance democratic accountability by eliminating personalism and
replacing it with objective regulations. Precisely because these policies’ results are so
encouraging, it is important to understand why politicians enact them – but also why,
even in success stories like Mexico, these policies have not driven clientelism completely
out of existence.
Yet we lack a systematic theory addressing how societies overcome clientelism: Why
do politicians relinquish the use of discretionary powers to coerce voters into supporting
them? Why is it that – even in societies that enact successful rules-based social policies
that make political favouritism harder – so much of the government’s budget often still
goes towards highly discretionary social spending? Why is it that despite the apparent
electoral success of politicians who championed successful programmatic distributive
programmes in countries otherwise plagued by clientelism, a significant number of
elected representatives still cling to the old ways and attempt to shift funding towards
clientelistic policies, instead of emulating the apparently proven electoral strategy of
supporting rules-based income distribution? These are some of the central questions I
address in this dissertation.
My theory calls attention to the divergent incentives that lead some politicians to
invest in traditional clientelistic networks and others to favour their dismantlement.
Specifically, I identify two major and interrelated differences between the incentives
faced by presidents on the one side and legislators and local officials on the other. I
propose that these divergent incentives are present in most if not all presidential
democracies, albeit in some cases they can be mitigated by other factors relating to party
structure and electoral rules. When taken in combination, they push presidents away
from clientelism while still giving ample reason for legislators and local officials to
invest in those arrangements.
The first reason has to do with presidents’ usual role in the political system. Like
in the US, Latin American presidents are placed in a position in which they are held
29On patronage Western Europe, see Gottschall et al. (2015).
30The parallel between the machine politics of America in the 19th century and what contemporary social
scientists call ‘clientelism’ was originally proposed by Scott (1969).
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responsible by voters for the general effectiveness of public policies. When the economy
does not perform well, voters blame the chief executive. When poverty and inequality go
up, presidents are first and foremost held responsible.31 As a result, presidents have little
incentive to invest scarce public resources into inefficient clientelistic networks that are
managed mostly to the benefit of legislators and local officials. Instead, they will choose
more efficient forms of redistribution.
The second reason has to do with the costs for politicians of maintaining clientelistic
networks. To build a reliable network of clients, politicians need access to public funds
that they can dispense at their discretion, rewarding loyal clients and punishing detractors
as they see fit. To that end, incumbents who plan on using clientelistic strategies invest
considerable political capital in writing loose regulations that give them the power to
choose who benefits from government programmes and when benefits can be withdrawn.
Because there are costs in securing the resources necessary for clientelistic networks
to operate, their members must find ways to solve two commitment problems. They must
ensure that voters keep their end of the bargain and do not simply take clientelistic benefits
and use the secrecy of the ballot box to ignore their promise to support a patron and vote
for someone else.32 Additionally, they must signal to their clients that they will not use
the discretionary powers that enable clientelism to exist to stop clients’ privileged access
to public resources once the election is over.
The answer to both types of commitment problem is that patrons and clients rely on
long-term interactions mediated by so-called brokers. Brokers are individuals who work
in communities (in which they often live) to create personal relationships with voters
and maintain a clientelistic network alive. The repeated interactions that brokers have
with each individual voter create the conditions for credible commitments to emerge.
Clientelism is thus a personalistic relationship.33
The problem is that the broker-based system creates two inefficiencies that make it
more attractive to politicians with careers linked to the parochial needs of small, local
groups than to more universalistic politicians such as presidents. First, each new broker
added to the network will increase the number of voters the machine can reach by a
constant amount because brokers must establish a personal connection with each voter.
By contrast, programmatic distributive strategies that are not mediated by brokers – such
31Greenstein (1978); Lowi (1986); Moe (1985). For a discussion of how this argument applies to
policymaking in Latin American multiparty presidential systems, see Mello and Spektor (Forthcoming).
32This assumes that secret voting laws exist and are enforced.
33As I discuss in Chapter 2, the commitment problem created by the secret ballot has been exhaustively
discussed in the literature, especially since the publication of a seminal article on the topic by Stokes (2005).
In that piece, Stokes acknowledges both commitment problems, but chooses to focus only on the possibility
of clients cheating politicians.
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as building a reputation or a ‘brand’ – may involve increasing returns to scale, with high
upfront investments but constant or even declining fixed costs. Second, as Stokes and
coauthors demonstrate, brokers’ dependency on local communities often leads them to
spend more on benefits to loyal supporters than what would be necessary to secure a win
for the patron.34 This principal-agent problem means that the brokers’ system is inherently
inefficient (from the point of view of patrons) and that the cost of this ‘leakage’ increases
as the number of clients goes up.
The inevitable conclusion is that clientelistic networks do not scale well. They are
more effective when run at the local level.35 As such, they are a logical choice for
politicians who need a limited number of supporters to win an election, but using them
for presidential contests would require a costly coordination effort. As I demonstrate in
the following chapters, Brazil’s large and diverse electorate, combined with its weak
party system, would simply make it too expensive for presidents to run such a
nation-wide clientelistic effort.
These two differences between presidents on one side and legislators and local officials
on the other will reinforce each other and the inevitable conclusion is that relinquishing
clientelism makes a lot of sense for the former, while the latter group will continue to
profit from personalistic distribution. As I discuss in latter chapters, presidents care both
about electoral goals and about their legacies. When it comes to designing social policies,
creating rules-based programmes will help them in both arenas. It will be a major part of
how they achieve success in office and leave a legacy in poor and unequal societies, but
also of how they secure reelection and the election of their successors.36
President’s incentive to abandon clientelism is influenced still by two other variables:
the structure of the party system and the rules of the electoral system. As I discuss in the
following chapters, Brazil’s open-list proportional voting rules, combined with a number
of laws that further undermines party structures and creates incentives for politicians to
cultivate a personal vote (rather than cooperating with party colleagues) weaken the
bonds between presidents and party officials on the ground. It is, thus, not uncommon in
Brazil for legislators to support a presidential candidate of a rival party for reasons that
only have to do with local politics. By weakening presidents’ connections to parties,
Brazil’s political system also drives presidents towards a universalistic path. Without
strong links to local politics, presidents will focus on designing social policies that can
34Stokes et al. (2013), Chapter 3.
35In Chapter Four I discuss in detail how broker-based clientelistic networks function in Brazil and how
they are intimately connected with local politics.
36I discuss why reelection and the election of their successors is an important concern for Latin American
presidents in Chapter Two.
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be seen as effective and fair by a diverse, national electorate that includes both
beneficiaries of government programmes and those that pay the taxes that fund them.
In countries where political institutions link presidents much more closely to a strong
party system, presidents will face a dilemma. Their incentives to establish programmatic
and universalistic social policies that cater to a national electorate will conflict with their
loyalty to a party oligarchy heavily dependent on the use of clientelistic practices to
maintain their standing through a domination of local politics. I explore one such case in
my discussion of Argentina, in Chapter Five.
The dependent variable of the dissertation
Understanding the rise and fall of clientelism is an ambitious project and this thesis
discusses many of the fundamental questions that arise in the existing literature.
However, it is important to be clear about the issues related to clientelism and
distributive policies that I do not discuss. I am more interested in the rise of rules-based
alternatives to clientelism, for example, than in understanding how clientelistic
arrangements get started in the first place.
The political origins of clientelism have already been well-explored by other authors.
James Scott, for instance, famously argued that clientelistic practices are institutional
leftovers of pre-modern politics and thrive in places where poverty and inequality in
access to public services are widespread.37 A second influential argument associates the
rise of clientelism with the institutional and cultural legacies of authoritarianism and
with dictatorial regimes’ need to establish networks that can distribute patronage in
exchange for continued loyalty.38
In Brazil, the historical origins of clientelism are the subject of a particularly
well-developed literature. An influential account by Raymundo Faoro highlights the role
of the country’s colonial history in shaping the formation of clientelistic networks. His
analysis goes all the way back to the formation of the Portuguese state in the 12th
century. Faced with constant conflicts with powerful Moorish enemies to the south and
having to occasionally fend off their more powerful Castilian neighbours to the east, the
Medieval Portuguese nobility rapidly built a centralised state around the figure of the
king in Lisbon. Vestiges of feudalism were swiped away in the name of the survival of
the state and the continuation of the Reconquista much more quickly and decisively than
in other medieval European states. To make the system work, the kings in Lisbon were
highly dependent on networks of patronage headed by powerful nobles to create, gather,
37Scott (1972); Scott (1977).
38Fox (1994); van de Walle (2003); Blaydes (2011).
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and distribute rents. The power of nobles in turn did not derive from land ownership as
much as it did for their counterparts in places like France or Britain. Instead, they relied
on privileged access to the centralised state and the privileges that their connections
afforded, such as trade monopolies and positions in the civil service for relatives and
clients. Such a system was consolidated and thrived during the economic boom that
Portugal experienced in the 15th and 16th centuries, when many new sources of revenues
and trade opportunities presented themselves, thus enabling monarchs to build vast
networks of patronage and consolidate a stable polity.39
Faoro argues that such a system inevitably shaped the institutions of colonial Brazil,
and later of the independent country. It enabled the rise of an elite that saw the state as an
institution for dispensing favours and resources. Access to the state was thus most
important way politicians had to assure loyalty and govern.40 According to this
interpretation, success in politics does not result from engaging in debates over ideas or
world views in the name of the voters, but rather from successfully capturing a share of
the government’s budget for oneself and one’s clients is widespread in much of Latin
America, albeit poorly theorised.
Other interpretations have highlighted the importance of a legacy of economic
inequality as the main factor that has enabled a privileged elite to capture the state.
Authors such as Victor Nunes Leal and Richard Graham have stressed how important the
co-optation of local elites has been for the Brazilian central government to maintain
stability and avoid the fragmentation and infighting that characterised most of the former
Spanish colonies. In this interpretation, local power-brokers benefit from keeping the
central state weak and alienated from the social policy arena. By doing so they can keep
the monopoly over loyalties and remain the only channel between the poor and any
public resources.41
For the purposes of this work it suffices to say that, wherever it exists, clientelism is
deeply ingrained in the political culture. Further research might be able to better explain
the historical conditions that led to the rise of some particular forms of clientelistic
relationships or indeed how they affected the formation of political culture in Brazil and
how comparable this process is to other countries’ experiences. My work here deals
explicitly with why some politicians continue to use this strategy and why others choose
to abandon it.
39Faoro (1958). Cf. Fragoso (2010), who offers a critique of Faoro’s. Fragoso’s argument is that Faoro
lacks proper archival investigation about Portugal’s (and Brazil’s) state formation.
40Idem. See also Schwartzman (1970), Carvalho (1980), and Pang (1989).
41Leal (1948); Graham (1990). See also Abrucio (1998).
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Separating clientelism from other social phenomena
In the beginning of this chapter I defined clientelism as a conditional exchange of goods
or services for political support between a voter and a politician. At first sight this does
not appear to be a complicated or controversial definition, and indeed much of the recent
literature on the topic uses it.42 Yet, before I move forward, I must explore the relationship
between this definition of clientelism and some related phenomena that are also discussed
in the clientelism literature.
One idea that often is associated with clientelism is that of patronage. It is hard to
disentangle these two concepts, partly because many authors have used them
interchangeably, but also because we can identify both clients and patrons in clientelistic
relationships. Here I shall also follow what appears to be an emerging convention in the
literature and define patronage as the exchange of public sector jobs for political
support.43
A second important concept related to clientelism is vote buying. I reserve this term
to talk about the short-term exchange of small sums of money or goods for a vote
immediately before an election. This way we can think of vote buying and patronage as
particular forms of clientelism. Nevertheless, it is occasionally useful to theorise about
them separately. Vote buying, for instance, is now illegal in most democracies, and it is
therefore usually conducted covertly and not (directly) with the use of public funds.44 It
also does not imply a long-term relationship between the parties involved. For example,
in Brazil right before the 2014 general election, investigative journalists were able to
identify meeting points in small towns where locals knew they could to go to in order to
meet brokers and sell their votes on the day before the election. Those interviewed by
reporters stated they had no previous relationship with the brokers or with the politicians
they represented. Instead, these voters would just go to a predetermined part of town and
there they would bargain with whichever party broker that would show up.45
In the American politics literature it is also common to see references to pork-barrel
distribution. This refers to geographically concentrated allocation of resources or benefits
as a tool for politicians to reward loyal constituencies at the expense of the rest of the
country.46 Pork-barrel does not necessarily entail clientelism in the sense that I use here
42Stokes et al. (2013); Weitz-Shapiro (2014). Weitz-Shapiro correctly points out that this is not a
definition of clientelism per se, but of the practice of clientelism. Yet, it remains useful for my purposes
here as the object of this study is in essence the institutionalisation of this practice.
43Chubb (1982); Geddes (1996); Gordin (2003); Folke, Hirano and Snyder (2011).
44I shall elaborate on how clientelistic networks in Brazil gain access to public funds that are later
employed in vote buying schemes in Chapter Four.
45Eleitores de Roraima Esperam Compra de Votos na Madrugada. O Estado de São Paulo, 04 Oct 2014.
46Bickers and Stein (1996).
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because it is not necessarily conditional on political support by the voters that directly
or indirectly benefit from it. Indeed, some electoral systems encourage accountability to
small geographic constituencies and politicians will see themselves as representatives of
that region that are supposed to fight for resources for those who live there. This happens
regardless of how inefficient this may be when one considers the country as a whole.47
It might be the case, however, that regional funds are cleverly managed in a way that
excludes non-supporters in that region. The literature on Pronasol in Mexico usually
makes this case and if we accept this interpretation the programme is both an example of
pork-barrelling and clientelism.48
Brazil’s open-list proportional representation system is highly conductive to pork
barrelling. Several candidates of the same party compete in large state-wide districts and
the amount of votes that each individual receives defines his or her position on the party
list. Because candidates are themselves responsible for their position on the list, they end
up campaigning in isolation from their party colleagues. Barry Ames has argued that the
most important determinant of re-election for Brazilian legislators is the number of
budgetary amendments for specific localities. He argues that it makes sense for
legislators in the Brazilian electoral system to build a geographically concentrated
following of loyal voters that is in order to more efficiently target rewards and
punishment.49 I will return to the issue of in chapters Two and Three.
Another practice often associated with clientelism is constituency service. Here I use
the term to refer to the individualised provision of guidance by politicians to their
constituents on the workings of government bureaucracies and on how to access to
government services. In theory, constituency service could be open to anyone in need of
advice and does not necessarily imply conditionality. Politicians can engage in such
activities in order to get name recognition and gratitude from voters, especially in
electoral systems that encourage politicians to cultivate a personal vote.50 This kind of
behaviour is not necessarily optimal. The logic is evident in a popular saying in Brazil
that politicians ‘create problems in order to sell the solutions’, meaning that bureaucratic
inefficiencies can be a deliberate result of politicians’ constituency service strategies.
Indeed, in many contexts constituency service is closely associated with clientelism.
In his ethnography of Argentine clientelistic networks, Javier Auyero shows how party
brokers that work doing constituency service also collect vital information on voters’
needs and how this information later becomes important for the distribution of clientelistic
47Shugart (1999).
48Molinar and Weldon (1994).
49Ames (1995a). See also Pereira and Rennó (2003) for a similar position. Cf. Samuels (1999).
50Mayhew (1974); Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987).
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benefits. By keeping tight control of access to public services like schools and hospitals,
party brokers learn in which households there are people with chronic diseases or which
children dropped out of school and might need an apprenticeship. Such information is
valuable for politicians’ strategies of targeting access to public services and benefits to
reward supporters and punish detractors.51 Some of the qualitative evidence I rely on in
subsequent chapters also comes from interviews conducted in political organisations that
offer a mix of constituency service and clientelism in Brazil.
What all these practices have in common is that they are all forms of income
redistribution in which resources are distributed in ways that serve a political imperative
rather than to enhance a community’s economic or social welfare. James Robinson and
Thierry Verdier argue that these phenomena are forms of ‘inefficient redistribution’
because they are not designed to improve welfare – and may actually decrease it.52 In
some contexts, these practices might be completely distinct from each other. There
might also be different legislative frameworks in each jurisdiction concerning the extent
to which they are ilegal and thus how they relate to other social phenomena such as
organised crime, coercion, and violence. Overall, it is important to distinguish
clientelism from other forms of distributive inefficiencies because of its combination of
targeting and conditionality. When it is possible for decision makers to target specific
voters and condition their access to state resources to political loyalty we will have
distinct implications for accountability and the quality of governance.
Three theories about the demise of clientelism
My research departs from much of the current thinking about why clientelism has
dwindled in some places while in others it is still a prevalent form of connection between
voters and politicians. This section presents three of the most compelling existing
theories and shows how, in all three cases, they provide an incomplete or potentially
misleading picture.
Clientelism as a legacy of authoritarianism
One argument that frequently arises in the study of clientelism is that this phenomenon is
directly connected to authoritarianism. Indeed, it is worth mentioning that the
overwhelming majority of the countries where clientelism is widespread today have had
non-democratic forms of government for long periods of their postwar history.53 Perhaps
51Auyero (2001).
52Robinson and Verdier (2013).
53Italy is perhaps the most notable exception.
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the best way to understand why democracy is such a powerful explanatory variable is to
briefly examine what we know about the drivers of distributive policies in
non-democracies. Most theories of distribution in dictatorships start from the idea that
groups in power design social policies in order to maximise their own welfare, while at
the same time trying to avoid being ousted by other groups. To stay in power, they need
to gain the support of a sufficiently powerful coalition of groups – a ‘selectorate’. Such
an alliance is likely to be very small compared to the one put together by a leader subject
to democratic procedures.54 Nonetheless, sometimes the determinants of distribution in
dictatorships and democracies might be similar. For instance, Robert Bates proposed in
his study of agricultural policies in Africa that groups that could more easily solve
collective action problems would be favoured by distributive policies. This might be so
because they could represent a credible threat to the dictator or because they could be
more easily mobilised in competitive elections.55
Nevertheless, other channels of distribution might be significantly different
depending on regime type, and some of these forces might even push for more
egalitarian distribution. Ricardo Barros and his co-authors have hypothesised that a big
factor contributing to the decline in inequality in Brazil since the consolidation of
democracy has been increased investment in public education.56 Similarly, James Scott
has argued that the creation of a large scale conditional cash transfer programme in
Mexico is explained by the demise of the rural-based PRI and the rise in influence of
urban unions in an open democratic system.57 Candelaria Garay indicated that the rise in
rules-based social spending in Brazil and in other parts of Latin America has been a
consequence of the turn towards democracy and political competition in much of the
region.58
The implication here is that clientelistic forms of association are reminiscent of
authoritarian periods when distribution favoured groups with privileged access to the
state. Even when the regime collapses, politicians might find it hard to rapidly shift
spending from these networks and towards policies that either favour the poorest – such
as cash transfer programmes – or that are universal, such as national education or
healthcare systems. Indeed, Barros and his coauthors concede that, despite the recent
focus on either universalistic or targeted social policies, most of Brazil’s social spending
is still directed towards policies that tend to favour historically powerful groups such as
54Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005). See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Blaydes (2011).
55Bates (1981).
56Barros et al. (2010).
57Scott (2008).
58Garay (2010).
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urban formal sector workers. They add that increased spending in pro-poor or universal
social policies over the last decades has been mostly payed for by new taxation rather
than by reductions on less efficient spending (such as clientelistic programmes). Over
time, however, their analysis implies that these authoritarian legacies would become less
and less important in the face of the competitive electoral pressures of democracy.
It is probably unwise in the face of current evidence to argue that there is no
connection at all between regime type and the nature of distributive policies,59 but even if
we acknowledge that this is part of the story, there are a number of empirical puzzles
surrounding the political economy of distribution that are still left unanswered by those
theories. First, even if one grants that clientelism might be a legacy of authoritarian
institutions of the past, there has been significant variation in the degree to which new
democratically elected governments have succeeded in, or even attempted to dismantle
the clientelistic policies they inherited. For example, the literature on clientelism in
Eastern Europe suggests that some post-Communist countries such as the Baltic states
have made much more rapid progress towards programmatic distribution than others that
became democracies roughly at the same time.60 Similarly, in Latin America one could
consider how countries that have ditched military dictatorships in the mid 1980s, such as
Chile and Argentina, have had such divergent paths when it comes to addressing
clientelism.61
Second, when we turn to large-n studies there is a significant problem of identification
in this literature. Democracy itself is highly correlated with other variables that appear
to affect levels of clientelism as well. For example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
famously claimed that the open institutions of democracy have a positive causal effect on
long-term economic growth.62 Their findings put in perspective any claim of causality
between democracy and policy outcomes in such cross-country studies since we are left
wondering whether what the models are identifying is the effect of democracy itself or of
one of the many things with which it is correlated, such as economic growth.
Like most of the literature, I too accept that it is likely that democracy has an effect
on the quality of social policy, however, I remain interested in understanding the
variation that exists between democracies and why some politicians appear to be eager to
reform social policies while others remain attached to the ‘old ways’ long after
democratic regimes have been established. I will return to this. For now, the important
59Cf. Mulligan, Gil and Sala i Martin (2004) and Ross (2006). These authors find no connection between
regime type and the volume of income distribution in a country. However, they do not look at clientelism
specifically.
60Cook (2014).
61Lopez-Calva and Lustig (2010).
62Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001).
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point is that democracies vary, as do non-democracies.
Economic growth as a solution to clientelism
A second theory on the reasons for the demise of clientelism is that this phenomenon
exists in societies where voters are poor. Because clientelism is a by-product of poverty,
proponents of this theory argue that it tends to disappear as citizens become wealthier
and can afford to rebel against politicians that condition public benefits on electoral
support. This argument was first proposed by modernisation theorists, such as Seymour
Martin Lipset, who first argued that economic growth would bring about the end of these
practices.63
There is no doubt that it is costlier for poorer voters to rebel against politicians with
discretionary power to allocate government spending as they please. The importance of
poverty as an explanatory factor was clear in many of the interviews I conducted for this
dissertation. A woman I approached leaving a campaign office in Rio de Janeiro during
the 2014 general elections lashed out at me when I asked why she went there to get an
inhaler for her son: ‘Do you think I like coming here to ask for favours from these crooks?
I could wait in line for four hours at the community health centre (posto de saúde) up in
Cocotá and they might not even have it. I could pay 42 reais [for the inhaler] at the
drugstore. Or I can come here. Why do you think I come here, sir?’
As compelling as it might seem there are at least two problems with the view that
poverty alone can account for the survival of clientelism. Just like in the case of the
relationship between clientelism and authoritarianism, the objections I raise here have
to do with explaining variation. The first problem is that significant economic growth
over the past century has happened in democracies where clientelism has remained a
powerful force in national politics. Take the Mediterranean European states that have been
traditional examples of clientelistic political systems. Italy’s GDP has multiplied thirteen-
fold since 1945, with much of the growth happening in the poor south. Yet clientelism has
remained an important feature of politics. The same is true of other southern European
states. Portugal’s GDP has increased 10 times since the end of World War II and Greece’s
has been multiplied by twenty-five in the same period. Indeed, in case of Greece the
continued relevance of clientelism in political life despite significant growth is so striking
that analysts have proposed that the opposite connection might be more plausible: a richer
state has meant that personalistic practices have thrived because more resources were
available for politicians to distribute through clientelistic networks.64 Economic growth,
63Lipset (1959). See also Moore (1966).
64Papacostas (2001).
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by itself, does not appear to have provided a way out of clientelism in these countries.
At the same time, some very poor countries have had some success in creating more
programmatic forms of social policy. In this dissertation, I will endeavour to show readers
that social policy has become significantly less personalistic in Brazil – a country which
in 2014 had a per capita income that was a little over half that of Greece’s. But such
innovations have not by any means been confined to fast growing, ‘emerging’ economies.
In some of the poorest countries of the world like Namibia and Kenya, where social
protection has often only covered small minorities of the population or been delivered
thorough ethnicity-based networks, governments have made significant progress in the
implementation of country-wide, rules-based programmes based on the conditional cash
transfer model.65
The rise of leftist parties breaks clientelistic links
A third important class of explanations for the demise of clientelistic distributive policies
attributes the creation of rules-based social programmes to the rise of leftist parties.66
The insight here is a compelling one: in a country where poverty and inequality are high,
politicians proposing distributive mechanisms that are more efficient at reaching the poor
– a platform historically associated with leftist parties – will thrive. However, if for
historical or political reasons there are no parties that can credibly commit to a
traditional left-wing programme of pro-poor income redistribution, programmatic social
policies will not emerge. Once this barrier is crossed, though, rules-based social
assistance will be the natural result of democratic competition for the votes of the poor
and the lower middle classes.
This theory draws much of its explanatory power from a literature about the rise of the
welfare state in advanced economies that links variation in types of social assistance to the
historical balance of power among the different income groups.67 Huber and Stephens,
for example, argue that different ideologies give rise to diverse views on the role of labour
and, consequently, of the services governments should provide.68
The authors have later extend the theory to explain the peculiarities of the evolution
of welfare policies in Latin America. They point out that Latin American late capitalism
65Ferguson (2015). For a discussion of traditional distribution networks in Africa, see Baldwin (2015).
66It could be argued that this explanation incorporates the one above that says that the rise of
programmatic social policies is the result of democratisation. The works I look at in this subsection argue
that it is not only the democratic process that creates the conditions for the rise of rules-based programmes.
Instead, it is when democracies have genuine left-wing movements that organise and mobilise the poor and
that have a real chance winning power that politicians abandon clientelism.
67Korpi (1978); Stephens (1979); Esping-Andersen (1990); Huber and Stephens (2001).
68Huber and Stephens (2001).
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was qualitatively different from what existed in Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries
when labour movements flourished and successfully pushed for a big role for the state
in income distribution. When Latin American societies joined the capitalist system, their
overwhelmingly rural societies had much higher levels of inequality than the ones in the
North. Add to that a much unequal distribution of land, politically powerful landowners,
and a largely informal urban economy. The result, according to the authors, was that Latin
American democracies were markedly unstable and the regions’ political parties did not
develop the mobilisation capabilities that their European and US counterparts had, nor
did they manage to develop constituencies around specific programmatic platforms, such
as the reduction of inequality or the provision of universal public services.69
More recently, Jennifer Pribble took the analysis further by examining the different
ways in which the region’s leftist parties have developed strategies to connect with their
bases after the wave of democratisation that Latin America experienced in the 1980s.
She finds that the different characters of political parties help us explain why some
countries in the region, like Chile and Uruguay, moved more successfully towards
universalist mechanisms for distribution. She argues that because Chile and Uruguay
managed to establish more competitive and stable electoral systems, more representative
left-wing parties emerged as powerful political forces favouring universalist social
policies. On the other hand, in Argentina and Venezuela, the political conditions for the
rise of programmatic leftist parties were less favourable and so programmatic policies
are less likely to develop.70
The idea that the left would represent a programmatic counterweight to more
clientelistic forces provides a useful refinement of the argument that voter demand is a
sufficient condition for redistribution to occur by emphasising the need for institutions
that allow the poor to organise and push for comprehensive reform. But is the rise of the
left really the main factor explaining the nature of distributive policy reforms in Brazil
and in other developing countries?
Here is why I am sceptical. First of all, there is no reason why parties that provide an
opportunity for the mobilisation of the poor will not themselves resort to clientelism
once in power. Historical experience has supported such skepticism. In early
20th-century Spain the populist Radical Republican Party built a strong support base
around the neglected urban poor and managed to control the government of Barcelona
for many years by relying on a mixture of vote buying, ‘constituency service’, Catalan
nationalism, and intimidation.71
69Huber and Stephens (2012).
70Pribble (2013).
71Blakeley (2001).
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Secondly, while the emergence of programmatic leftist parties that have a chance of
winning elections in some developing countries is certainly a sign of democratic
consolidation, these parties will not necessarily win with the votes of the poorest of
society. In Brazil, the centre-left Workers’ Party (PT) won its first presidential election in
2002, but not in a contest of the rich versus the poor. Rather, it was crucial for its victory
that a dissatisfied middle class – traditional beneficiaries of the existing welfare
institutions in the country – came to accept presidential candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva as a moderate politician who would not put economic stability at risk once in
office.72 Luiz Dulci, a senior strategist in the PT’s presidential campaign of 2001,
recognised this from the beginning. In my interview with him, Dulci admitted that his
party had than faced a dilemma: it had a decisively middle class support base while it
was proposing a left of centre agenda that would benefit a completely different social
group. He argued that this tension was important for the decision to move forward with a
radical expansion of Bolsa Família: ‘You have to understand that [before the 2001
victory] we were increasing our vote share in the southeast [of the country] in every
election. But we knew that one of our weak spots was in the [poor states of the] north
and northeast. There you have the poorest people in the country. And who were they
voting for? The PFL.73 And it had been like that for 500 years! And it still is when you
look at those who are the governors and the mayors there – except for Bahia where we
made a lot of progress. When we finally went into government and could implement our
policies, we did better at the national level. These guys [i.e. the voters in the poorest
areas of Brazil] need to see who is bringing them results, they do not care about right or
left. They could not care less about that. It is people like you and me who are into those
things.’74 The point here is that left-wing parties in the developing world at first appeal to
the urban middle classes, not necessarily to the rural poor, who are often the target of
72Almeida (2006).
73PFL stands for Partido da Frente Liberal, or the Liberal Front Party, a now defunct centre-right outfit
that was a junior party during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidency and that later supported José Serra,
Cardoso’s chosen candidate and Lula’s main opponent in the 2001 Presidential Election. PFL was formed
mainly by former supporters of the military dictatorship (1964-1985) that had later accepted the transition
towards civilian rule. It was a strong political force in the poor regions in the northeast of Brazil, where
critics have often pointed out its association with the traditional landed elite and with clientelistic practices
and vote buying.
74Interview with Luiz Dulci, São Paulo, 28 Nov 2014. Original in Portuguese: ‘Você tem que entender
que antes a gente estava ganhando apoio no Sudeste a cada eleição. Mas a gente sabia que era fraco no
Norte e Nordeste. Esses lugares são os mais pobres e em quem eles votam? Votaram no PFL. E foi assim
por 500 anos! E ainda é um pouco assim quando você olha para os governadores e prefeitos nesses lugares
– exceto talvez pela Bahia onde a gente fez muito progresso. Quando a gente finalmente chegou no governo
e pôde implementar as nossas políticas, a gente começou a ganhar mais apoio no país todo. Esses caras
precisam ver quem está entregando resultado, eles estão se lixando para direita ou esquerda. Não estão nem
ai para essas coisas. Só a gente está ligado nisso.’
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more clientelistic politicians. Their platforms are more likely to be about protecting
national industries and the privileges of formal workers then about the rural poor in the
informal economy. Transformative social policy reforms are not necessarily popular with
left-wing parties’ original base, as the Brazilian Workers’ Party found out when it came
to power.
Thirdly, this account sometimes overstates the relative power of left and centre-left
parties in the multiparty presidential systems of Latin America. Even when they appear
strong by, for example, gaining enough votes to claim the presidency, and even if they
decide to push for social policy reform, leftist parties cannot do everything they want.
Their power is limited by the rules of the pre-existing system and the need to
compromise with other large political forces represented in local offices and in
parliaments. Yet much of this literature takes it as a non-question whether left-wing
presidential candidates, if electorally successful, will be able to implement their favoured
‘pro-poor’ policies regardless of the fact that the rest of the political system does not
change overnight. Indeed, most of the analyses focusing on the role of the left highlight
the importance of the election of progressive presidents to the detriment of the role of
legislatures and local governments.75 But even if we grant a good level of party
discipline that allows presidents to exert substantial control over their supporters in
parliament – a highly unlikely proposition even in strong presidential systems – heads of
state are seldom lucky enough to be able to command a large majority of legislators from
their own parties in the proportional systems of Latin America. In Peru the Socialist
Party elected Ollanta Humala in 2011 with 51% of the popular vote, but the loose
coalition that supported his bid for national office won only 25% of seats in Parliament.
Brazil’s Workers’ Party managed to elect Dilma Rousseff in 2010 with 56% of the votes,
but elected only 16% of the members of the lower house of Congress.
Part of the problem as far as Latin American presidential systems are concerned, is
that the separation of powers matters more than most studies of left-wing parties in Latin
America admit. This in turn makes it harder to transplant explanations based on the
history of the European welfare state to that context. Presidential power is not absolute
and it is actively contested by legislators that do not have a direct stake in the success
of the government. Electing a president might just be the first round in the struggle of a
popular government to control policy outcomes. In fact, such governments face dilemmas
that become more important as legislative bodies grow stronger and political competition
becomes fiercer.
Theories that link party organisation and distributive patterns in Latin America miss
75Campello (2011); Pribble, op. cit.
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crucial aspects of legislators’ incentives even when analysing countries in which left
parties managed to muster sizeable majorities in parliament, as in Chile or Uruguay for
much of the 2000s. Party affiliation is surely an important variable affecting their
behaviour, but there is also much evidence of more specific interests of legislators when
crafting distributive policies. Some have proposed that – just as in the US and Britain –
there are strong incentives for ‘constituency service’ in the developing world, both on the
left and on the right.76 Other authors underline the broad incentives for the provision of
pork-barrel rewards or clientelistic goods to which legislators can individually take credit
and differentiate themselves from others, including party colleagues that compete in the
same districts. For example, Carey and Shugart develop a model that shows why some
political systems are able to create mechanisms that lower the importance of personal
reputation, thus reducing at the same time the share of budgets allocated to pork and
private distribution.77 Crisp and his coauthors provide the most comprehensive
examination of the issue for Latin American presidential systems. Their analysis
includes data from Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Venezuela
and suggests that locally oriented behaviour and a preference for particularistic benefits
are legislators’ usual response to increased political competition, even from members of
their own parties. The broad conclusion of their findings is that in most presidential
systems, legislators have strong incentives to think locally and support initiatives that
make them ‘stand out’ from the rest of the crowd. As the authors note, ‘the time deputies
spend on local, pork-oriented, legislation is time they cannot spend on national issues.’78
These analyses underline the broad incentives for the provision of pork-barrel rewards
or clientelistic goods to which legislators can individually take credit and differentiate
themselves from others, including party colleagues. Nothing suggests politicians in left-
wing parties will be less susceptible to these incentives than their colleagues in centrist
or right-wing outfits. As my analysis in the following chapters demonstrates, left-wing
legislators are rewarded by voters for engaging in exactly the same type of clientelistic
behaviour as their right-wing counterparts.
76For the general argument, see Parker (1986); Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1984) and Cain, Ferejohn
and Fiorina (1987). For a discussion of how it applies to the Brazilian political system see Mainwaring
(1991) and Ames (1995a). Cf. Figueiredo and Limongi (2002).
77Carey and Shugart (1995). Cf. Myerson (1993) who also explores the conditions under which
individual office seekers will favour narrow distribution of resources as opposed to universal distribution.
78Crisp et al. (2004). The citation is from p. 843.
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My theory of clientelism survival and demise
Why is clientelism a more attractive political strategy to groups of politicians in some
political contexts than in others? Why do politicians abandon it altogether in some
communities in favour of programmatic policies and in others it remains a stable
characteristic of social policies? The main argument I make is quite straightforward. I
propose that not all political actors benefit equally from a shift away from clientelism.
For politicians who essentially depend on the dynamics of local politics in order to be
elected – most notably legislators and local officials – clientelism will remain the optimal
strategy for the design of social spending. As a result, this appeal to clientelism will
survive even as societies get richer and the relatively poor becomes politically powerful.
Consequently, such politicians will only abandon these practices when facing enormous
pressure from more powerful actors with an interest in creating programmatic
distributive policies.
Indeed, I propose that – at least in presidential democracies – presidents will face
strong institutional incentives to fight for more rules-based forms of distribution and that
presidential power plays a key role in explaining this transformation. Progress towards a
more programmatic welfare state will happen when presidents gain the upper hand in the
design and implementation of social policy as well as on the budgetary process that
ensures that these new policies are well-funded. The emergence of large scale
programmatic anti-poverty policies requires, therefore, a change in the balance of power,
one that gives presidents political advantages and access to resources. When that
happens, rules-based policies will inevitably arise.
But why are the incentives for legislators and local officials so different from those of
presidents, even though both groups of actors remain concerned with electoral
outcomes? I propose two interrelated reasons for that. The first has to do with the nature
of presidents’ position in the political systems in Brazil and much of Latin America as
the sole elected officials bound to a national constituency. I argue that this push towards
national outreach sends presidents in the path of developing a coherent and centralised
response to social problems, while resisting the appeals of localised clientelistic
networks. The second incentive has to do with the costs imposed by the personalistic
nature of modern, broker-based clientelistic networks. I show why these costs are higher
for presidents than they are to legislators and local officials.
Presidents’ ability to act on these incentives will be, though, shaped by the very nature
of the political system. In societies where presidents’ connections to parties is weaker,
presidents will move more easily towards developing their universalistic-driven legacies.
When the connection is strong, however, presidents will have to balance these incentives
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with their parties’ desires to push for more clientelistic spending in order to maintain their
networks on the ground. However, as I elaborate in the next chapter, presidential systems’
fundamental rule of separating the political survival of chief executives’ from that of
legislators in their own parties makes so that all presidents will push against attempts
to tie their own political futures to the provincial logic of clientelistic networks. We will
examine these points in more detail below.
Legislators, local officials, and clientelism
Let us first look at the role played by legislators and local officials in designing and
implementing distributive policies in Brazil.79 Like their counterparts in the US and in
most Latin American countries, but unlike many of their Western European colleagues,
Brazilian legislators work under the shadow of a separately elected head of government.
Unlike in the United States, however, Brazilian legislators are elected in large
multi-member electoral districts and, in the case of the lower House, they compete
fiercely with their colleagues – including their party colleagues – in an open-list
proportional representation system.80 To succeed in their quest to retain political office,
candidates to Congress will have (a) to differentiate themselves from their
colleagues-turned-competitors and (b) to be able to claim credit for improving the lives
of a large enough subset of their constituents to place them in a good position on the
party list.
In the following chapters I will show that one of the many tools that incumbent
legislators have at their disposal to accomplish those goals is to maintain networks of
clients. Through these networks, legislators channel government social spending to
specific voters. In this sense, Brazil’s political system is a textbook case on the
cultivation of the personal vote given historical and institutional reasons which I will
explore more fully in Chapter Four.
Local officials are important here too because in this system they are the main allies
that legislators will have in order to effectively manage clientelistic networks. In Brazil,
mayors, aldermen – and to a lesser extent even some state governors – are heavily
dependent on the central government for financial resources. In return for the support
they get from members of Congress, they can offer the local knowledge and
79As noted above, I first develop this theory looking at the case of Brazil. Chapter Two will highlight the
theory’s comparative analytical potential. In Chapter Five I will provide empirical evidence from Argentina
and Mexico to corroborate this claim.
80On the dynamics of intra-party competition, see Figueiredo and Limongi (1999), especially Chapter
Two. On the consequences of Brazil’s open-list proportional representation for patronage and clientelism,
see Ames (1995b).
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infrastructure of brokers necessary to make successful clientelistic arrangements work in
the long term. I propose that local officials and legislators form the perfect partnership,
as they face strong incentives to work together in order to channel resources towards
non-programmatic spending.
In some political systems, the tendency for legislators to look after narrow interests
of their clients at the expense of national-level politics can be mitigated by a strong party
system that forces politicians to work in concert around a national agenda. This is most
obvious in parliamentary systems, where majorities supporting the government are
co-responsible for crucial bills presented to parliament and have to face the risk of
anticipated elections if they go against their own government. Presidentialism offers
more opportunities for defection, but it is still possible in those systems for parties to
provide a way of coordinating behaviour and preventing individualistic action.81 Indeed,
Figueiredo and Limongi argue that legislative procedures in Brazil empower party whips
by creating numerous opportunities for block party voting, which makes individualistic
behaviour less likely than in the US legislature. For them, this in one of the most
important factors enabling presidents to govern despite the fragmented party system. In
this interpretation, legislators follow individualistic motives during elections, but are
forced to follow party leaders when in office.82
When it comes to clientelism, however, the role that Brazilian parties can play in
curbing personalistic behaviour is at best limited. In Chapter Four I show that
Congressional procedures giving party leaders powers to enforce discipline are useful
tools to make them vote together in projects that have only limited impact on their
electoral prospects. And indeed – as explained by Figueiredo and Limongi – these rules
empower presidents to push through significant national legislation. Conversely,
providing particularistic benefits stands at the top of legislators’ agendas because it is
one of the most important tools they have to get reelected and to retain their political
status in their home states. I show that in these matters, their incentives to cooperate with
a national party agenda will be limited.
81In Chapter Five I briefly discuss why the Argentine closed-list proportional representation system
does not eliminate the incentives for clientelistic behaviour in that country’s legislature. To negotiate a
comfortable position in their home province’s party list, Argentine legislators must prove that they will be
useful to local officials who draft the party lists. One of the most relevant ways for doing so is to secure
resources for clientelistic arrangements at the local level. This view is consistent with what was proposed
by Moreno and coauthors in an influential analysis of Latin American party systems. In a 2003 essay they
have argued that electoral systems in the region undermined accountability by creating parties that were
either too strong and oligarchical to be held to account by voters or too weak to force legislators to think
beyond the concerns of small interest groups. See Moreno, Crisp and Shugart (2003).
82Figueiredo and Limongi (1999).
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Presidents and clientelism
The final players in the politics of distributive policy design are presidents, who I show
to be the main political beneficiaries of programmatic social policies regardless of their
party membership. Like all other elected officials, presidents play the game of policy
design keeping in mind their incentives to be responsive to voters. Yet there are two
reasons why presidents have incentives to abandon clientelism in favour programmatic
social policies.
First, the broker-based system of networks does not scale up effectively. For
clientelistic deals between politicians and voters to work in modern democracies, the
former must recruit local leaders, or brokers, to establish personal relationships and
make promises to provide privileged access to state resources credible. But because the
system is so personalistic, each broker can only establish relationships with a limited
number of clients. Presidents will find that maintaining local alliances to recruit enough
brokers to make a difference in a national election will be prohibitively expensive.
A broker-based network solves clientelism’s commitment problems but also brings
with it monitoring costs for patrons. As Stokes and colleagues demonstrate, brokers tend
to ‘overspend’ on benefits for loyal supporters because of their need to maintain good
relations with the local communities in which they operate.83 Monitoring a vast network
of national brokers is costly; thus, clientelism tends to be decentralised. The cost of
‘leakage’ and of developing monitoring systems for broker-based operations rises as the
number of voters one caters to goes up. In the case of Brazil, where there are no strong
and centralised parties that provide monitoring capacity, presidents will rarely choose to
pay such costs, preferring instead to rely on programmatic distribution.
The second reason pushing presidents away from clientelism is closely related to the
first one. Presidents’ large and heterogeneous constituency not only makes them less
willing to pay the costs of a broker-based system, but also makes them to derive more
benefits from rules-based distribution than do legislators and local officials. The logic
behind this is that presidents cannot win elections based on the provision of privileged
access to small groups of voters. Instead, they must gain the support of a majority which,
by definition, will include both clients and those who cannot or will not have access to
the protection afforded by a clientelistic network. Having to design social policies that
are acceptable throughout the nation – both to those that are potential beneficiaries and
to more wealthy voters who will pay the costs of income redistribution – presidents have
an incentive to focus on issues of fairness and effectiveness. As a result, I propose that
presidents will be uniquely averse to particularistic designs and will instead tend to favour
83Stokes et al. (2013).
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building a centralised capacity for effective governance that can be directed by them at the
national level.
The idea that the incentives presidents and legislators face are different because of the
former’s national constituencies is not new and was captured decades ago by scholars who
sought to explain why presidents and legislators in the United States had such different
approaches when designing public bureaucracies. Terry Moe and Michael Caldwell have
provided what is probably one of the clearest statements of the argument:
(Presidents’) broad national constituency leads them to think in grander terms
about social problems and to resist the specialized appeals of groups. Unlike
legislators, moreover, they are held responsible by the public for virtually
every aspect of national performance. When the economy declines, an agency
falters, or a social problem goes unaddressed, presidents get the blame. To
be judged successful in the eyes of history, they must be seen as leading and
governing effectively. This is the driving force behind presidential behavior.84
In this dissertation I rely on this argument that presidents have a tendency to prefer
universalistic positions, while legislators are driven by particularistic goals. Authors
such as Moe and Caldwell and others that adopted similar positions have argued that US
presidents’ unique constitutional position as national leaders pushes them into thinking
more about their success in office, and in particular about their own legacy.85
Yet recent critics of that literature have shown that presidents are not that immune to
electoral pressures. They care about reelection and about the future of their political
allies.86 Taking this criticism of the original ‘universalistic president’ thesis into
consideration, I adopt a moderate version of the argument that does not ignore
presidents’ electoral concerns. In Chapter Two I show that Latin American presidents do
care about reelection and about who will become president after they leave office. This
happens because they never fully abandon frontline politics and often consider the
prospect of running for a third (non-consecutive) term. I also show that this does not
necessarily change their preferences for programmatic social policies.
84Moe and Caldwell (1994), p. 175. Note that the groups to which Moe and Caldwell are referring
here – the groups to which presidents can often afford to be indifferent – are interest groups. My analysis of
clientelism extends the same logic to the ‘special interests’ that are clientelistic networks. The particularistic
benefits demanded by clientelistic networks are remarkably similar to the kinds of demanded issued by
special interest groups in the United States and elsewhere. Both interest groups and clientelistic networks
are interested in carving out a privileged niche within the state, a niche they exploit for their own gain
regardless of the consequences for the larger community or nation.
85See, for example, Linz (1994); Moe and Wilson (1994); Lewis (2004); and Huber and Shipan (2010);
Kagan (2010); Howell, Jackman and Rogowski (2013).
86Kriner and Reeves (2015); Lowande, Jenkins and Clarke (2015).
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There are many characteristics of the Brazilian political system that make the
‘universalist president’ argument compelling despite the fact that it was originally
developed as an explanation of structural dynamics of US politics. First, the
responsibility that presidents have towards the majority of voters is magnified in cases
like Brazil’s, where voting is mandatory. This ensures that even citizens who have little
interest in participating in the political process must turn out to vote and that tactics
designed to lower the turnout of certain groups have little or no effect. Other scholars
have investigated this question in detail and pointed out the significant effect that
compulsory voting can have on the reduction of inequality. The logic was originally
captured by Arend Lijphart in 1996 and has more recently been put to the test by John
Carey and Yusaku Horiuchi in the case of Venezuela and by Anthony Fowler for the case
of Australia. In both cases researchers have found a positive association between
compulsory voting and social spending.87
Paradoxically, compulsory voting can also be harnessed as a force for
non-programmatic politics. There is some evidence that in certain regions of Brazil, poor
voters sometimes struggle to cover the cost of going to the poling station and are eager to
make a small profit or just break even. During the 2014 election, a team of investigative
journalists tracked down a group of young man in the northern state of Roraima. They
lived in a slum in the outskirts of the capital city of Boa Vista, but had to go to the city to
vote. When asked by a reporter about their goal they were clear: they wanted to sell their
votes to ‘some politician’ in order to cover the costs of fuel for their bikes and for some
food while in the capital. A pregnant woman expected to make a small profit: ‘I need
money for the baby’s clothes,’ she said.88 It is easy to see how in a small state like
Roraima – with less than 470 thousand people – a few hundred votes bought on election
day can change the outcome for local politicians.
Another key factor pushing Brazilian presidents towards universalism is the
country’s weak party system, combined with a host of rules that incentivise politicians to
seek the personal vote. The open-list political system means that legislators compete
with each other for the loyalty of voters, so their allegiance to a unified party platform or
to the centralised party leadership is weak at best. This, combined with lax campaign
finance rules that enable individual candidates to raise and spend money without
coordinating with party leadership and large electoral districts that favour smaller parties
ensure that presidents’ ties to local party leaders is weak at best, limiting any chance of a
strategy of winning a national election by aggregating across parties’ or legislators’
87Lijphart (1997); Carey and Horiuchi (2013); Fowler (2013).
88Eleitores de Roraima Esperam Compra de Votos na Madrugada. O Estado de S. Paulo, 04 Oct. 2014.
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clientelistic networks. In Chapter Two I explain why party structure and electoral rules
matter for my general argument about the role that presidential power plays in the
development of rules-based social programmes. I show that very centralised party
structures can create a dilemma for presidents: notwithstanding their incentives to cater
to national constituencies, presidents must still work together with a unified party
structure that requires particularism to survive. In Chapter Five I explore how a different
party structure in place has weakened presidential universalism in Argentina.
I find strong empirical evidence in support of my theory in the later chapters. Such
findings hold both in descriptive statistics and in a host of econometric models under
different identification strategies. They are also supported by qualitative evidence
collected from speeches, parliamentary records, as well as dozens of interviews
conducted specifically for this project between 2013 and 2015. Overall, the picture that
emerges is one in which distribution serves distinct electoral functions depending on
how the relevant actors are placed in the political system. Presidents – regardless of
party affiliation – tend to win more votes for their own reelection campaigns (or for their
chosen successors) in municipalities with high levels of spending on programmatic,
rules-based social programmes. Conversely, incumbent legislators tend to win votes in
places where the spending of more discretionary, clientelistic programmes is higher.
What’s more, presidents do not appear to gain any significant electoral advantage by
increasing discretionary social policy spending, and legislators supporting the
government in the Congress are not systematically favoured by programmatic
anti-poverty spending like conditional cash transfers.
It is no surprise, therefore, that presidents throughout Latin America have been
championing rules-based income redistribution. In Brazil, the right of centre Cardoso
administration designed a centralised conditional cash transfer programme to replace
more traditional clientelistic practices controlled by local governments. Since then, every
person to occupy the presidency invested considerable political capital in the creation of
rules-based social programmes. Other similar initiatives have happened throughout the
region, always with presidents being at the forefront of institutional innovation. For
example, Colombian president Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) took advantage of
administrative reforms enacted during a financial crisis to replace older handout policies
with a conditional cash transfer controlled directly from his office. As the evidence in
Chapter Five demonstrates, social policy reforms in Mexico since the fall of the PRI
regime were designed within the executive’s cabinet and implemented by a new
generation of technocrats working under the political protection of presidents despite
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fierce resistant from legislators.89
Clientelism and credible commitments
A crucial part of my argument relies on the idea that clientelism creates very specific
commitment problems between politicians and their supporters. This is not an original
claim and there is a growing literature examining the mechanisms that politicians use to
make credible commitments to voters about income redistribution and how this
phenomenon relates to clientelism. As numerous real life examples in this thesis show,
voters are constantly concerned about being cheated by politicians who claim to be
willing to provide favours to their supporters once in office. At the same time, politicians
have reason to consider whether voters will defect on their promises to support them in
exchange for clientelistic benefits, taking advantage of the secrecy of the ballot box. The
existence of these commitment problems does not mean that clientelism will be
impossible without commitment devices, but only that we can expect that commitment
devices – such as brokers – will enable politicians to use scarce resources more
effectively.
Previous studies on commitment problems have shown that repeated interactions,
sufficiently low discount rates and observable actions can lead to credible commitments.
However, as I will explore in more detail in Chapter Two, repeated interactions in
politics require that voters and politicians communicate directly with each other, and
creating such channels comes at a cost to politicians. A number of authors addressed the
question of what mechanisms politicians can develop to make their promises to voters
credible in the first place. Robinson and Verdier and Robinson and Torvik propose a
formal model in which politicians’ promises to voters are not credible, but they can
cheaply make them credible only to a subset of voters whose actions they can better
observe through brokers. Bueno de Mesquita et al. make a similar point, theorising that
it is more efficient for politicians to make credible commitments to voters with whom
they share some personal connection.90
The idea that it is less costly for politicians to build credibility with specific subsets
of voters also appears in theories of machine politics in the context of the United States.
Dixit and Londregan argue that machine politics emerges when parties are better able to
redistribute resources to voters with whom they share some kind of ideological affinity.
Their model assumes that only promises to these voters can be made credible. As a result,
89For an outline of social innovations going beyond cash transfers, see Santiago Levy, Is social policy
in Latin America heading in the right direction? Beyond conditional cash transfer programs, Brookings
Institution, 2015.
90Robinson and Torvik (2005); Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005); Robinson and Verdier (2013).
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so-called ‘core supporters’ will have an advantage in receiving distributive payments.91
Some authors have claimed that clientelism emerges when making credible
commitments to redistribute to the broad citizenry is too costly. Keefer argues that the
widespread use of clientelism in Africa has to do with the high costs that politicians face
when making credible commitments to the broad citizenry.92 In a related paper, Keefer
and Vlaicu use a formal model to show that, in countries where this cost is high,
politicians will instead promise to redistribute to small groups through clientelism.93
A second group of scholars have looked at how clientelism creates its own
commitment problems. Stokes was the first to discuss the role played by brokers in
creating credible commitments between voters and clientelistic leaders. Her work called
attention to brokers’ role in gathering information and stopping voters from using the
secrecy of the ballot box to take benefits from patrons and voting for someone else.94
Latter works built on that insight and emphasised the costs for politicians of maintaining
a broker-based system to solve the challenges posed identified by Stokes. In that spirit,
Edwin Camp shows that brokers in Argentina extract significant rents from their parties
and over-invest in in neighbourhoods where they already have strong support.95
Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, and Brusco take this argument one step further by
claiming that politicians relinquish clientelism in favour of programmatic policies when
the costs associated with making credible commitments through brokers become higher
than the benefits they obtain through clientelism. They point to four factors that
determine how costly the broker-system will be: the size of the electorate that a
politician has to cater to, the resources that patrons have to monitor brokers’ activities,
how poor the voters being targeted by clientelistic promises are, and the cost of
communicating programmatic promises to voters.96 Likewise, Larreguy, Marshall, and
Querubin offer evidence that clientelistic spending in Mexico is more efficient when
politicians have more resources to monitor brokers’ activities. They interpret these
results by pointing to brokers’ tendency to overspend to further their own local careers.97
In one way or another, all these works point to the commitment problems inherent in
clientelistic relationships. While none of these authors categorically affirms that
clientelism is impossible without a commitment device, they do show evidence that
91Dixit and Londregan (1996).
92Keefer (2010).
93Keefer and Vlaicu (2007).
94Stokes (2005).
95Camp (2017).
96Stokes et al. (2013), Chapter Seven. See also Camp, Dixit and Stokes (2014) for an in-depth study of
the British case.
97Larreguy, Marshall and Querubin (2016).
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politicians engaged in modern clientelistic relationships all over the world tend to
employ brokers to establish personal relationships with voters and thus facilitate these
transactions. Stokes and colleagues’ Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism was the first work
to focus specifically on the inefficiencies that the broker-based system has and to develop
a model to explain the demise of clientelism based on the cost of using brokers as
commitment devices.
My work here builds on this literature. It acknowledges that commitment problems
shape the nature of modern patron-client relationships and that the devices that they use
to facilitate the exchange of votes for privileged access to state resources will create a
number of inefficiencies. I also take the debate one step further by pointing out that the
inefficiencies inherent in the broker-based system do not affect all politicians equally.
Specifically, presidents’ large electorates and tendency to took towards the needs of the
majority of voters – rather than those of groups of well-connected of clients – makes them
less willing to tolerate the costs of patron-client relationships and pushes them towards
rules-based redistribution.
Policy design
Comparative evidence suggests that the instruments that allow politicians to choose who
benefits from a particular policy and when benefits are withdrawn tend to be included in
the process of policy design. Filipino president Gloria Arroyo sought in 2001 to establish
a national distributive programme to address rising poverty and unemployment caused
by the Asian financial crisis. Arroyo proposed to emulate the cash transfer programmes
beginning to take root in some Latin American countries. Her proposal to Congress was
to create a central bureaucracy and a complex set of rules to provide cash to those whose
income was below the national poverty line. Many legislators from across the political
spectrum were resistant to such design, claiming it would encourage the poor to spend
money on alcohol or drugs while at the same time discouraging them to look for jobs.
It is not that legislators were reluctant to commit public funds to social policy, but the
design they favoured was one based on food handouts and subsidies to the poor operated
by each province under a vaguely-worded piece of legislation that gave provincial officers
significant discretion over the implementation of the programme.
The process of policy design provides those that favour clientelism with the
opportunity to empower or disempower actors that are more likely to run social
programmes as they prefer. Actors backing particularistic interests will tend to favour
policies that can easily be run through networks of brokers. For example, in Brazil one
of the most common ways to spend anti-poverty resources is though the National Social
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Assistance Fund. Legislators will fight for budget amendments to support particular
initiatives that are run within the Fund’s framework. They can include building a social
assistance centre, funding a jobs programme, repairing roofs, building a water well,
providing food handouts or many other such initiatives. In a system like this, legislators
will be able to specify when and where money will be spent. The involvement of public
bureaucracy is at best minimum, leaving much room for clientelistic brokers to operate
the programmes on the ground in a way that best suits their masters’ electoral interests.
The perfect setup for personalistic credit claiming and not at all what one would do if
their goal is to provide effective poverty relief.98
Chapter Two of this dissertation provides a theory that not only accounts for why
Brazilian legislators will not support programmatic policies but also describes what kinds
of mechanisms they will favour when it comes to distributive policy design. First, they
will push hard for minimum involvement of civil servant specialists and favour instead a
policy implemented by local brokers that they owe loyalty to their political group. Second,
they will try to make legislation as simple and vague as possible in order to give the
maximum discretionary power to those implementing policy to reward and punish voters
as it suits them. Third, they will avoid commitments that tie resources to one particular
activity or programme in order to effectively claim credit for supporting communities and
groups as well as to keep them dependent on the goodwill of policy-makers as much as
possible.
This is the very opposite of what an actor who needed to claim credit for the reduction
of poverty and inequality would do. In the process of policy design someone who wants
to be seen as a champion of the poor would actually be best served by a well-equipped
and impartial bureaucracy that is able identify where and how scarce resources would
be better spent. I argue that it is in the interest of presidents to fight for something that
resembles this design because the problems of commitment involved in managing a large
network needed to reward and punish individuals or small groups on the ground rises with
the size of the politicians’ constituency and will quickly prove prohibitively expensive for
a president of a large democracy. In order to gain votes, they would prefer to see resources
allocated through rules-based programmes – not out of altruism, but because they will be
rewarded in the ballot box. Presidents will also be in favour of clear eligibility rules that
can be objectively examined and of complex regulation that takes power away from a
myriad of local officials.
98I discuss this fund’s role in clientelism at length in subsequent chapters.
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Budget process
After the disputes about policy design are over, there is no guarantee that public resources
will flow towards the most efficient policies. Indeed, as we will see in the chapters below,
politicians will have a myriad of options of policies in place, some more clientelistic and
others more programmatic.
The powers of budget allocation in Brazil have changed significantly since the 1990s
when the first large-scale programmatic anti-poverty initiatives emerged. Presidents
gained powers to control budget execution with the 1988 Constitution, but it was with
fiscal reforms in the second half of the 1990s that they gained the ability to reduce the
flow of money to mayors and governors, allowing the central government to have
significant say over local initiatives.99 By doing so, presidents have concentrated
enormous fiscal power in the federal government and have made the relationship
between Congress and the Presidency the defining feature of the budget allocation
process.
Weaker presidents will have a harder time keeping programmatic policies fully
funded. During the 2016 budget negotiations, there was much dispute over what
government initiatives would be cut in the midst of a profound fiscal crisis in Brazil.
With President Rousseff’s popularity in the single digits, legislators pushed to enforce
their preferred cuts on the very same policies that had contributed to her victory in 2014,
but that – as I will show in Chapter Three – had no significant impact on legislators’
electoral fortunes. The rapporteur of the budget bill – in spite of his position as a
government ally – argued for a cut of 10 billion reais from the Bolsa Família conditional
cash transfer programme as a way to balance the budget. This would prevent the
government from admitting new beneficiaries during that fiscal year.100 When I
interviewed former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003) and asked for his
opinion on the then ongoing crisis between Rousseff and the legislature – one that would
eventually lead to her impeachment in 2016 – he pointed out that the biggest threat to
government effectiveness in Brazil’s system came from a weak president: ‘When they
smell weakness they come at the president with this kind of legislative agenda. They do
not really care about Bolsa Família. They are using this as a bargaining chip. They are
saying: do not mess with what our base cares about or else we will come after you.’101
99Abrucio (1998); Arretche (2000).
100Relator vai propor corte de R$ 10 bi do Bolsa Família no Orçamento de 2016. G1. 21 Oct. 2015.
101Interview to the author, November 2015. Original in Portuguese: ‘Quando eles sentem cheiro de
derrota eles vêm para cima do presidente com essas pautas-bomba. Eles não estão nem aí para Bolsa
Família. Eles estão usando como moeda de troca. Estão dizendo: não mexe com a nossa base ou nós vamos
atrás de você’.
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This type of behaviour goes against the logic that all politicians supporting the
government will benefit from government spending in the same ways, but is an example
of how conflicting interests will shape budget allocations in social policies. Reconciling
these interests is easier in moments of economic growth, when new revenues will allow
for increased spending in both programmatic and clientelistic initiatives, but in times of
economic hardship all actors will have to fight tooth and nail to keep their favourite
programmes well-funded. A speech given by a Brazilian legislator during the legislative
budget debates of 2014 exemplifies how the budgetary process had divided even
legislators were nominally supporting the government:
This is a joke! They are toying with us. They make us introduce the budget
bill, make us introduce the amendments, and then we deceive the aldermen,
the mayors, because we do introduce the amendments. And now you do
this? Now, I am sorry, but I cannot understand. My party supports the
government of President Dilma Rousseff, but this is difficult. How am I
going to justify myself to the population of Curitibanos, of Campos Novos,
of Lages? (...) How am I going to justify this, Deputy Marcos Rogério?
What am I going to say to the farmer? To that alderman that is sacrificing
himself? Our mayors cannot sleep because of the difficulties in their
municipalities. But they blocked our amendments. Unfortunately, they
blocked our amendments. We had the right to 15 million [reais] in
amendments. Each deputy could give 15 million in amendments to the
municipalities he wanted to. The 15 million [reais] is now going to be just 5
million.102
The process Deputy Onofre Agostini describes above illustrates the other side of the
budget battle: when presidents are strong (as President Rousseff was in February 2014)
they are able to impose significant cuts to the preferred spending priorities of local
politicians, while at the same time preserving programmes that benefit them politically.
Why Brazil?
This dissertation develops a theory about the dynamics of the emergence of rules-based
distributive policies in societies where clientelistic practices have previously been the
norm. My theory is broadly comparative, although the empirical evidence I use comes
102Onofre Santo Agostini (PSD-SC), Speech before the Chamber of Deputies. 21 Feb. 2014. My
translation from the original Portuguese.
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from national, municipal, and individual-level data from Brazil. I choose to work on
Brazil for several reasons.
First, clientelism has thrived as an electoral strategy in Brazil under a variety of
political conditions since the 19th century. Historians have highlighted the importance of
the practices of distributing government jobs and buying vote through small favours and
handouts by local bosses under Brazil’s 19th century constitutional monarchy – one
which had parliamentary overtones.103 Such arrangements continued to work well with
the introduction of a presidential republic and the elimination of restrictions on the right
to vote based on income in 1889,104 as well as to the introduction of the secret ballot in
1932. Clientelism thrived after the creation of the first large-scale government initiatives
explicitly designed to fight poverty, including highly politicised public works and land
reform programmes that were the cornerstone of the country’s incipient anti-poverty
strategy though the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, there is no evidence that this arrangement
was affected in any meaningful way when the presidential republic was replaced in a
second experiment with a semi-presidential system from 1961 to 1964. Clientelism was
also an important element in the strategy of cooptation of local elites developed by the
military dictatorship that lasted from 1964 to 1985. As the state increased its role in the
economy under the military regime, it also began to play a more significant role in
poverty reduction. Legislators got more power to direct resources to their favoured social
projects in their constituencies, and the central government created the first large scale
land reform initiatives at the federal level.
In tandem with the political changes, the country’s economy and society have also
undergone dramatic transformations. Until the late 1960s, Brazil remained a
predominantly rural society, with an economy based primarily on agricultural exports.
Inequality was a much less significant issue, but poverty was widespread. The 1970
census shows that women at the time had an average of 6 children and that more than
three quarters of the population was illiterate (and thus not allowed to vote). Only 20%
of citizens between the ages of 12 and 15 had completed at least 4 years of formal
education – almost all of those were white. Fast forward to 2010 and what you see is a
country where 85% of the population lives in urban areas less than 20% of adults are
illiterate (and now even they could vote, thanks to a reform introduced in 1988). Almost
all of the young had completed primary education and a little over 70% had the 8 years
of study required to complete secondary school. Inequality – which had increased
dramatically from the 1960s to the 1980s – has been shrinking since the second half of
103Graham (1990).
104Viotti (2010).
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the 1990s.105 Another reason to look closely at the Brazilian case is that here we find not
only a new generation of rules-based anti-poverty programmes gaining ground, but also
a significant share of the government budget still directed towards traditional
discretionary policies.
Over the years, I have successfully collected micro- and macro-level data that allow
me to examine in detail several implications of by theory for voting behaviour and the
behaviour of elected officials, including why they prefer to allocate resources to some
types of social programmes over others. Such information is often difficult to come by,
especially for non-OECD countries and collecting it has been possible in part thanks to a
Freedom of Information Law enacted in 2012 that forced government agencies to make
micro-level spending data accessible to researchers.
I am by no means the first person to look at issues related to inequality and social
policy in Brazil. Indeed, an excellent literature has emerged over the past years focusing
on the political economy of conditional cash transfer programmes, and it usually pays
special attention to the Bolsa Família programme and its electoral consequences.106
However, my dissertation offers several new insights that had been ignored or
under-theorised by previous works. It also relies on a with data on numerous other social
programmes, not just Bolsa Família.
Finally, I put Brazil’s experience in comparative perspective, challenging narratives
about the country’s exceptional path towards inequality reduction or about the unique role
played by the centre-left governments of the Workers’ Party that have ruled the country
since 2003.107 I also confront the argument that the reforms enacted over the past decades
do not amount to more than a continuation of Brazil’s clientelistic political system.108
Plan of the Thesis
The next chapter presents my theoretical framework for understanding politicians’
incentives when creating and implementing distributive programmes in presidential
democracies and provides an explanation for the rise of programmatic distributive
policies in settings where clientelism was previously the norm. I also present a series of
105Arretche (2015).
106Hunter and Power (2007); Nicolau and Peixoto (2008); Zucco (2008); Soares and Terron (2008);
de Janvry, Finan and Sadoulet (2008); Licio, Castro and Rennó (2009); Fenwick (2009); Fried (2012);
Sugiyama and Hunter (2013); Zucco (2013)
107Cf. Singer (2012), who makes the case that the combination of economic growth and poverty reduction
in recent Brazilian history was made possible by the Workers’ Party – and particularly by President Lula’s
leadership.
108Cf. Hall (2012), who argues that Bolsa Família and other similar distributive policies adopted in Brazil
during the late 1990s and early 2000s were also designed to enable clientelism.
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hypotheses about politicians’ strategies and behaviour to be assessed using empirical
evidence in the subsequent chapters. My theory of the factors that have led to the rise in
programmatic anti-poverty policies in Chapter Two stresses the connection between the
likelihood that politicians will support programmatic policies and their dependency on
local-level political dynamics for reelection. Chapter Two also provides some stylised
facts about the dynamics of decline of clientelistic politics in Brazil over the last three
decades.
Chapter Three provides empirical evidence based on municipality-level social
spending data for several of my theoretical claims. Some of these relationships, in
particular the connection between Bolsa Família spending and presidential support, have
been explored by other scholars. Other relationships are much harder to account for with
existing theories about the demise of clientelism, but are consistent with the hypotheses
raised in this dissertation.
Chapter Four looks more closely at the decision making in parliament and the
executive in Brazil to examine if these actors actually behave strategically in the way
predicted by the theory, namely that presidents actively push for more spending towards
rules-based social programmes and legislators fight for more discretion when designing
and funding policies. It relies mostly on qualitative evidence, including fieldwork and
numerous interviews with politicians and civil servants
Chapter Five concludes by summarising the main findings and discussing alternative
explanations that could account for the expansion of rules-based social policies in
developing countries. That chapter further extends the analysis to Argentina and Mexico
with two brief case studies and analyses the implications of this work for the broader
literature on the political economy of distributive policies.
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Chapter 2
A Theory of Programmatic Distribution
Clientelism has provided, in many democracies, an efficient and well-established way for
politicians to build a loyal following – especially among the poorest voters – one that
they can use to retain political office and gain leverage in political bargains. This happens
because, in clientelistic programmes, politicians maintain a high level of control over
how public funds are distributed, who gets them, and when benefits are withdrawn. Thus,
with discretionary powers to allocate resources strategically, politicians can reward their
supporters and punish opponents.
If clientelistic strategies are so efficient, why would politicians relinquish such
powers in favour of policies based on objective rules and, in the process, voluntarily
diminish their own political influence? In this chapter I propose a theory that accounts
for why some politicians choose to push for more programmatic distributive policies that
are not based on personal connections to a clientelistic network, while others remain
committed to high levels of discretionary social spending. My theory draws on evidence
from Brazil’s political system, but the insights it produces illuminate dynamics common
in many other presidential democracies.
My explanation has two parts and both have to do with how legislators and local
officials’ approach to social policy is different from presidents’. The first part looks at
the costs of creating credible commitments to redistribute income using broker-based
clientelistic networks. As I briefly discussed in Chapter One, politicians and voters that
want to engage in clientelistic arrangements face two commitment problems. The first is
that, if politicians can withdraw resources from voters whenever they want, how can the
latter trust them enough to enter into long-term patron-client relationships? Furthermore,
if voters can rely on the secret ballot to vote for whoever they want, how can patrons
ensure that they will not take clientelistic benefits and vote for someone else?
To solve these commitment problems, patrons and clients will rely on brokers –
political operators that maintain personal connections with clients and who can put their
credibility on the line for politicians. The personalistic arrangements that sustain the
relationships between brokers, voters, and patrons are akin to iterated games, where
cooperation becomes more likely and defection costlier because actors anticipate the fact
that they are going to play this game over and over again with no end in sight.
Even though such broker-based networks can work well for mayors of small and
medium towns, aldermen or congresspeople – for whom a few thousand votes can make
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the difference between winning and losing – their utility will tend to diminish as the
relative size of the electorate one is accountable to increases and, as a result, the cost for
politicians of maintaining arrangements that rely on personal connections goes up.
Fortunately, not all politicians can afford such costs Presidents in Brazil and in most
other presidential democracies deal in millions of votes and need to appeal to broad
sections of the electorate – even when elections are tight. For them, employing an army
of brokers to establish personal connections and deliver personal favours, even to a small
percentage of their electorate, would be prohibitive. For them, even alliances with
thousands of local bosses that could deliver brokers all over the country become
problematic and prohibitively costly to be pursued in large scale. Clientelism’s
personalistic nature works as its limitation.
The second part of my explanation has to do with how presidents’ national and
heterogeneous constituency makes them more sensible to the distortions created by
clientelistic favouritism. By its very nature, clientelism is based on privileging those that
are politically connected with favours and resources – not necessarily those that need it
the most. This type of rent-seeking can be favourable to those, like legislators, who build
a career by meeting the parochial needs of their constituents, instead of working to
improve the overall efficiency of the system of social protection.
Conversely, presidents’ unique position in the political system means that they have to
work for a majority of citizens. They will thus tend to focus on the national implications
of public policies and on designing effective programmes that will be seen as both fair
and effective use of public money by the majority of voters – including both those eligible
to receive benefits and the ones that will pay the taxes that fund these programmes. I
propose that a focus on clientelistic relations goes against presidents’ incentives towards
universalistic policies and thus would undermine their position of leadership and their
ability to leave a lasting legacy – two key goals that presidents have an incentive to focus
on.
In this chapter I explain in detail these two reasons for why presidents and legislators
have such different views of clientelism. I build my theory by drawing mainly on
research into the Brazilian political system. In doing so, I explain the role played by the
main actors involved in the decision-making in Brazilian politics: legislators, local
officials, and presidents.1 Although I focus on these actors in the Brazilian context, their
relevance in social policy outcomes will have parallels with what happens in other
presidential democracies. Therefore, I will provide interpretations about how to conceive
1I do not discuss the role of voters’ demand for clientelistic spending in this dissertation. On this topic,
see Nichter and Peress (2014).
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of them in other contexts whenever possible.
Finally, I also consider in this chapter the role of variables unrelated to the role of
presidents: party systems and electoral systems. I argue that Brazil’s weak parties and
the existence of a host of rules that favour personalistic relationships between voters and
politicians give presidents significant leeway in adopting programmatic social policies
instead of adopting clientelistic arrangements. Conversely, in political systems where
party leaderships are strong and the rules favour control of machines by a centralised
oligarchy – as in the case of Argentina – presidents will have to weigh their incentives to
cater to their own national constituencies against their need to maintain a good
relationship with their party’s powerful leadership.
My theory provides an explanation for why clashes between politicians who prefer
programmatic policies and those who favour clientelism are neither necessarily based on
party affiliation nor on the relative wealth of the people that they represent. In Chapter
Four I further explore this logic and demonstrate how a series of political reforms in
Brazil has greatly empowered successive presidents2 to pursue an ambitious agenda of
policy reform that resulted in new rules-based, anti-poverty initiatives in the late 1990s
and through the 2000s – a process that has continued under both centre-left and
centre-right administrations. In Chapter Five I explore how the same logic can explain
the recent changes in the social policy landscape in Argentina and Mexico. Recognising
the existence of such divergent interests brings us closer to explaining observable
patterns of transformation in social policies in Brazil and in many other Latin American
countries.
Sharing Spoils and Problems of Commitment
Clientelism’s personalistic nature creates two commitment problems that make relations
between voters and politicians more difficult. In this section I show how politicians
employ networks of brokers to mitigate these problems and provide for the emergence of
long-term relationships between themselves and their clients. I also elaborate on why the
tendency of modern clientelistic networks to use brokers makes the practice less
attractive to presidents.
To understand the problems of commitment created by discretionary spending, let
us imagine a simple interaction between two players, Patron and Client. Patron holds
political office and thus – because of how social policy is designed – exerts significant
2As I explain in Chapter Four, most opportunities for reforms come with exogenous shocks that shake
up the political system: financial crises, corruption scandals, even the death of incumbent presidents. All
these can create opportunities for reforms that affect presidential power in the long run.
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discretion over how certain public funds are used. He is interested in using these powers
to gain the support of Client in the upcoming elections. Client is a voter in Patron’s
electoral district and is willing to exchange his vote for some kind of privileged access
to state resources. It might be that Client anticipates the need to schedule appointments
with a doctor at an overcrowded public hospital. He might as well be expecting that with
Patron’s intervention – who happens to control funding for the local public healthcare
system – he may be able to get these appointments expediently. It could also be that
Client needs access to a food handout programme – one that does not have clear criteria
for inclusion – or is tired of waiting years to be given his own plot of land through a
government’s land reform programme that has equally vague requirements for inclusion.
In any case, Client’s expectation is that Patron can help him now and in the future, and
in exchange all that Patron asks is for Client’s vote. Client has the first move. He can
choose either to negotiate his vote for Patron in exchange for clientelistic benefits or to
seek access to goods and services outside the clientelistic network. Here, seeking support
outside the network implies either looking for different patrons or reaping the benefits of
having a ‘free vote,’ that is, voting according to one’s own policy preferences and not as
a function of clientelistic interests, while at the same time finding other ways to access
services that can be accessed through membership in the network (e.g. putting one’s
children in private schools, hiring private doctors, etc.). In effect, when Client chooses
carry out the exchange, he is trading his vote for a share of Patron’s spoils of office.
The spoils of office are valuable to both players today and in the future. Patron can
use his powers as an elected official to push for policies at an ideal point or simply to
extract rents for himself. Nevertheless, Patron’s power is limited, so the political capital
that he puts into securing funds to support privileged access to the state for Client cannot
be used to push for specific policies or securing advantageous deals that will benefit him
financially or pushing for policies that he prefers. To put it another way, political capital
spent by politicians building or maintaining clientelistic networks is political capital that
cannot not be used to push for other policies. Client, in turn, values the spoils of office
because he wants to secure preferential access to scarce public services that would
otherwise only be available to him through expensive non-political means. To make
matters simpler, we can assume that, if Client decides not to strike a deal to exchange his
vote for benefits, there is no probability that he will vote for Patron, and this increases
the probability of Patron losing the election and having to leave office altogether. Also,
we assume that if the Client votes for Patron, there is no probability that the latter will
lose office.
For Client, a decision not to support Patron presupposes incurring the cost of either
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creating a relationship with a rival clientelistic network or securing access to public
services through non-political means (e.g. through the market for private education or
healthcare). While investment in non-political access to resources implies a cost to
Client, it also translates itself into the benefit of freeing up his vote and political
allegiance. This, in turn, enables Client to push for his own favoured ideal point policies
through democratic processes. Doing so also gives him a de facto fraction of the office
power, but one that is usually smaller than what he would get by negotiating privileged
clientelistic deals. One can think of a small businessman who becomes wealthier and
does not need the help of a local patron to put his children through public schools,
deciding instead to educate them privately. The businessman is now able to join a local
small business association and support a different politician who has programmatic
proposals for tax breaks that – under his eyes – has the potential of making make his
company more competitive.
As I have briefly examined in the previous chapter, granting benefits to Client has a
cost to Patron which is defined in terms of a share of the utility he obtains from holding
office. The cost exists in the form of the political capital spent to maintain his network
even in the absence of elections and is subtracted from the utility he obtains from holding
office. This means that clientelistic politicians will have to pay a fixed cost throughout the
electoral cycle that is proportional to the number of clients they have (even if the clients do
not receive regular payments). Put it another way, in the clientelistic system, Patron is in
effect sharing part of the spoils of office with others in the clientelistic network, including
Client and Patron’s allies – the brokers on the ground, which I will come back to.
An important distinction should be drawn here: Clientelistic and programmatic
politicians relate to their supporters differently. A programmatic politician is elected to
push for a specific policy agenda. We can assume that he ran on this policy agenda
because he expects to gain some utility from enacting it, either because he believes in the
policies or because he somehow benefits from them as well. Thus, when a programmatic
politician works for this given policy agenda, both he and his supporters will gain from
it. Conversely, the clientelistic politician buys the support of his client by using his time
and political capital to secure resources to maintain the clientelistic network. For him,
awarding benefits is part of a bargaining process with his clients in which the two parties
agree to divide the benefits of office.
In this interaction, there are two commitment problems that undermine Patron’s ability
to credibly commit to sharing the spoils of office with his loyal clients – those that choose
to invest in the clientelistic network rather than in seeking goods and services with other
politicians or in private markets. The first relates to the fact that voting is secret and Patron
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has no reliable way of knowing if Client actually voted for him. The second commitment
problem is the result of the discretionary powers that are at the basis of clientelism. If
Client votes for Patron, how can Client be confident that his benefactor will not use the
same powers that enabled the exchange in the first place to either revoke or stop the flow
of benefits once the election is over?
These problems are only of theoretical nature, but real concerns faced by those
politicians engaged in clientelistic relationships. After all, providing privileged access to
public resources to Client is costly for Patron. He has to engage in careful political
negotiations with other political actors to secure the resources needed to sustain his
network. More importantly for my argument, the incentive Patron has to renege on his
promise of privileged access gets higher as his network increases in size. Maintaining
the loyalty of a handful of clients throughout the electoral cycle is one thing, but
providing privileged access to public resources to tens of thousands of voters and
maintaining the loyalty of a network of brokers necessary to administer the system is a
full-time job. The larger the network becomes, the more it eats away the spoils of office
that Patron can appropriate for himself.
In the short run, Patron’s best strategy will be to ‘inflate’ the size of his network as the
election approaches and cast aside some of these clients and brokers after the election is
over in order to cut costs. The effects of this strategy appear in regions where clientelistic
networks operate in the familiar complaint that politicians’ come to the village during
election time making promises to the residents and latter ‘abandoning’ voters, only to
return in the next election. Such opportunistic behaviour is evidently not sustainable in
the long run if the political system is truly competitive. One could expect that voters’
confidence in the established clientelistic patron will erode over time and so Patron will
become more vulnerable to challengers who are able to project credibility. For Patron to
remain successful, thus, some kind of commitment device is likely to emerge.
If both actors desire to strike a bargain, the logical way of solving commitment
problems is by developing some kind of contract or institutional framework that would
enable Patron to credibly commit to the provision of benefits to Client even once the
election is over, while committing Client to vote for Patron even though voters enjoy the
protection of the secret ballot.
The problem created by the secrecy of the ballot box is difficult to solve without
violating the law, but this has been known to happen in places where the integrity of
voting regulations is imperfectly guaranteed.3 Other scholars have examined this
phenomenon and have described in detail how these actors can use a wide range of
3See, for example, Gerber et al. (2013).
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signalling techniques and threats of punishment to overcome this particular problem.4
Examples of signalling techniques include asking voters to dress in campaign-themed
shirts, having party officials (brokers) stand outside polling stations, asking voters to
provide them their voter registration numbers (even when that information cannot be
used to check how they voted), and many others reported in the literature. Crucially, the
continuous presence on the ground of brokers working for Patron is the main source of
information about clients’ needs, preferences, and behaviour before and after the
election. As such, brokers will constantly signal to clients the cost of betrayal and the
risk of being found out while at the same time collecting information on their behaviour
that can be used to punish cheating.
Likewise, the problem created by the discretionary powers that allow Patron to
withdraw clientelistic protection after the election is not easy to solve. This is because
any arrangement that curbs Patron’s discretion to choose beneficiaries of public services
and replaces it with more objective rules would undermine the very foundation of
Patron’s electoral strategy: Patrons needs rules to be vague and unspecific, so that they
can direct resources to the people they want to help while denying benefits to others. A
way out of this problem, one highlighted by James Robinson and Thierry Verdier, is for
Patrons to focus their clientelistic strategies on the distribution of public sector jobs. In
many countries deciding, who gets these jobs is relatively easy; politicians can exercise
their discretion. But taking away a constituent’s job once offered is difficult.5 In this
example, the laws protecting civil servants from outright dismissal function as the
contractual device that patrons and clients are not able to sign with each other.6
Another possible solution is to avoid a long-term commitment altogether and stick to
on-the-spot vote buying or one-off transfers. In many parts of Brazil this happens through
the distribution of cestas básicas (literally, a basic basket), a bundle of low-cost food items
that theoretically would satisfy the basic nutritional needs of a family of four persons for
a month and that are normally distributed in short-term food handout programmes. In
other instances, it might happen in the form of a one-off transfer of an asset through a
4Auyero (2001); Stokes (2005); Stokes et al. (2013); Nichter and Peress (2014); Hidalgo and Nichter
(2015).
5Robinson and Verdier (2013).
6In a similar vein, Jean-Paul Azam highlights the importance of public sector jobs as part of some
African governments’ distributive strategies, where key ethnic groups are guaranteed high-paying public
sector jobs with the understanding that anyone chosen for these jobs will remit part of their payments
to other members of their ethnic group, thus securing the political support of a large block of voters
for the incumbent. Azam even proposes that IMF debt restructuring programmes in Africa that lowered
civil servants’ salaries (previously well above market rates) may have indirectly contributed to undermine
political stability. See Azam (2011). For an in-depth study of patronage in Latin America, see Grindle
(2012).
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government initiative, such as what happens in many land reform programmes where a
peasant receives the property rights to a plot of land. In other cases, it takes the form of
direct cash payments to voters, something that is usually illegal and thus has to be done
covertly, imposing additional costs and risks on those involved.
In any case, this type of one-off bargaining strategy theoretically eliminates the
problem altogether. However, empirical work tends to support the idea that patrons and
clients routinely engage in continuous relationships for several reasons. First, clients
tend to have on-going demands for privileged access to the state. The peasant who was
awarded a plot of land today will need subsidies to buy fertilisers tomorrow. The parent
who needed to enrol their child at the public school during this electoral cycle will need
help to get a doctor’s appointment next month. Voters often demand the protection and
special treatment that comes with being part of a clientelistic network.7 In a competitive
electoral system, patrons are aware that if they don’t provide ongoing services and
protection to their clients, someone else might come along willing to do it. Furthermore,
having a faithful clientele might be helpful to further non-electoral political goals that a
patron may have: a politician will often hold rallies not only to measure his own support
and the efficiency of his network, but also to show his peers the size of their political
base. Reliable clients can also be mobilised to engage in acts of violence that serve a
political purpose8 or to participate in protests designed to reinforce their patron’s
political or social agenda.9
In some situations, networks will indeed strike one-off deals with voters exchanging
votes for favours, goods, or even buying votes on the spot with money. However, the
reality of clientelism is that effective patrons understand the need to invest in long-term
links with the same groups of voters. Much like in other markets, an ongoing
relationship with loyal ‘costumers’ often bears lower transaction costs than attracting
new ones, making votes-for-benefits trade less expensive and decreasing the risk of voter
defection and the cost of monitoring. Networks take advantage of some voters’
dependency on public services in order to foster loyalty among clients, while at the same
time making sure they are not going to be coopted by rival politicians. In practice,
politicians will often spread goods and services to loyal clients throughout the electoral
cycle and complement this long-term strategy with one-off vote-buying at election
time.10 In researching this dissertation, I myself have witnessed numerous examples of
7Nichter and Peress (2014).
8Auyero (2007); Wilkinson (2008).
9Escobar (1994); Berenschot (2012).
10Cox and McCubbins (1986); Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni (2012); Stokes et al. (2013). Cf.
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987); Stokes (2005).
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Fig. 1: Bounced cheque issued by a candidate’s campaign election committee in 2010
supposedly to buy a vote.
flagrant cheating in relationships based solely on on-the-spot vote buying. One such
occasion I witnessed an elderly man at a political rally bemoaned how ‘unreliable’
politicians could be. When asked about why he was so critical, he produced a bank
cheque that he had received during the 2010 election campaign. The cheque, which was
given to him in his native town of Palmas, clearly indicated how much he had been paid
for his vote. The man went on to tell why he had accepted it. It was, he said, because the
sum of money was a lot more than what he had expected, and because the cheque stated
the name of the official campaign committee and thus seemed ‘official’ to him. When it
came to cashing the cheque, however, the elderly man discovered that the bank no longer
had sufficient funds to cover the amount. ‘I thought these official cheques could never
bounce’, he confided.11 This particular voter’s complains are hardly unique.12 Signalling
techniques can increase trust, but are not perfect, especially if the secrecy of the ballot
box is enforced.
11Interview with participant in a political rally, Rio de Janeiro, September 2014.
12Another example was reported by a newspaper in the city of São Paulo. Days after the results of the
2016 local elections were announced, a group of 30 voters stormed the campaign headquarters of a defeated
mayoral candidate claiming that he had not payed what he had promised them. Numerous similar cases are
reported throughout the country after elections are over. For this particular report, see Cabos eleitorais
protestam na sede do PRB contra suposto ‘calote’ da campanha de Russomanno, Folha de São Paulo, 05
Oct 2016.
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The preference by both sides for an ongoing relationship is both consistent with the
existing empirical literature and with the evidence collected in the field when talking to
brokers and clients. One low-level broker once explained how a ‘social centre’ was a key
part of his patron’s electoral strategy in a poor neighbourhood of Rio de Janeiro. ‘We
here are poor, but not stupid. [Voters] can differentiate between someone who has been
working [in] the community for a long time and and some ‘adventurer’ who just shows
up on election time. The centre needs to be open so everyone can see our work, see who
is really investing in the community.’13 When pushed on why they cannot simply focus
everything they have on the election years, he laughs: ‘It’s like my son: I never see him
studying, except when it’s time for [school] exams. Then he locks himself in his room for
two or three days. I don’t need to tell you that his grades are s..., right? A good student
has to study year-round. Obviously you give a little extra before the exam, but you can’t
just study everything in one day.”14
Clientelism and the Inter-temporal Sharing of Spoils
I propose that a logical solution to both commitment problems is to use systems of
sustained personal connections and direct communication between voters and brokers to
enable credible commitments. Successful connections are established by brokers that are
personally known to clients and with whom they deal repeatedly, often both in public
and in their private lives. Effective brokers are also well-known to politicians who trust
them to relay information that could help determine whether a voter is cheating. Such
agents make it their business to know as many clients as possible personally and so their
prestige in the community is dependent on the ability of the politicians they represent to
keep their promises. Effective brokers are people ‘from the community’ that put their
own personal relationships with their neighbours on the line to make commitments
between politicians and voters work – for a price. In short, brokers can guarantee to
potential clients that, if they become a member of a clientelistic network, the investment
will pay off in the long run. At the same time brokers will be gathering enough
information about voters to deduce who is cheating and who is a reliable client.15
13“A gente aqui é pobre, mas não é idiota. Todo mundo sabe quem está trabalhando na comunidade o ano
inteiro e quem é aventureiro que só aparece na época de eleição. O centro precisa estar sempre funcionando,
por que ai todo mundo pode ver o nosso trabalho, ver quem realmente está investindo na comunidade.”
14“É que nem o meu filho: eu nunca vejo ele estudando, só na semana de provas. Aí ele se tranca
no quarto e fica lá com a cara no livro uns dois ou três dias. É claro que as notas depois são tudo uma
m..., né? Para passar de ano tem que estudar o ano inteiro. Claro que você rala um pouquinho mais na
semana de provas, mas não dá para aprender tudo num dia só.” Interview with social centre worker in Ilha
do Governador, Rio de Janeiro, September 2014.
15A recent literature has explored the conditions under which brokers can effectively enforce clientelistic
deals and the shortcomings of the broker-based system to curb cheating by voters protected by the secret
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In formal language, this type of connection enables us to think of the interaction
between patrons and clients as an iterated game. In repeated interactions that actors
perceive will continue indefinitely into the future, when discount rates to future benefits
are sufficiently low16 and the actions of players are observable to each other and
enforceable,17 credible commitments might emerge even in the absence of a contract. In
models of political bargaining where one has to take account of the difficulty in
attributing responsibility to each actor for outcomes, observable actions is a requirement
that is usually modelled as political actors being able to effectively communicate with
each other.18 Indeed, clientelistic relations in traditional societies are often marked by
face-to-face interactions between patrons and clients, where ties of honour, loyalty,
family, or clan permeate the exchange, making promises to share spoils credible.19
Yet modern clientelism is much more complex. It involves networks – sometimes
based around a party brand and sometimes based on non-political organisations, such as
churches, clubs, ethnic communities, neighbourhood support groups, and so on. These
networks distribute benefits to a large number of clients, many of which have powerful
patrons at the top of the network who will never meet each client personally. Politicians
are able to adapt clientelism to the age of mass politics in this way precisely because
they embrace other mechanisms of direct contact between them and their clients: a party
brand, mass communication, and, especially, a complex network of brokers to help them
negotiate with a large number of potential clients. Herbert Kitschelt refers to this type of
modern clientelism as ‘anonymous,’ but it is far from it.20 In fact, for two-way
communication to exist, effective clientelistic organisations are known to invest heavily
in grassroots activists, or brokers, capable of both feeding the machine information about
voters’ needs, preferences, and behaviours as well as projecting confidence that
politicians will stick by their favoured clients once they are in office.21
If we consider what we know from the existing literature about the way brokers
ballot. In Peru, for example, scholars have found evidence that brokers’ capacity to enforce clientelistic
deals is generally weak (Levitsky and Cameron (2009); Munoz (2014)). In India, Schneider has found
that brokers attempt to "guess"which voters are cheating based on limited information (Schneider (2014)).
In São Tomé and Príncipe, only 12 percent of the voters claimed they had been punished by brokers for
violating clientelistic deals (Vicente (2014)). While all these works show evidence of the weakness of
brokers in solving one of the commitment problems pointed out here, they all acknowledge that the system
is used in every one of these countries. In a study of clientelism in Kenya, Kramon argues that brokers
are only capable of solving the second commitment problem I point to here – the one relating to long term
protection of client’s membership in networks. See, Kramon (2017).
16e.g. Bronk (2002).
17e.g. Drezner (2000).
18Keefer and Vlaicu (2007).
19Leal (1948); Scott (1969); Scott (1972); Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984); Lémarchand (1988).
20Kitschelt (2000), p. 849.
21Auyero (2001); Stokes et al. (2013).
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work, the assumption that they serve as a way to foster the kind of two-way
communication and personal connections with clients required for credible commitments
makes sense. Brokers and the clientelistic networks they represent are effective to the
extent that they insert themselves into the lives of the communities they deal with. The
assumption is even more plausible in settings where clientelistic networks have operated
for a long time, like in countries where they are much older than the formal democratic
institutions of the state.22 In Brazil, the logic of trading favours for political support has
existed for much longer than the current democratic regime. Even during the military
dictatorship that existed between 1964 and 1985, local elections for mayors and
alderman existed outside state capitals and a few large municipalities, and clientelistic
leaders remained active political players with the support of the regime.23 In other
countries, such networks were embedded in powerful political parties that ruled for
decades, such as the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) of Peru, the
Peronist Party in Argentina, the Democrazia Cristiana in Italy, or the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico. While Brazil’s party system does not
show the same degree of stability or unity that we see in other Latin American countries,
clientelistic networks have been remarkably adaptable and over the years and have
supported candidates from most of the country’s many political outfits.
In a way, the reliance that clientelistic networks have on brokers to establish credible
commitments between patrons and clients is analogous to what is described in studies
about credibility and trust in mafias. Like criminal gangs, clientelistic networks operate
outside the formal remit of the state and thus cannot benefit from the normal protection
that most individuals can rely on, such as binding contracts, courts to settle disputes or
freedom to advertise reputation openly. As in such organisations, participants in
clientelistic networks need to constantly assess the reliability of their counterparts and do
so based on ties of kinship, friendship, and other such personal connections that go
beyond the participation in the clientelistic network itself.24
However beneficial, resorting to brokers also creates problems for patrons. Stokes
and coauthors point out that brokers might prefer to channel benefits to loyal supporters
of the clientelistic networks, while patrons favour targeting clientelistic benefits at swing
voters.25 Keefer and Vlaicu highlight the fact that brokers demand a share of clientelistic
spoils of office for themselves and thus increase the cost of communication between
22Leal (1948); Chubb (1982).
23Skidmore (1993); Nicolau (2012).
24Campana and Varese (2013).
25Stokes et al. (2013).
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patrons and clients as compared to the traditional forms of face-to-face clientelism.26
Despite this recognition of the challenges that employing brokers poses to the
administration of clientelistic networks, most accounts recognise their essential role in
facilitating communication between actors. They are often described as agents able to
give patrons reliable information about the needs and political preferences of clients,
making it easier for patrons to curb cheating at the ballot box.27 Yet their role in enabling
patrons to credibly commit to sharing spoils of office after the election is less well
understood.
Brokers will communicate their patron’s proposals to voters and, at the same time,
keep patrons well informed about the political moods in the community they are
embedded. But to be effective they have to do a lot more than that. Unlike absent
patrons, they are usually well known to individual clients. Their personal and
professional lives are intrinsically linked to the community and their future depends on
the ability of the patrons in higher offices to channel public resources there. In Brazil,
some high-level brokers manage to get elected to local offices and serve as aldermen or
even as mayors in small towns and villages, thus signalling to more powerful politicians
their own ability to mobilise voters in one particular community.28 In other instances,
brokers may be rewarded by patrons with political appointments to the local offices of
federal and state bureaucracies that have high levels of discretionary spending, serving
both as facilitators in the process of distribution of benefits to clients and as enablers of
commitments between those clients and recipients of benefits. Others still can be
employed as advisors to their patrons through NGOs run by their political group or in the
patron’s congressional staff, acting mainly as liaison officers in their constituencies, or as
functionaries in ‘social centres’ or ‘charity centres’ that dispense favours and services on
the ground.
Brokers often go to great lengths to convince voters that their professional future is
tied to that particular village, town or neighbourhood, and they rarely have real hopes for
higher office and thus are unlikely to ‘abandon’ that group of clients. When national or
state-wide elections come, they often endorse specific candidates to congressional seats,
state legislatures and sometimes even governorships and senate seats, promising their
followers that if those they endorse are elected, there will be significant discretionary
funds available to that community – and, specifically, to those in the community they are
connected with. Such brokers rarely have any programmatic commitments to a party or
26Keefer and Vlaicu (2007).
27As described in the previous chapter, Stokes et al. (2013) make this a central feature of their theory of
why clientelistic arrangements collapsed in Britain and the United States.
28Novaes (Forthcoming).
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an ideology, but the clients they serve rarely care about such things. Rather, they serve
as guarantors that politicians’ promises will be kept. The system works because brokers’
careers depend both on their patrons’ continued access to resources and ability to channel
a portion of them to their communities and on clients’ continued willingness to trust and
support the network politically.
Evidently, professional politicians interact with voters at least during every election
and one could say this constitutes a repeated interaction system between patrons and
clients even without the need to put brokers into the model. However, brokers enable
information to flow both ways. Without them, communication becomes unidirectional,
with patrons able to use mass media and other tools of political campaigning to
communicate proposals to large groups of voters. Yet, this is a poor substitute for the
personal connection that enabled mutual credibility in clientelistic arrangements.
Embedded in what is by its very nature a personalistic relationship, clients need
reassurance that they will deal with someone that will have repeated interactions with
them, not with voters in general. Unlike patrons, brokers are credible when they promise
to a client that they will gain favours and special access to state resources because their
professional future is tied to a particular community where they had developed
connections to clients that often go beyond politics. In effect, they are – or must be seen
as – locals, without the resources or the inclination to leave the community whenever
they see fit and with a personal reputation for loyalty.
With efficient brokers, patrons will be able to solve the commitment problems of
clientelistic relations. To be sure, voters will still be able to use the secrecy of the ballot
box to cheat patrons into providing them with benefits without actually voting for them
and patrons themselves will still have the power to renege by going back on their
promises to their clients after the election is over. But repeated interaction between the
players of a clientelistic game make a cooperation outcome much more likely and less
costly.
In countries or regions with strong and stable parties associated with clientelistic
practices, maintaining a well-functioning relationship between the party leadership and
its brokers on the ground is crucial to upholding the party’s good reputation, even though
defections and intra-party competition among patrons for the loyalty of brokers could
happen.29 But in fluid party systems such as the one that exists in Brazil, assuring the
loyalty of brokers – who can easily switch from one party to another – becomes a crucial
priority for patrons. In clientelistic systems in general, it is not only the defection from
29Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni (2012) and Chubb (1982) offer detailed analyses of such systems
in Mexico and southern Italy respectively.
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his clients that the patron fears, but that of his brokers. In theory, patrons understand that
they can replace at least some of the voters they have cheated upon with other supporters
elsewhere. It is harder to rebuild a network of brokers that have credibility with their
local communities that can be used to enter into clientelistic arrangements. That is the
main incentive that patrons have to uphold the resource-sharing arrangement with
clients.
Similar systems of modern clientelism exist in many other countries, but differences
in socio-economic and political realities affect how arrangements work. Argentina, for
example, has adopted a closed-list proportional representation system that is different
from Brazil’s open-list. In that system, governors of the country’s small and powerful
provinces have great power in the ordering of candidates’ names in proportional elections,
thus exerting influence over how networks are organised. As a result, party brand becomes
more important and brokers have potentially less leverage over patrons.30 Like Argentina
– but unlike Brazil – Mexico has a long history of strong party brands associated with
clientelistic policies.31 When clientelistic parties are powerful, it is likely that the cost of
creating credible commitments to share spoils of office through clientelism for individual
patrons is lowered; nevertheless there is significant evidence that, even in those systems,
brokers play a leading role in organising networks and enabling credible commitments.32
My theory underscores one reason why clientelistic politicians tend to favour the
decentralisation of social policy decision-making: to make effective use of clientelistic
networks, patrons need brokers to be able to fulfil their promises to provide special
access to public services to clients. Since brokers are the ones that clients must trust, the
more control they exert over actual distribution of goods and services, the more credible
they will be. In an interview I conducted with an aid to a federal legislator in Brazil he
made this clear to me: ‘We [the team around the congressperson who employs the
interviewee] spend our entire office tenure trying to give mayors the tools to fulfil their
electoral promises. That is why we must have the "power of the pen"on our hands. We
have to be making decisions about the [social] programmes, otherwise the mayor can’t
look voters in the eyes in four years. Otherwise the alderman cannot go around asking
for votes. If we loose our local presence, we are doomed. Those guys [local politicians]
will end up campaigning for someone who they might think will be better [at delivering
promises] moving forward. They are faithful to the [budget] amendment, not to us.’ 33
30Spiller and Tommasi (2009).
31Magaloni (2006).
32Auyero (2001); Stokes (2005).
33‘A gente passa o mandato inteiro trabalhando para dar as condições os nossos prefeitos poderem
cumprir as promessas eleitorais deles. É por isso que nós temos que ter o poder da caneta na mão. A gente
tem que tomar decisão sobre os programas, senão o prefeito não tem como olhar no olho do eleitor daqui
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As long as the clientelistic network continues to deliver, there will be strong incentives
for brokers and voters to remain loyal.
This is a functional view of clientelistic networks. Such arrangements between
brokers, patrons, and clients might have economic, social, and even cultural roots that
predate and go beyond the role that they play in enabling credible commitments between
voters and politicians. In many places, such networks existed for generations and have
served many politicians and parties over the years. In other cases, networks are put
together by patrons who acquire new positions of power that give them the resources to
establish a clientele. In yet other cases, networks serve as a way for brokers to ‘shop
around’ in the political system for suitable patrons willing to channel resources into a
community. Notwithstanding the reasons they emerge in the first place, clientelistic
networks play a key function for patrons by making deals about special access to public
resources credible, and this function explains why patrons invest in them.
Returns to Scale and Brokers’ Inefficiencies
So far, my effort in this chapter has been to explain why patrons and clients rely on
brokers to intermediate clientelistic arrangements. The simple answer is that the particular
dynamics of clientelism requires personal connections between politicians and voters,
which in modern democracies can only be accomplished by relying on those agents on
the ground.
My theory also has implications about the efficiency of clientelistic networks that are
relevant to understand why some politicians choose to abandon it and instead push for
programmatic forms of income distribution. It suggests that even modern forms of
clientelism rely on personal connections and that a fundamental characteristic of such
arrangements is that they do not ‘scale’ well. Thus, politicians accountable to larger
constituencies may find it more efficient to relinquish their discretionary powers
altogether and adopt a programmatic relationship with voters based on impersonal rules
and bureaucracies.
Because of the personalistic nature of their job, one single broker will not be able to
credibly commit to providing benefits to too many clients. For clients, knowing a broker
personally, having direct two-way communication with them, being able to personally
assess their loyalty through previous interactions (that often go beyond politics), and
having a sense that a broker’s future is tied to that community for the foreseeable future
a quatro anos. Senão o vereador não tem como pedir voto. Se perdermos o contato local, estamos fritos.
Esses caras vão fazer campanha para outro lá que eles acharem que vai ser melhor lá na frente. Eles são
fiéis à emenda, não à gente.’ Interview with Legislative aid. Brasilia, July, 2015.
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is crucial to enable credible commitments in an environment of high policy discretion.
For patrons, brokers are also a useful source of information on clients’ preferences and
behaviour.
A handful of well positioned brokers will make all the difference in local elections
when a few thousand votes can decide if a mayor or a state assemblyman is elected or
not. But what about large races that are decided by differences of hundreds of thousands
or even millions of votes? Consider a candidate to become president that decides to bet
heavily on clientelism in a country like Brazil. Such candidate will not only have to
concern himself with the formidable challenge of finding the resources to share the spoils
of office with many thousands of clients – which would not necessarily be an impediment
if the size of the spoils of office were sufficiently large at the top, but would also have to
put together a network of thousands of brokers spread across a vast territory.
Brokers’ personalistic strategy does not provide the returns to scale that presidents
need. Adding an additional broker to a clientelistic network expands the size of its voter
reach by a fixed amount due to the intensity and frequency of interactions between
brokers and voters that are required to sustain the operation. Fortunately, different
options are open to presidents and presidential hopefuls. They can invest in building
personal reputations or ‘brands’ by communicating their programmatic ideas through
mass and social media. By doing so, they avoid making promises to individuals, talking
instead in abstract terms about laws and regulations that they plan to enact if elected to
office. While there is certainly room for cheating by unscrupulous politicians in
programmatic commitments made through mass communication, voters can always look
at the candidate’s past record in dealing with poverty and inequality as a way to infer the
candidate’s credibility.
There are numerous examples of how presidents and presidential hopefuls create this
reputation. In Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva ran for president three times before his
election in 2002. It was no surprise that once he took office he immediately started
working on revamping and drastically expanding the rules-based social programmes
created by his predecessor. As a member of Brazil’s 1987-1988 Constitutional
Assembly, Lula had been a leading proponent of enshrining articles that committed the
federal government to reforming social policy to increase its efficiency and reduce
poverty and inequality. In all his previous attempts to win high office he had made
income redistribution a cornerstone of his campaign. He made speeches, wrote
manifestos, and made a point to be seen alongside leading experts on the topic.
The same is true for many other presidential candidates in other countries. Some
write books and appoint famous experts as advisors. Others work with non-governmental
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organisations and prominent activists to gain credibility. Others still may choose to use
governorships as a stepping stone to show that they are qualified to be president, piloting
social programmes that they can claim will later be extended to the entire country. Be it
as it may, the initial investment that any politician must make in order to build a national
reputation is certainly much higher than the one required to employ a handful of brokers.
Presidents, however, must be willing to make these upfront investments because, while
the initial cost is high, the large returns to scale makes this strategy more efficient for those
wishing to gain favour with a large national electorate. In contrast, legislators who can
win only by courting a limited number of supporters are much more likely to be daunted
by the heavy start-up costs of such a strategy and stick to the clientelistic model.
This insight is key for the first part of my main argument: Not all politicians will be
equally well-placed to make good use of clientelistic networks and practices. When only
a handful of votes can make the difference between winning and losing office, clientelism
can be a powerful tool and I expect politicians who hold and hope to continue to hold
such offices to favour discretionary social spending. Conversely, for politicians that have
ambitions to run for higher offices, where hundreds of thousands or millions of votes
separate winners from losers, such discretionary powers will get in the way of a more
effective form of gaining political support through social spending. Instead of favouring
the type of discretionary spending powers that characterise clientelistic policies, they will
be better off by designing programmes based on objective rules that can be controlled by
specialised bureaucracies from the top. Crucially, this theory provides an explanation for
variations in politicians’ preferences for clientelism that does not depend directly on their
party affiliations or on voters’ relative wealth. Instead, it focuses on the incentives created
by the electoral system and the limitations inherent to clientelistic social spending itself.
This perverse logic that makes small groups more vulnerable to clientelistic practices is
perfectly captured in an old saying that is popular in Hispanic America: (pueblo chico,
infierno grande) (small town, big hell).
There is a second reason why presidents are more sensitive to the costs of the
broker-based system. Brokers may be a patron’s agent, but their actions cannot be
wholly observable or perfectly monitored. Did a patron’s support in a certain precinct
fall because other candidates did a better job campaigning or because brokers on the
ground failed to use effectively the resources made available to them? Are brokers
effectively targeting the voters more likely to switch allegiance or are they channeling
resources to some clients based on their personal preferences? Did the candidate fail to
mount an effective campaign or is his broker on the ground simply bad at his job?
These kinds of questions bedevil every politician engaged in clientelistic
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arrangements. Because brokers’ future is not only dependent on their standing with the
politician who hires them, but also on maintaining a good standing in the communities
they live, it has been shown that they distribute more than what would be necessary for
their patron to win an election and they do it to voters whom they have closer
relationships with, instead of seeking out those that would need smaller transfers to
change their minds and vote for the patron. This inherent inefficiency of the
broker-based system has been well-studied in the literature. In their work on vote buying
in 19textsuperscriptth century Britain, Edwin Camp and his coauthors pointed out that
politicians often considered their brokers (dubbed ‘party agents’) as ‘parasites’ or
‘traitors,’ a necessary evil to make the system work.34 In a separate paper, Camp finds
that Argentine brokers blackmail patrons for more resources by using the threat of
defection to rival party machines.35 Similarly, Mariela Szwarcberg finds that brokers in
Argentina are not only agents of politicians, but of other non-political social networks
such as money lending, childcare, and counselling. Their multiple loyalties ensure that
they distribute resources in ways that do not always favour their patrons.36 The most
important cross-country empirical work on the issue has been done by Stokes and
coauthors, who find evidence that brokers in Argentina, India, Venezuela, and Mexico do
not allocate clientelistic resources in order to maximise the vote share of their patrons,
but to maintain their own personal influence in the community.37 No work yet exists on
the topic using evidence from Brazil, but anecdotic evidence points to the same troubled
pattern of relationships between brokers and patrons. For example, recent discussions
about electoral reform following a Supreme Court ruling cracking down on private
donations to parties in 2012 focused primarily on limiting the number of brokers each
candidate could employ in his or her campaign.38
This evidence suggests another reason why scaling up clientelistic networks can be
problematic. Politicians must invest heavily on monitoring their brokers’ actions or
paying the cost of sub-optimal allocation of their resources.
By contrast, centralised bureaucracies that can collect objective information on the
state of poverty and inequality across the country and thus design impersonal delivery
34Camp, Dixit and Stokes (2014).
35Camp (2014).
36Szwarcberg (2012).
37Stokes et al. (2013), Chapter 4.
38For regulations on hiring brokers, see Federal Government of Brazil. Lei Federal
12.891/2013, Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/
2013/lei/l12891.htm, especially Article 100. For interpretation, see High Electoral Court.
Especial Minirreforma: lei impõe limites para a contratação de cabos eleitorais, 17 Dec
2013. Available at: http://www.tse.jus.br/imprensa/noticias-tse/2013/Dezembro/
especial-minirreforma-lei-impoe-limites-para-a-contratacao-de-cabos-eleitorais.
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mechanisms are an effective choice for presidents. The cost of monitoring their actions
will be significant smaller because their activities will be more transparent and therefore
simpler to observe. Like the process of building a reputation, setting up a centralised
bureaucracy to deliver social benefits requires a significant upfront investment, but it
provides higher returns to scale.39
Universalist Presidents, Particularistic Legislators
In the previous section I have shown why the cost of clientelistic arrangements is
significantly higher for presidents than for legislators and local officials and that policy
designs that bypass the broker-based system can be more effective for politicians
catering to a large, national constituency. In this section I will explain why presidents’
shift towards rules-based policies is not just escaping the costs of the broker-based
system, but also about the unique constitutional position that they have.
By definition, presidential democracies separate the political fate of presidents from
that of legislators. The former represents the entire country and in almost every
jurisdiction is elected by winning the support of a majority of the voters. To govern,
however, they must work together with parliamentarians who represent the interests of a
particular group of voters. As a consequence, we can expect that disagreements between
presidents and legislators over design, control and funding of social programmes will
reflect not only disagreements about what the optimal policy might be for either the
country as a whole or for some particular group, but also disagreements over how to
prioritise between these two constituencies.
Presidents, one can safely assume, must look at issues such as poverty and inequality
considering first and foremost the welfare of the country as a whole because of their large
and heterogeneous constituency. Conversely, legislators may be interested in national
issues, but their political survival will be tied to the groups who helped them get elected
in their constituency. When it comes to redistributing income, these two approaches are
bound to conflict with each other.
We can think of redistribution as a policy that provides two outcomes: one national
and diffuse and one local and concentrated. I argue that legislators and presidents will
disagree about the relative relevance of these outcomes. Whereas presidents will care
about the national effects of distribution, legislators will be more focused on the effects to
his constituents, placing the national implications of policies only as a secondary concern.
For legislators, distortions created by policies designed to send resources to their preferred
39To be sure, bureaucracies can also generate agency costs. See, for example Huber and McCarty (2004).
I assume here that these costs will be lower than the costs of broker-based clientelism.
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constituents will be a small price to pay to secure the favour of the groups that ensure their
reelection.
Because broad collective action of constituents in the design of distributive policies
is extremely costly,40 legislators can afford to make alliances with local leaders and
clientelistic networks on the ground with relatively little cost to themselves but with a
high probability of reaping electoral benefits. The benefits gained by a legislator for
concentrating resources on their supporters and excluding their opponents can outweigh
the costs of maintaining a broker-based system described in the section above. As a
result, legislators can be less sensitive to the cost inherent in supporting the broker-based
system because the benefits that they accrue from providing small groups of supporters
with privileged access to state resources is much larger than what would be for
presidents. At the same time, they may consider the cost of creating distortions in the
welfare system to favour their constituents as a small price to pay to secure the support
that they need to remain in office. The expected outcome was exhaustively described in
the sections above.
However, constituents expect different things from presidents. By the very nature of
their office as directly elected heads of government, in Brazil – and in most other
presidential systems – presidents need the support of a majority of voters. Brazilian
electoral legislation makes this broad accountability even more striking by using
mandatory voting for all literate citizens between the ages of 18 and 70.41 Their large
and heterogeneous constituency drives them to look at issues in a universalistic way. If
poverty or inequality goes up, it is presidents that get the blame. If policies are designed
in ways that are seen not to be fair by the broader public, presidents are also at fault.
Instead of finding ways to favour some chosen politically connected voters, presidents
must think of social programmes that appeal to both those that are beneficiaries of social
programmes and those that must pay taxes to support them – that have legitimacy with
the broad public as a necessary government action designed to produce a fairer and more
equitable society.
As a result, instead of investing in personalistic arrangements, presidents will be better
off by pushing for impersonal and objective rules of eligibility in targeted programmes or
by providing public goods. Instead of a network of brokers and clients, presidents will
prefer centralised bureaucracies that can be seen as impartial by voters and that allow
them to control social programmes from the top with reduced cost.
None of this means that presidents do not care about electoral outcomes. Like
40See, for example, Bates (1981); Olson (2009).
41Carey and Horiuchi (2013).
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legislators, they keep in mind that they can gain a second term, which has come to be a
hallmark of a successful leader in most presidential democracies that allow reelection. In
Latin America, however, this temptation is much stronger, as former presidents – even
those that secure a second consecutive term – rarely leave frontline politics as many
attempt to elect a chosen successor and return for a non-consecutive third term after four
or eight years. In Brazil, Lula da Silva has announced his intention to run in 2018 for a
third non-consecutive term as president, after the impeachment of his chosen successor
in 2016. In Chile, a country that does not allow presidents to run for a consecutive
second term, former presidents Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010 and 2014-2018) and
Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014 and 2018-present) have returned to active politics after
seating out one term.
Other former presidents become party grandees, sometime running for a seat in the
country’s parliamentary upper house or for another suitably distinguished office that
allows them to retain influence. In Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso has remained
closely involved in the internal politics of his former political party, mostly trying to
nudge its leaders towards the centre of the political spectrum and making sure
subsequent presidential candidates fielded by the party would defend his legacy of
privatisations and structural reforms. Itamar Franco (Cardoso’s predecessor) had
announced his intention to run for a third term before dying from a sudden stroke. Even
in Colombia, one of the few countries that bars both consecutive and non-consecutive
presidential reelection, former president Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) has consistently been
a major figure in all presidential campaigns after he has left office, supporting candidates
that had close personal ties with him. Even presidents in their final terms appear to know
that the best way to solidify their legacy and secure lasting influence in the public sphere
is to ensure that an ally – or at least someone sympathetic to their policy choices – takes
over the presidency after their are gone.
Presidential Particularism?
All things considered, it is safe to say not only that presidents care about reelection, but
also that they care about who succeeds them. This is relevant because, if presidents are as
driven by electoral outcomes as legislators and local officials engaged in clientelism, why
would they be so inclined towards universalistic policies when legislators are so driven by
particularism? Would not their incentive to elect a handpicked successor drive them into
the hands of their parties and, by extension, into the networks of clients that machines
control on the ground?
Recent works have cast doubt over the extent to which presidents can be absolutely
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universalistic in all their endeavours. Brandice Canes-Wrone, for example, has pointed
out that US presidents tend to favour more particularistic spending when in election years,
especially when their popularity ratings are low.42 Still looking at the American political
system, Kriner and Reeves have shown that presidents are indeed rewarded by voters for
the performance of the government as a whole, but also that they take into consideration
how these policies affect their local geographic constituencies.43
Indeed, there are numerous instances in Latin America in which we can find
evidence of presidential particularism – and specifically, clientelism. In Chapter One I
opened this dissertation by using Hugo Chávez’ misiones programme in Venezuela and
Mexico’s Pronasol as examples of clientelism. In Argentina, Presidents Néstor and
Cristina Kirchner (2003- 2007 and 2007-2015 respectively) have also been accused of
using the national government to empower the Peronist clientelistic machine throughout
the country. This is indeed a powerful criticism that must be addressed before we move
to the empirical part of this study.
First, it is important to point out that presidents’ electoral concerns do not mean that
they are absolutely beholden to a party machine. Much of my argument about why
presidents are in favour of rules-based policies is that they make sense for them both
electorally and as a tool to strengthen their positions as national leaders. As other
analysts of Latin American presidential systems have pointed out, parties throughout
most of the region do not completely unify their campaigns for presidential office with
those of legislators and local officials – precisely because they understand that what is
required to win the presidency is completely different from what is required of
candidates to seats in parliament or in local elections.44 The end result is that, while
presidents must indeed work together with legislators by allowing them access to the
resources necessary for them to keep the clientelistic machines running, the more
bargaining power they have over parliamentarians, the more they will be successful in
getting their way and pushing for rules-based policy designs. There are, however,
situations in which presidents are overly dependent on strong parties and must balance
their incentives to relinquish clientelism with their dependency on party oligarchies. I
will return to this theme towards the end of this chapter and in my study of Argentina in
Chapter Five.
Second, much of the criticism of presidential universalism is specific to the US case,
having to do with the distortions created by the electoral college that exists in that
country. That system does not exist anywhere else, making this argument irrelevant for
42Canes-Wrone (2006).
43Kriner and Reeves (2015).
44Samuels and Shugart (2010).
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my analysis. In Latin American presidential elections, voters are equal regardless of
where they are registered. This means that presidents have fewer incentives to adopt
distributive strategies that create spatial inequalities.
What I adopt here is a soft version of the universalistic presidency argument. While I
disagree with one of its premises – namely, that presidents are not motivated by electoral
outcomes – I propose that presidents’ unique position atop the political system, catering
to a large and heterogeneous constituency gives them unique set of incentives.
That being said, there are situations when we do observe presidents engaging in
clientelistic activities. These show some limitations of my argument. A first limitation is
that my theory assumes a certain quality of democracy and real electoral competition.
Where democracy is weak and electoral competition non-existent, patrons would have
little to fear from competing politicians and could more easily get away with cheating
their clients. Conversely, the more competition, the more leverage clients have to walk
away and punish the patron. For this very reason, politicians occasionally try to create
captive clienteles that cannot find other ways of accessing public resources other than
through the established network. In Brazil during the 19th and early 20th centuries, local
bosses were known to employ violence to punish detractors, especially before the
institution of the secret ballot.45
Secondly, my theory does not fit well with the logic of rentier states, where political
leaders – usually those at the national level – have at their disposal exogenous sources
of revenue that they can use to build nation-wide clientelistic networks. Such is the case
with many oil producing countries like Venezuela and Russia, where groups that captured
the national government were able to use the oil revenues that it controlled to establish
formidable national networks of brokers with their vast oil and gas revenues. The logic
of clientelism in rentier democracies is a topic in need of further examination by the
scholarship.
Thirdly, as I will further explore in Chapters Three and Four, presidents do not fully
control the agenda in parliaments and will often be forced to collaborate in clientelistic
arrangements with legislators and local governments as part of their strategies of
coalition management. Yet, as I show in Chapter Three, the federal government’s
spending on clientelistic programmes does not increase the likelihood that voters will
support a president or his chosen successor in Brazil.
45Leal (1948); Bieber (2000).
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Presidents and Particularism in Comparative Perspective
The idea that presidents and local politicians prefer very different kinds of institutions is
not entirely new, of course, and is consistent with a wider literature on the political
determinants of institutional design. In their study about the incentives facing politicians
when designing bureaucracies, Moe and Caldwell have argued that American presidents
have a strong incentive to be "champion[s] of effective, responsible
government."Conversely, legislators are by their very nature parochial and thus willing
to work with special interest groups in building ‘whatever sort of bureaucratic
monstrosity’ suits their interests.46 Shugart has argued that in presidential systems
legislators tend to be close to their regional constituencies and very responsive to their
demands for pork-barreling and clientelism, while a nationally elected executive has the
mandate to provide collective goods.47 In analysing US defence policy, Cowhey argues
that presidents approach the subject as a way to provide constituents with a public good
(security), whereas legislators are largely concerned with infusing policy with
particularism such as defence contracts for local constituents.48
Other authors have also highlighted that the personalistic nature of arrangements
between patrons, brokers, and clients imposes limits on the use of clientelistic practices.
Robinson and Verdier, Robinson and Torvik, and Keefer and Vlaicu, have all built formal
models that lead to the conclusion that clientelism is somehow a result of broader
failures of politicians to credibly commit to delivering public services during the
electoral process.49 Specifically, Keefer and Vlaicu separate politicians into those that try
to build reputations by keeping voters informed of their commitments and following up
on their pledges and those that rely on brokers (which they confusingly call ‘patrons’)
that build credibility through their personal relationships with voters. As I discussed
earlier, Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, and Brusco look at the issue from the point of view
of the debate about whether clientelistic networks tend to favour core supporters – those
that are loyal to the network – or swing voters – those that are indifferent between voting
for the clientelistic politician or not and are thus nudged to do so by clientelistic
transfers. By looking at this question they identify a divide between the interests of
patrons and brokers similar to the one I pointed to in this chapter: if patrons would have
an incentive to channel scarce resources to swing voters, after all, why would the patron
want to offer bribes to those already committed to your cause? Brokers, however, are
embedded and loyal to the communities where they live and work. Their own
46Moe and Caldwell (1994).
47Shugart (1999).
48Cowhey (1995).
49Robinson and Verdier (2013); Robinson and Torvik (2005); Keefer and Vlaicu (2007).
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professional future depends on their relationships with the locals. They are also
self-interested rent seekers, who live off public resources and deliver only as many votes
as is necessary for the network’s candidate to win the next election. For brokers, buying
the vote of a loyal partisan is cheaper and easier than risking their resources on a swing
voter who is not directly connected to the network. Relying on brokers thus presents a
principal-agent problem for patrons. Eventually, however, exogenous factors such as
economic development, urbanisation, and industrialisation, increase the costs of
monitoring and communication associated with the operation of clientelistic networks.
In those situations, Stokes and others predict that patrons will turn against their own
brokers and push for reforms that will weaken clientelism.50
Here I am not seeking to disprove those arguments, but rather to highlight different
mechanisms that can work to undermine a brokers-based clientelistic system. There is,
however, considerable debate within the literature about the assumption made by Stokes
and coauthors that the concepts of core and swing voters is applicable in developing
democracies, where programmatic debates are rarely at the centre of electoral disputes.
Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Estévez, for example, have built a core-voter model that
takes into account the calculation by clientelistic networks that core voters are their
supporters only because of past clientelistic benefits and the expectation that they will
continue to receive them in the future.51
Finally, my argument shares features with the classical critique of presidentialism in
Latin American politics. According to those who have originally proposed it, several
features of the region’s presidential systems make them inherently unstable. In those
systems, because the executive and the legislative branches are elected separately and
using different electoral systems, they would be permanently at odds with each other. In
a seminal piece, Juan Linz has claimed that, because presidents are elected nationally,
their goals will be ‘plebiscitarian.’ Their best policy strategy will be to try to satisfy as
many people as they can, rather than give in to interest groups. On the other hand,
legislators represent narrow subsets of the population. Their primary goal then will be to
satisfy the parochial interests of the people that elected them and to form alliances with
powerful interest groups, rather than thinking of the common good. With fundamentally
different constituencies, presidents and legislators are destined to oppose each other’
agendas and decision making will inevitably be paralysed by institutional disputes.52
50Stokes et al. (2013). See also Camp, Dixit and Stokes (2014) for an application of this theory to the
United States and Britain.
51Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni (2012).
52Linz (1994). See also Shugart and Carey (1992); Mainwaring (1993); Linz and Stepan (1996); Stepan
and Skach (1996); Mainwaring and Shugart (1997).
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Pessimists about Latin American presidentialism cautioned that the US system only
endured the test of time because of its strong ’disciplined’ two-party system.53 Having
decided to adopt different variations of proportional representation, Latin American
countries were condemned to political instability and deadlock. Yet, we know that most
of the region’s democracies have endured with reasonable levels of institutional stability
well beyond the 1980s and 1990s, when most of that criticism was first raised. We know
as well that significant – often unpopular – constitutional reforms were successfully
enacted into law by governments, including central bank independence, social security
reform, and privatisation of state-owned enterprises,54 showing that those regimes could
adapt well to constraints imposed by a changing global economy.
What this first generation of studies of Latin American presidentialism neglected to
account for was the powerful tools that those presidents have to manage fragmented
assemblies.55 Brazil has remained a paradigmatic case for those arguing that a powerful
president can provide stability under a fragmented party system. Most strikingly, the
Brazilian Constitution of 1988 has given presidents the ability to legislate by decree,
force special sessions of Congress to discuss executive initiatives, line-item veto
legislation, dislodge legislation from committee and send it to the floor through urgency
measures, and – most important for my analysis – the power to distribute resources that
can be used for clientelistic purposes by legislators and their allies in local politics.
The concern over the stability of fragmented presidential systems left unexamined
the issue of the quality of governance they could provide. Many Latin American
presidents found ways to build majorities because they had control over the distribution
of a number of forms of clientelistic benefits coveted by legislators and their allies,
including patronage. In countries where some form of coalition presidentialism took
root, presidents have often found themselves having to strike a delicate balancing act
between their own ‘plebicitarian’ incentives that force them to abandon clientelism and
the need to form majorities in legislatures where parochial interests prevail. In Chapter
Four I discuss how the federal distribution of clientelistic resources for local politicians
remains in place despite the fact that presidents themselves appear not to benefit from
such practices. Clientelism’s durability is, I will argue, a by-product of the bargaining
process inherent in Brazil’s ‘coalition presidentialism.’ Presidents, after all, cannot
always act unilaterally. They need to compromise sometimes – or they’d get nothing. As
we will see in Chapter Four, these compromises are an enduring feature of Brazil’s
53Linz op. cit..
54Kingstone (1999); Boylan (2001).
55Figueiredo and Limongi (1999); Chasquetti (2001); Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh (2004); Amorim
(2006); Figueiredo, Canello and Vieira (2012); Chaisty, Cheesemana and Power (2014).
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political landscape’ and often involve presidents providing legislators with the resources
to fund clientelistic machines despite the fact that chief executives cannot win electoral
support from that kind of social spending.
Presidents, Parties, and Clientelism
The theory I outline here paints a picture of presidents as independent actors, more or
less divorced from their parties’ consideration. But to what extent are presidents really
independent? Can their concern about the electoral future of their parties shift them
away from programmatic policies and towards clientelism? Can presidents simply use
the clientelistic networks of their allies in the legislature to effectively harness the power
of clientelistic distribution?
My response is that presidential systems tend to drive legislators and presidents
apart, making this sort of arrangement unlikely. As Samuels and Shugart demonstrate,
presidents tend to reach the top with weak ties to their parties. They rarely have strong
connections with their central party organisations and therefore have few opportunities to
engage in coordinated action with their party allies. In effect, legislators and presidents
run different types of campaigns and have little opportunity – and even little reason – for
close cooperation.56 It is worth quoting Samuels and Shugart at length here:
In pure presidential systems, parties are not likely to select candidates for
president for their skills at handling the party bureaucracy or managing the
party’s legislative contingent. Instead, because they must win an electoral
contest separate from legislative elections, parties will select presidential
candidates based on their outsider appeal, partly because the traits that
appeal to voters may be only loosely correlated with the traits that send
signals of reliability to party insiders. In making such choices, parties accept
the possibility of adverse selection in order to enhance their chances of
victory in the popular election for president. The conventional wisdom thus
assumes a trade-off under pure presidentialism due to the incompatibility
between being a good [party] agent and being a good candidate.57
Brazil provides ample evidence to support a view that presidents and legislators do
not, in practice, find cooperation useful or viable. Major presidential candidates find it
difficult to force party officials to unite behind them and often have to deal with legislators
and local officials in their own party actively supporting a rival candidate for reasons
56Samuels and Shugart (2010).
57Idem, p. 69.
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having to do mostly with local politics. For example, in the 2017 election, the alderman
of the Workers’ Party in the state of São Paulo – which one year before had witnessed the
impeachment of Dilma Rousseff – decided to ignore their party leader and presumptive
presidential candidate, Lula da Silva, and support the mayoral candidates put forward by
the governor of São Paulo, Geraldo Alckmin. For them, the fact that Alckmin would
be Lula da Silva’s main challenger in 2018 was not as important as securing an alliance
with the local governor.58 Such betrayals are so common that the High Electoral Court of
Brazil heard twenty complains of party bosses claiming that party members were actively
campaigning for opposition candidates in 2006 alone. When the issue finally reached the
Supreme Court, justices ruled that party members’ right to free speech included the right
to support candidates of rival parties.59
It is worth noting, however, that the extent to which presidents can mobilise support
from their parties will also be affected by electoral rules and party structure. Brazil’s
relatively weak parties tend to empower individual candidates. There are specific rules
that further weaken the hand of party leaders: a strong federal system creates numerous
regional leaderships with significant resources to attract mayors and other local officials.
Furthermore, campaign finance rules allow each candidate to effectively run a separate
campaign with no need to collaborate with any central authority to raise or spend any
campaign money.
In that regard, I propose that Brazilian presidents will have much weaker ties to parties
than some of their colleagues around the region. In other cases, such as Argentina, the
political system will inevitably create stronger bonds of dependency between party leaders
and presidents. When that happens, presidents’ incentives will be less clear: on the one
hand, the challenges they will face to cobble together networks of brokers will be less
significant, as they can rely on a well-established party apparatus on the ground that is
heavily dependent on the central party structure for the resources necessary to engage
in clientelism. On the other hand, presidents will still be the sole actors in the political
system responsive to a national constituency. The key dynamic that I expect to find in
such cases is that parties will act as a moderating force on the universalistic impulses of
presidents. Presidents will still attempt to carve space in the budget for their own rules-
58Fernando Taquari, Com apoio do PT, deputado do PSDB é eleito presidente da Alesp, Valor
Econômico, 15 Mar 2017.
59Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). Jurisprudência em Favor de Outro Partido ou Coligação. Avaliable
at: http://temasselecionados.tse.jus.br/temas-selecionados/propaganda-eleitoral/
propaganda-em-favor-de-candidato-de-outro-partido-ou-coligacao. On the right to
free speech, see Pedro Canário, Liberdade de expressão permite apoio a candidato de outro partido,
Consultor Jurídico, 29 Apr 2016. Avaliable at: https://www.conjur.com.br/2016-abr-29/
liberdade-expressao-permite-apoio-candidatos-outros-partidos.
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based policies, but will be wary of taking resources away from the machines that support
them.
What Clientelistic Networks Look Like
So far, I have discussed clientelistic networks in very abstract terms. Yet, they are very
real phenomena and their form of organisation is crucial to understanding the strengths
and weaknesses of clientelistic forms of income redistribution.
In conducting fieldwork for this thesis I had the opportunity to interview a number
of brokers and witness them doing their job of organising the distribution of clientelistic
spoils. These are individuals that work at the edge of legality, almost always uncertain
themselves if what they are doing at a given moment is illegal. It is no surprise, therefore,
that thee have been few studies on the inner-workings of clientelistic networks: It is very
costly and time-consuming to collect evidence on the micro-foundations of clientelism.
Two notable examples of such studies have been the anthropological work on Argentine
clientelism by Javier Auyero and the classic study of Italian networks by Judith Chubb.60
I use both works extensively throughout this dissertation.
A small number of recent works have looked at clientelism using both formal theories
and econometric techniques. The 2013 volume by Stokes and others referenced above
includes a survey experiment with Argentine brokers and a game-theoretic model that
shows why clientelistic networks work in ways that create incentives for brokers to give
benefits to core voters, while swing voters – who, in theory, would change their votes in
exchange for fewer benefits – are mostly ignored.61 Finally, a forthcoming piece by Lucas
Novaes offers statistical evidence that aldermen work as brokers for federal legislators in
Brazil. His article provides the best evidence so far for how crucial brokers are to the
electoral fortunes of federal legislators and how weak their loyalty to parties or individuals
is.62
From the existing literature, we can see that there is much variation in how
clientelistic networks operate. In Brazil, the evidence collected by Novaes shows that
networks are not faithful to a specific party or to a politician. Brokers will be constantly
on the lookout for legislators and other well-positioned politicians who can provide them
with the resources to satisfy voters.63 Auyero claims that Argentine networks are more
60Auyero (2001); Chubb (1982). Chubb’s concept of patronage is roughly equivalent to what I term
clientelism.
61Stokes et al. (2013) For survey experiment, see Chapter Four. For a formal model showing why brokers
favour core voters, see Chapter Five.
62Novaes (Forthcoming).
63Idem.
76
closely linked to a specific party and receive resources directly from certain legislators.
More recent anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that Argentine brokers do switch
allegiance in search or resources, but that the process simply takes more time given how
stronger party identities are.64 One thing is clear from the existing literature: Politicians
need to constantly channel resources to their brokers on the ground, and therefore,
parties that have more resources available to them get an advantage in access to
clientelistic networks. In a fragmented system such as Brazil’s, even very small parties
have access to clientelistic networks.
Unfortunately, there are still many unanswered questions regarding clientelistic
networks. For example, it is unclear how clientelistic networks are set up in the first
place. From interviewing brokers and clients on the ground, one gets the sense that
organising around such groupings to demand benefits from politicians is simply ‘how
things are done’ in many poor communities in Brazil. There is also limited evidence on
what happens to networks if a patron loses an election. Some brokers I interviewed had
more than one patron, not necessarily from the same party.
Conclusion
In this chapter I outlined a theory of why some politicians are more likely to favour
programmatic social spending, whereas others tend to prefer to maintain the kind of
discretionary distributive arrangements that characterise clientelism. My theory has two
parts. First, it explores the consequences of clientelism’s personalistic characteristics; it
relies on personal connections between politicians’ representatives and voters. For a
patron to make credible promises to provide his clients with privileged access to state
resources, he must rely on a network of brokers, who will work to establish personal
relationships with clients and help make commitments to distribute benefits credible
even in the absence of enforceable rules. Maintaining a network of brokers and awarding
benefits to clients is costly to politicians, so the utility of such strategies will depend both
on how many clients a patron needs to significantly improve his chances of being elected
and on how much political capital and resources he can realistically dedicate to sustain
his network of clients.
Second, it highlights presidents’ role as a national political actor, accountable to a
large and heterogeneous constituency. This means that presidents cannot be effective
leaders by catering to small groups of voters that are well-connected with political
64See, for example, Pablo Torres, Menos Estado, Más Clientelismo: Políticas Sociales
y punteros. Anfíbia. Available at: http://www.revistaanfibia.com/ensayo/
menos-estado-mas-clientelismo/.
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machines. Instead, they must establish a reputation as effective leaders, capable of
designing policies that can be seen as fair and efficient by both welfare recipients and by
those that pay taxes to fund the system. By doing so, I propose that presidents will be
rewarded by their constituents. In countries plagued by poverty and inequality they will
be able to establish themselves as national leaders, leave a lasting legacy and – as I
explore in detail in the next chapter – gain the support of voters when running for
reelection or when supporting a specific candidate to succeed them.
One of the main advantages of this theory is that it is simple and straightforward. It
highlights a logic affecting the incentives faced by politicians when deciding when to rely
on clientelistic networks to safeguard their electoral future. It is also powerful because it
relies on assumptions common to many theories and empirical studies that have examined
situations that are analogous to the operation of clientelistic networks.
In the next two chapters, I use both quantitative and qualitative evidence to explore
the validity of this theory. In Chapter Three I demonstrate that discretionary and
programmatic social policies have different effects on politicians’ chances for reelection:
spending on programmatic policies tends to favour incumbent presidents or their chosen
successors, while having no effect on the vote share of legislators in president’s party.
The reverse is true for spending on highly discretionary programmes. Here, spending has
no statistically significant impact on president’s prospects for reelection, but it provides a
major boost for incumbent legislators’ prospects. I show this to be true under
administrations of different parties of both the centre-left and the centre-right and under
different identification strategies.
In Chapter Four I turn to qualitative evidence, showing that political actors behave
very much in accordance with the theory and the incentives I describe, with presidents and
governors of larger states pushing hard for programmatic distributive policies, whereas
local political leaders tend to favour clientelism. I also explain how a dramatic shift in
power from Congress to the Presidency in Brazil is directly connected to the evolution of
large-scale programmatic social policies. As I develop the empirical case for my theory, I
return to a more careful discussion of the conceptual issues raised in this chapter.
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Chapter 3
The Electoral Consequences of Programmatic
Distribution
The theory I outline in Chapter Two provides for two observable implications that can be
used to test it. First, presidential candidates that are either running for reelection or are
supported by the incumbent will benefit in the ballot box from rules-based anti-poverty
spending, but their vote share will not be systematically affected by highly discretionary
programmes. Conversely, legislators in the governing coalition seeking reelection will not
gain much from programmatic social spending, but will profit from clientelistic schemes.1
In this chapter I use a unique database of anti-poverty spending in Brazil to statistically
test these propositions.
Winning votes from clientelistic social spending requires candidates to establish
personal connections with voters through complex clientelistic networks. Maintaining
such arrangements in turn forces politicians to hire brokers who can vouch for their
promises to deliver privileged access to government resources to their loyal clients once
the election is over. This is expensive for politicians and takes away from the benefits
they accrue from holding public office. The price of such highly personalistic
arrangements increases proportionally to the size of the network the politician in
question needs to build in order to retain office. Because the proportional electoral
systems in many Latin American democracies allow candidates within large districts to
form alliances with each other so that all their individual clientelistic promises count
towards the party list vote share, maintaining networks is affordable and a highly
profitable investment for most candidates that do not have presidential ambitions.
Latin American presidents, on the other hand, cannot hide behind party lists or a
handful of faithful clients. Instead, they have to find ways to improve the lives of the
majority of the voters in the country. Their electoral strategies may well include smart
alliances with key regional leaders, but this is a sideshow. For the most part, the retail
politics required to make clientelism work is too burdensome to be used as a large-scale
vote-gaining strategy in presidential elections. As I explained in the previous chapter,
1To be sure, there is no reason to expect that clientelism will harm presidential incumbents’ electoral
chances, i.e. that it will have a significant and negative effect on their vote share. In presidential systems,
candidates to the executive and legislative branches can campaign separately, even when they are members
of the same party. This makes it easier for presidential candidates to distance themselves from clientelistic
schemes or to make alliances with powerful patrons as they please. This is especially true in the case of
Brazil, where the party loyalties are weak.
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broker-based clientelistic networks are more costly for presidents due to their large and
diverse electorate. Furthermore, their position as a national leader makes them uniquely
accountable to a majority of voters – both those that receive anti-poverty benefits and those
that pay the taxes that support them. In order to build legacies and establish themselves
as strong leaders, presidents must design policies that are both centralised and seen as fair
and effective by their constituents.
This chapter uses a unique dataset to explore the empirical implications of the theory
The data – gathered and assembled over two years – contains information on the
Brazilian federal government’s major anti-poverty programmes from 2002 to 2014 in
each of the country’s 5.570 municipalities. In constructing this dataset, I relied on a
mixture of open sources and freedom of information requests.2 Each of the policies on
which I have gathered information has been adopted by the federal government with the
explicit intention of relieving poverty or indirectly supporting poverty relief strategies.3
As expected, I find that federal spending on the programmes that use detailed
legislation to circumscribe the discretionary power of politicians benefits presidential
candidates endorsed by the incumbent or running for reelection. By contrast – and in line
with my prediction – that same spending has no effect on the parliamentary vote share of
the incumbent president’s party. Conversely, programmes that give politicians significant
discretionary the power to choose who gets to be a recipient have no significant impact
on presidential candidates’ vote in any election. Nevertheless, spending on those
programmes benefits the incumbent party’s vote share in legislative elections.
Interestingly, this happened regardless of whether the incumbent president came from a
centre-left or a centre-right party.
What’s more, these statistical patterns hold for a variety of statistical models,
regardless of the assumptions made. The findings are also robust when we account for
the alternative explanations outlined in the literature, including the effects of party
membership and relative economic development of each municipality. And finally, they
also hold under different identification strategies.
All of this is encouraging, though of course there is more work to be done. One could
use the research design presented in this chapter to investigate whether the same patterns
exist in countries with different electoral systems, but this is outside the scope of this
thesis. It would also be desirable to continue collecting data for several more years so as
to test whether the patterns I describe here are robust to future political shocks or change
over time – if other political parties win the presidency, for example.
2See appendix on data sources at the end of the dissertation.
3Their goal is evidenced in the laws and regulations governing them, which are discussed in more detail
below.
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Measuring Discretion
The goal of this chapter is to examine the connection between social spending and voting
behaviour and how this dynamic shapes incentives for politicians to engage in clientelistic
activities. To that end, I first created objective criteria to distinguish distributive polices
are more open to clientelistic use from those that are rules-based. That is just the first step
in this analysis, but it is an important one.
We start by looking closely at one well-known type of policy design: conditional cash
transfers (CCTs). Much of the literature on CCTs has taken as unproblematic that their
design automatically excludes politicians from the decision-making process and replaces
discretion with objective rules that favour the poor.4 But this is not always the case. I will
elaborate on how politicians have successfully manipulated CCTs in Brazil to suit their
clientelistic strategies in Chapter Four. For now, it suffices to say that both in Brazil and
in other countries, politicians have found clever ways to use CCT rules in their traditional
clientelistic bargains. One strategy that has been employed in Brazil is establishing a very
low income threshold for programme eligibility, thereby creating wait lists. Such lists in
turn can be manipulated for electoral purposes, with politicians or their representatives
influencing the choice of which eligible citizens are enrolled first. A second strategy is
to tightly control information on the programme’s existence and enrolment rules, handing
out membership forms only in political rallies or even over-complicating the enrolment
process with bureaucratic procedures for voters who are not confirmed loyal supporters,
while providing enrolment assistance it for the ones who are. Because of politicians’
inventiveness, those who are serious about eliminating political favouritism must write
detailed legislation that anticipates most such possibilities in order to tie the hands public
officials now and in the future.
There are two straightforward – albeit imperfect – indicators of how much discretion
politicians have. The first is a simple count of the number of words in the legislation that
regulates it. The second is the number of words in the legislation divided by the number
of years that have passed since the policy in question was created.
The first indicator – the word count – is a raw signal of how dense is the regulatory
environment that politicians and civil servants have to navigate when dealing with a
programme. The second takes into account the fact that new legislation – mostly
secondary legislation – is produced every year simply to update the legal framework in
every government programme and make it consistent with the rest of the legislation of
the country.
We can see how the number of words in a programme’s legislation is relevant by
4Weyland (1996); Hunter and Sugiyama (2009); De La O (2015); Ferguson (2015).
81
looking at two clearcut examples. First take Bolsa Família, – a well-known CCT run
by Brazil’s federal government. To create this programme, President Lula published an
emergency decree with 5,746 words in 2003 that was later confirmed as a law by Congress
in 2004. This law in turn was enacted to modify parts of the 2,309 word-long law that
created Bolsa Escola, Brazil’s previous federal CCT programme.
As is customary in Brazil’s legal tradition, the Lula soon after issued a 15,657 words
decree to clarify how the Executive would implement the law and, using prerogatives
established under that law and its accompanying regulatory decree, successive ministers
for Social Assistance issued 207 portarias (a form of secondary legislation issued by
ministers), totalling 91,415 words,5 to regulate even the most mundane decisions that
would have to be taken by civil servants involved in the implementation of Bolsa Família.
As we will see in this chapter, this makes it by far the most densely regulated social
programme in the country and strikes a contrast with other CCTs enacted by Brazilian
municipalities at one time or another. Take, for instance, the CCT created by the mayor
of Campos dos Goytacazes, a city with a population of 470,000 people, roughly 300
kilometres from Rio de Janeiro. There, the municipal government created its own CCT
programme in 2004 using a windfall of tax revenues from vast oil deposits that exist
in that region. The municipal assembly drafted a simple bill, authorising the executive
to create a programme called Cheque Cidadão (Citizens’ Cheque) by collecting data on
citizens’ wealth and to award those living with an income below half a monthly (federal)
minimum wage a grant of unspecified amount and to impose unspecified conditionalities
on programme participants. The law has in total 1,508 words and no regulatory decree
was ever issued to clarify its implementation.
With so much discretion given to the executive, Cheque Cidadão became
synonymous with clientelism in Brazil’s political debate. Since 2004, three mayors in
that city have been arrested for using Cheque Cidadão for clientelistic purposes. During
the 2012 mayoral elections the press found that membership cards were distributed in
political rallies and could be activated only after the election was over.6
Few federal anti-poverty programmes are as unregulated as Cheque Cidadão, but
fewer still maintain the high standards set by Bolsa Família. In this chapter, I take a
close look at four of the largest federal programmes that were designed to alleviate
poverty in some way. By this I mean that I excluded from consideration any universal
forms of redistribution, such as public schooling or even programmes that where not
designed to benefit the poor directly, such as university scholarships. I also do not
5Excluding numerous mathematical formulae and standardised forms in the annexes.
6Campos tinha ‘lista clandestina’ de beneficiários do Cheque Cidadão, Época, 16 Nov 2016.
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consider programmes that are designed to build infrastructure or to address regional
inequality, but only those that provide either cash or a service to individual citizens. Two
of these programmes as clearly rules-based. They are Bolsa Família, the aforementioned
CCT, and the Estratégia Saúde da Família (Family Health Strategy), a policy designed
to provide basic preventive healthcare in poor neighbourhoods which currently has a
legislative framework with 51,366 words.
The two other policies I explore are highly clientelistic: both have very loose
regulatory frameworks. They are the National Fund for Social Assistance – or FNAS in
the Portuguese acronym – and the National Land Reform Programme. The FNAS is a
federal fund that pays for a network of social care centres throughout the country to
provide several forms of assistance to those in need as well as for a myriad of ad hoc
projects ran by municipal and state government and the federal administration. The
FNAS was set up to create what the law calls a ‘decentralised social care system’, funded
by the federal government, but administered at the local level. The total number of words
in the programme’s legislative framework is 29,521.
Land reform is the second highly discretionary programme I consider. Its regulations
are similar to those found in most land reform statutes around the world: land deemed
unproductive can be expropriated and redistributed to unlanded peasants – or those who
are deemed to be unlanded peasants – who latter may receive credit or farming equipment
from the government to establish themselves as small farmers. It currently has a total of
18,308 words in its legislative framework. I chose these programmes because they are all
national in scope and are representative of the two dynamics under study. They also have
existed for enough time for an assessment to be made about their electoral effects under
different conditions.
Few federal anti-poverty schemes are entirely clientelistic or entirely rules-based.
Many initiatives are in the middle of this continuum. Brazil’s Programme of Assistance
of Family Agriculture (Programa de Assistência à Agricultura Familiar), is a case in
point. PRONAF mixes some rules-based elements, but has been linked to clientelistic
practices in the past. Other policies appear to be new additions to the hall of rules-based
programmes, but have only existed for a small number of years and their electoral effects
cannot be credibly assessed yet. A clear example here is the ‘My House, My
Life’(Minha Casa, Minha Vida) initiative, that aims to subsidise or simply give away
low-cost housing to the poor, a signature policy of the Dilma Rousseff Administration
(2011-2016). ‘My House, My Life’ would clearly fall in the more rules-based camp in
my word-count continuum and I would expect that spending on this programme would
favour presidents, but not legislators. Others still are older programmes that appear to
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Fig. 2: Discretion index 1: number of words in the legislation governing each
anti-poverty programme.
have produced some legislation over the years, mainly because they have existed for a
long time and politicians have had to adjust their legislative framework to changing
overall procurement rules. Once we take into account how long these programmes have
existed, the appearance that they are becoming more rules based disappears. The most
prominent case in this category is the National Health Fund (Fundo Nacional de Saúde,
FNS).
Still others – indeed, many others – have very simple legislative frameworks, have
existed for many years, have national scope, but cannot be included in my analysis
because disaggregated spending data is not available. One prominent case is the National
School Lunches Programme (Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar, or PNAE), a
policy to pay for lunches for poor children attending public schools.
Figures 2 and 3 rank the programmes mentioned above along the continuum in two
measures of discretion based on their legislative frameworks. One is a simple word-count
of all the legislation regulating each of the policies – laws, decrees, and portarias. The
second is the an index of discretion calculated by dividing the word count by 2017 − Lp,
where L is the year in which the first piece of legislation creating programme p in its
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Fig. 3: Discretion index 2: number of words in the legislation in each anti-poverty
programme divided by the number of years since the policy was enacted.
current form was enacted.
Both measures give similar results. Some newer policies, like ‘My House, My Life’
go up significantly when we take into account their creation date, but for the most part,
clientelistic programmes remain clientelistic, while more rules-based policies are created
in this way and continue to be so.
Rules-Based vs. Discretionary Redistributive Policies
The criteria outlined above provides one way of separating the policies that are
clientelistic from those that are rules-based. A brief qualitative examination of the four
programmes examined in this chapter corroborates that criteria: the ones that have less
detailed legislation are the ones often connected with allegations of corruption and
clientelism. The sections below provide an overview of what the existing regulation
provides for in each of the four programmes and what evidence exists connecting them
to clientelistic practices.
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Rules-Based Policies
Bolsa Família
Few types of anti-poverty policies in developing countries get as much attention as
conditional cash transfers. Their basic idea is simple: all citizens (or households) below
a certain income level are eligible to receive some amount of cash from the government,
provided that they fulfil a pre-specified condition, such as sending their children to
school or showing up for health checks regularly.
This straightforward design allows politicians to incentivise poor citizens to engage
in pro-social behaviour they would not otherwise be able to afford – like sending children
to school instead of forcing them to join the labour force at a very early age. In this
simplest form, CCTs have the added advantage of eliminating much of the discretionary
powers that politicians in developing countries have over income redistribution schemes
and replacing them with objective criteria.
However, as I discussed in the previous section, such policies can be easily adapted
to serve politicians’ clientelistic purposes. In the mid 1990s, when the idea of creating
CCT programmes was seriously considered by mayors and governors throughout Brazil,
it was far from clear which model Brazil would follow: one based on transparent rules or
another that gave politicians wide latitude to do whatever would maximise their electoral
support. Most municipal CCTs created in the 1990s were short lived, usually lasting for a
few months before an election, and many mayors were accused of manipulating waiting
lists and enrolment rules to empower party brokers.
When the federal government decided to create its own programme in 2001, it did
not look at those policies for inspiration. Rather surprisingly, it looked at the example of
the government of the Federal District (comprised of the capital, Brasília, and its suburbs
and roughly equivalent to the District of Columbia in the United States). There, the
governor created in 1995 what was arguably the first CCT in Latin America. This was a
curious choice of a model to emulate. The governor at the time was Cristovam Buarque,
an economics professor of the then-opposition Workers’ Party with few friends in his
own party7 had gone to great lengths to insulate his flagship Bolsa Escola programme
from political interference. The design was simple: a small group of career civil servants
was designated to work in the poorest neighbourhood of Brasília registering families
with at least one child of school-age. Parents would sign a contract acknowledging that
they earned less then the monthly minimum wage and agreeing to keep every child in the
7Buarque, at the time represented a moderate wing of the leftist Workers’ Party that had opposed
longtime party leader Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and lost. He eventually left that party and joined a small
centrist outfit.
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household at school and ensure a satisfactory school attendance every month. If they
fulfilled this conditionality, families would receive one tenth of the monthly minimum
wage for each schoolchild up to the limit of three children per household. Buarque was
adamant that all qualifying families would be eligible for benefits irrespective of their
political leanings. In speech after speech he emphasised that membership in the
programme was not conditional on beneficiaries’ electoral support for him and that he
did not want beneficiaries’ votes in exchange for that benefit.8 Voters got the message.
So free did they feel to support other candidates that in 1999 they elected his challenger,
Joaquim Roriz, who scrapped the CCT in his first year in office and replaced it with a
traditional food handout programme.9
The federal CCT was created along similar lines to the one that existed in Brasília in
2001 and its name was changed from Bolsa Escola to Bolsa Família in 2004, reflecting a
new government’s emphasis on reducing economic inequality, rather then simply boosting
school enrolment. As the federal government scaled up the programme to include the
entire country, more regulation was enacted to curb possibilities that it could be hijacked
for clientelistic purposes. Much of the regulation enacted over the years has to do with
ways to measure the income of potential beneficiaries when they work in the informal
sector and do not have payslips. An entire division was created within the government’s
statistical agency to devise and regularly update such methods based on findings from the
country’s yearly population survey.
While the rules of Bolsa Família are very much crafted by the centralised
bureaucracy established within the Ministry of Social Assistance to run the programme,
implementation was left to municipal civil servants. Thus a second part of the
regulations deal with curbing any powers that local authorities could use to politicise
enrolment or conditionality monitoring. To tie the hands of municipal officers
empowered with the registration process, the government commissioned an elaborate
software system controlled by the Ministry in Brasília and which will only register new
beneficiaries when the data is entered correctly and the application is certified both by
local officials and a civil servant in Brasília. It also diversifies the registration options
available to potential beneficiaries by hiring state-owned banks and the Post Office – all
controlled by the federal government – to make preliminary applications through their
local branches, which can be later confirmed by municipal officials or by regular
‘missions’ of federal social workers send from the capital. To curb invalid registrations,
the system also uses social security numbers to cross-check beneficiaries income against
8Sugiyama and Hunter (2013), loc. 1922.
9I discuss regional and municipal CCTs in detail in the next chapter.
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Central Bank data on citizens’ banking and credit activities.
A final set of regulatory instruments imposes mandatory regular audits of the
programme. While this is clearly the most complex programme of all examined here,
cases of clientelism exist and are regularly picked up by the press. One investigation
found a municipal civil servant who registered 2,4 million beneficiaries in one day,
triggering an alert in the electronic system in Brasília.10 Another investigation found
over 4,800 beneficiaries that were over the legal income threshold in the state of São
Paulo.11 To limit these practices, the programme has been subject to special separate
yearly audits by the Court of Accounts and the Office of the Comptroller General. Audits
clearly do not make Bolsa Família immune to clientelism, but they do make it a less
attractive target for those wishing to reward political allies and punish detractors.
Saúde da Família
The second rules-based programme examined here is part of Brazil’s national health
service. Modelled after the British National Health Service, Brazil’s Single Health
Service or SUS, technically provides universal healthcare for everyone in the country
that is free at the point of delivery. In practice, however, lack of funding and inadequate
management means that access to SUS services is limited; those who can afford private
healthcare continue to hire private health insurance plans. Because of scarcity, access to
services in public hospitals is often mediated by political brokers, whose political
masters control – directly or indirectly – the health system in each municipality. The
practice of using administrative control to turn SUS into a tool for clientelism is so
widespread that a number of aldermen I interviewed talked openly about how they used
their powers to make doctors work part of their hours in private ‘social centres’, charities
maintained by politicians to cater to their clients.12
Saúde da Família was created as an attempt by the federal government to insulate
basic preventive healthcare from much of the clientelistic practices that are prevalent in
the rest of the health system. The idea is that the government hires health agents – not fully
trained doctors – to visit peoples’ homes and dispense basic, preventive healthcare. In a
country suffering from a shortage of doctors – and where doctors tend to prefer lucrative
private practices to working in a corrupt public healthcare system – this policy would fund
10Pente Fino do Governo Descobre Fraude no Bolsa Família. O Globo, 24 Ago 2016.
11MPF apura fraude de R$ 7,7 milhões no Bolsa Família na região de Ribeirão, G1, 21 Jul 2016.
12In one interview an alderman for a municipality in the state of Pernambuco stated: ‘we have a social
centre, to support the communities. We have dental care, legal counselling, a school, and an ambulance.
We bring in a GP, a paediatrician, and a dentist from [the local hospital]. The first two bring their own
equipment and the dentist sees our people in her [private] practice. Interview with alderman of the city of
Paulista, 10 Mar 2015.
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basic training for health agents, a less expensive option than providing care at hospitals.
As with the CCT programmes Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Família, this programme was also
inspired by a similar initiative in Cuba.13
Much of the legislation created under the Saúde da Família programme is about the
training of health agents. Most health agents do their work on the streets, away from the
supervision of their bosses. One potential problem that regulators appear interested in
curbing is that these positions can be used to hire favourites of local political bosses. To
curb that practice, the legislation put the training of agents firmly under the control of
the Ministry of Health in Brasília, which later provides funds for municipalities to cover
hiring of those that complete the appropriate training.
Further legislation addresses incentives to boost productivity of health agents.
Because overseeing their work is difficult the government has created a system of
remuneration based on the health indicators in each team’s catchment area. With that,
agents themselves are expected to complain about working with others who are there
mainly for political reasons and to resist pressure to politicise their visits.
This incentive-based system is possible because of a loophole in Brazil’s overall
health laws: while the Constitution and other legislation put municipalities and state
governments firmly in control of healthcare policy, the government realised there was no
mandate for local governments to control preventive care, thus affording the opportunity
for the Ministry of Health to assume control of this area by decree and regulate it by
secondary legislation. As long as Congress continues to fund such a system,14 and does
not pass legislation to revoke the decrees that created Saúde da Família, it remains
mostly outside the reach of the legislature.
Discretionary Policies
The National Fund for Social Assistance
This chapter deals mainly with large-scale national policies, but the reality on the ground
in Brazil is that anti-poverty initiatives are usually small, short lived programmes. The
National Fund for Social Assistance, or FNAS, was created in 1993 as part of a broader
government effort to help the federal government pool its social assistance investments
into one fund. In practice, however, FNAS has two functions. The first – not of direct
interest here – is to finance Benefícios de Prestação Continuada (BPCs), which are non-
contributory pensions for workers over 65 who are either considered disabled or have a
13Dresang et al. (2005).
14In the next chapter I discuss under what conditions presidents are able to maintain funding for their
preferred policies.
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Fig. 4: A member of the Minas Gerais State Assembly (right, not blurred) gives away a
wheelchair to a client (seated) in a FNAS-sponsored programme in the municipality of
Formiga.
per capita income of less than one quarter of the monthly minimum wage.15 The second –
and the one relevant in this chapter – is to support a national network of social assistance
centres that can provide unspecified benefits for people in poverty.
In practice, social assistance centres and the benefits they provide are mostly funded
by amendments to the federal budget designed to finance specific local initiatives that
have the support of federal legislators and their allies. Consistent with the theory outlined
in the previous chapter, most such programmes tend to cater to small clienteles. In 2015,
for example, one of the poorest municipalities in the state of São Paulo received FNAS
money that could only be used to refurbish a local football pitch, despite an ongoing Zika
epidemic in the region.16
When I was undertaking fieldwork for this dissertation I had the opportunity to
witness one example of how FNAS funding can easily be appropriated for clientelistic
purposes. In the municipality of Formiga, a city in the state of Minas Gerais, an NGO
was awarded a FNAS grant to distribute wheelchairs to the poor. The organisation that
received the money to run the programme did indeed give away 125 chairs in a ceremony
(see picture below) where each beneficiary would take a photograph with a member of
the state assembly who had secured funding for the initiative and who happened to be
one of the directors of the organisation.
15BPCs are technically funded with FNAS resources, but they are regulated by separate legislation.
Here, I exclude BPC spending from the model because of their separate legislative framework.
16Vereador em São Paulo dá mais verba a campo de várzea que à Saúde, Folha de São Paulo, 03 Set
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Because FNAS is so unregulated, its projects are often textbook examples of
clientelism: politicians work to earmark funding to some initiative they think will allow
them to reward their clients through FNAS. But the funding comes with political strings
attached. FNAS managers will often celebrate an agreement between the government
and the organisation specified by the politician who secured the budgetary amendment in
question. Because politicians often have influence over such organisations, they are able
to freely control who receives benefits and thus maintain leverage over their clients.
The Land Reform Programme
Land reform has been an issue of the Brazilian left for decades. This is not surprising
considering that a recent survey found that 44% of all land in the country was owned by
less than 1 percent of landowners.17 Virtually every Brazilian president since the 1940s
has promised some degree of land reform, either because of the potential for violence and
instability that the political mobilisation of landless peasants brings or, more recently, to
fulfil promises made to peasant organisations that helps left-wing leaders get elected. For
that reason, numerous land reform programmes have existed throughout Brazilian history.
Of interest here is the one presently in place.
In keeping with previous legal frameworks, the goal of the present land reform
programme is for the government to expropriate agricultural plots deemed
‘unproductive’ and grant plots to landless families.
Existing regulation addresses the definition of what can be considered ‘unproductive
land’ and the minimum size of plots of land that can be subject to expropriation (most
smallholders are exempt from productivity requirements). There is, however, great
discretionary power when it comes to actually expropriating land that has been
considered ‘unproductive and suitable for land reform’ (the language used in the
legislation). In each case, a presidential decree is required to complete the expropriation
process, making it possible for the president to stop or speed up land reform as he or she
pleases. Compensation to landowners is not strictly dealt with in programme regulations,
but is instead addressed in more general laws and constitutional provisions concerning
expropriations of private property.
The most important issue, however, is the selection process of beneficiaries. Here,
there are important criteria in the legislation that are based on previous residence in rural
regions of Brazil or experience in Agriculture. But the ways in which one can prove
eligibility are vague. The existing legislation is also mostly silent about who gets priority
2016.
17IBGE, Censo Agropecuário 2006. Brasília: IBGE, 2009.
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in the waiting lists. The Lula administration created some new criteria, giving preference
to those who are part of landless social movements, an attempt to bring in organisations
that have long been close to the Workers’ Party.
The land reform programme is often the subject of corruption or fraud investigations.
In 2016 the Federal Court of Accounts for the first time cross-referenced a list of land
reform beneficiaries with data from the Federal Revenue Service. It found that, among the
beneficiaries of the programme there were 61,965 business owners, 144,621 civil servants,
37,997 dead persons, and 1,017 elected politicians, including one senator.18 While cases
of corruption such as these do not necessarily point to clientelism, these two phenomena
often go hand in hand.
Research Design and Measurement Strategy
The previous section distinguished two types of redistributive policies: those which are
rules-based and those that are more prone to enable clientelism. It is now time to see
if these two types of policies altered the behaviour of Brazilian voters in the ways that
my theory would predict. To that end, I begin by identifying other variables that have an
independent impact on voters’ preferences. In this section I discuss the variables I use as
part of my original database on social spending in Brazil.
Dependent Variables: Vote Share in Brazilian Municipalities
Every four years Brazilians go to the polls to choose a new president. On the same day,
they choose the members of the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Congress.
They also choose the governors for their home states, vote to elect all members of the
states’ unicameral legislative assemblies, and renew part of the Federal Senate.19 Voting
is mandatory for every Brazilian citizen between the ages of 18 and 70, and optional for
those aged 16 or 17, over 70, and for those who are illiterate. For all legislative elections
apart from the Federal Senate, Brazil uses an open-list proportional representation
electoral system that greatly benefits small parties. A generous system of public funding
for parties that enables most tiny groupings to receive some funding serves as another
incentive for fragmentation. In 2016, for example, there are 23 parties represented in the
Chamber of Deputies20 and roughly double that number registered with the Federal
Electoral Court. For presidential, gubernatorial and mayoral elections in mayoral
18Fraudes causam suspensão do programa de reforma agrária. G1, 07 Apr 2016.
19There are three senators for each state and every senator is elected for a term of eight years, so in some
elections there are two senatorial seats at play in each state, and in others only one.
20This number changes significantly throughout the year as legislators switch party affiliation at will.
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elections in cities with over 100.000 registered voters, a two-round system of voting is
used whenever no candidate gets more than 50% of the valid votes. For all executive
offices, each candidate is allowed to attempt reelection for a second consecutive term,
but never for a third.
To compare the effects of social policy spending I look at two sets of dependent
variables: (1) the vote share of the presidential incumbent or of the candidate supported
by the incumbent; and (2) the vote share of the incumbent president’s party in the
elections for the Chamber of Deputies.21 In each case the vote share is calculated for
each one of Brazil’s 5,670 municipalities, excluding those for which data is not available.
The summary statistics for the dependent variables for each election between 2002
and 2014 are displayed in the table below.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables measuring the vote share of incumbents and
incumbent supported candidates and parties (2002-2014)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Presidential vote share 2002 5,476 0.309 0.132 0.022 0.801
Parliamentary vote share 2002 5,471 0.161 0.181 0.0004 0.885
Presidential vote share 2006 5,477 0.516 0.179 0.114 0.934
Parliamentary vote share 2006 5,472 0.119 0.099 0.002 0.670
Presidential vote share 2010 5,477 0.553 0.158 0.158 0.948
Parliamentary vote share 2010 5,475 0.148 0.119 0.005 0.812
Presidential vote share 2014 5,536 0.514 0.197 0.001 0.920
Parliamentary vote share 2014 5,535 0.137 0.127 0.000 0.805
Independent Variables
The key independent variables in my analysis are government spending per person in
each social policy of interest. I look separately at each of my four social policies – Bolsa
Família, Estratégia de Saúde da Família, FNAS, and the Land Reform Programme – and
calculate estimators for each election between 2002 and 2014 based on how much the
federal government spent in each municipality per person in each policy. Spending has
21In the time frame I examined in this dissertation, no presidential incumbent switched parties or
supported a candidate of a party that he was not affiliated with. Also, no incumbent president declined
the opportunity to run for a second term.
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been adjusted to account for any matching funds that may or may not be provided by each
municipal or state government.
Many models used here also include a vector of control variables that could affect both
social spending and voting behaviour in each year. Most such variables are measured for
every election-year – such as the party affiliations mayors and governors. Others are the
same for every model – such as the vote-share each of the two main parties received in
the 1988, which I use as a proxy for the electoral base each of them had before the period
analysed here. For FNAS there is no available desegregated spending data before 2006
and for the land reform programme there is only data for the year of 2006.
Descriptive statistics on all independent variables are displayed in the table below.
A full description of each dependent, independent, and control variable, including their
sources, is available in an appendix at the end of this dissertation.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables measuring spending per capita for each
anti-poverty programme of interest (2002-2014)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
2002 CCT spending p.p. 5,473 0.220 0.117 0.000 0.633
2006 CCT spending p.p. 5,477 0.762 0.472 0.002 2.859
2010 CCT spending p.p. 5,477 1.085 0.644 0.002 2.935
2014 CCT spending p.p. 5,129 2.478 3.918 0.004 9.866
2002 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 5,365 0.410 0.323 0.000 1,522
2006 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 5,522 0.743 0.519 0.000 2,988
2010 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 5,483 1.294 0.902 0.000 5,197
2014 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 5,048 2.072 1.320 0.000 6,367
2006 FNAS spending p.p. 5,522 0.101 0.575 0.000 0.279
2010 FNAS spending p.p. 5,483 0.172 1.134 0.000 0.714
2014 FNAS spending p.p. 5,048 0.271 1.751 0.000 0.914
2006 land reform spending p.p. 5,365 0.110 1.636 0.000 0.584
Statistical Analysis of Social Spending
The tables below report a series of coefficients for cross-sectional regression models using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specifications. I have clustered standard errors by state in
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each of the models in order to adjust estimated standard errors for any arbitrary patterns
of correlation within states, such as serial correlation and correlation resulting from state-
specific components. The OLS models address heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and
contemporaneous correlations using robust standard errors. In each case, the full results
for each model can be found in the appendix at the end of this dissertation.
The dependent variables across the models on the tables below are spending on each
of the social programmes of interest for the 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 elections and the
independent variables are the vote share of presidential candidates in each election. In
almost every election, the two rules-based programmes are associated with a significant
increase in presidential candidates vote share, while the highly discretionary policies are
not shown to be significantly correlated with voters’ choices in presidential elections.
Table 3: Effects of CCT spending on incumbent party’s presidential and legislative vote
share (2002-2014). See appendix for full regressions.
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2002 CCT spending p.p. 0.201∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.020) (0.033)
2006 CCT spending p.p. 0.079∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.006) (0.006)
2010 CCT spending p.p. 0.084∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.005) (0.006)
2014 CCT spending p.p. 0.001∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.0004) (0.042)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4: Effects of Saúde da Família spending on incumbent party’s presidential and
legislative vote share (2002-2014). See appendix for full regressions.
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2002 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 7.103e-02∗ 0.0283
(3.681e-02) (0.0612)
2006 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 0.0097 0.0098
(0.0234) (0.0220)
2010 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 0.0298∗∗ 0.0193
(0.0136) (0.0155)
2014 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 0.040∗∗∗ 0.640
(0.015) (1.254)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Overall, these models show two types of redistributive programmes: the first kind
favouring presidential candidates, and the other favouring legislative candidates that are
members of the incumbent president’s party. How can we make sense of these results?
The fact that redistributive spending favours incumbents is not surprising at all. After
all, prominent models of income distribution show that politicians redistribute income
because it helps them get reelected – or, in some cases, elect their chosen successors and
retain political influence.22 What is remarkable here is that presidents are not rewarded
by voters for federal spending in the two programmes that are more prone to clientelism,
while at the same time legislators in the president’s party cannot build a party following
using programmatic spending.
The answer is that clientelism has not been a good investment for Brazilian presidents,
who simply will not be rewarded by voters for engaging in particularism.
22See chapters One and Two for the discussion of literature, including my argument for why presidents
also care about reelection and about electing a chosen successor.
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Table 5: Effects of FNAS spending on incumbent party’s presidential and legislative
vote share (2006-2014). See appendix for full regressions.
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2006 FNAS spending p.p. 0.1173 0.11070
(0.1993) (0.2121)
2010 FNAS spending p.p. 0.1100 0.2445∗∗
(0.1215) (0.1070)
2014 FNAS spending p.p. 0.569 0.3197∗∗
(1.0106) (0.082)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Legislators that are affiliated with the party of government, on the other hand, appear
not to benefit systematically from the federal government’s signature spending on key
policies like Bolsa Família. Instead, they gain votes from investment in the programmes
that can be more easily used for clientelistic purposes. Again, this happens with the two
major Brazilian parties that have occupied the presidency for most of the time since
democracy was restored: the centre-right PSDB and the centre-left Workers’ Party.
Neither of them managed to use rules-based policies to build a loyal party following that
increased their legislative vote share.
There are two exceptions here: in 2006, Saúde da Família and FNAS spending
appear not to affect the vote share of the incumbent party at all. In the next section I
employ more sophisticated statistical techniques that show that the anomalous 2006
FNAS coefficient is more likely a result of endogeneity in the OLS models and that it
disappears under different identification assumptions. The Saúde da Família 2006 results
showing no relationship between spending and voting behaviour, however, remains an
anomaly that is does not fit any of the theories of redistribution presented here and could
be caused by measurement error. All these results are discussed in detail in the next
section.
Table 6: Effects of Land Reform Programme spending on incumbent party’s presidential
and legislative vote share (2006). See appendix for full regression.
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2006 land reform spending p.p. 0.557 1.522∗∗
(0.708) (0.668)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robustness to Endogeneity Bias
The OLS models above provide strong evidence in favour of the theory that presidents
have incentives to push for rules-based social policies, but that legislators favour the
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clientelistic status quo. But is it possible that the results are affected by endogeneity
bias? And can endogeneity bias be the reason that two of my results diverge from what
the theory predicts?
There are reasons to suspect bias in OLS models using observational data. For
example, it may be the case that social spending is collinear with unobserved variables
that also affect voting behaviour in ways that affect some policies more than others.
Indeed, it is well-known that politicians not only craft spending strategies with an eye on
future elections; they also develop them to reward voters that supported them in the
past.23. This could potentially confound the results.24 It is also possible that voting
behaviour is what is causing social policy to be distributed across municipalities in a way
that gives the impression that some are associated with legislative vote increase and
others with presidential vote gains. To put the problem in terms of microeconomic
theory, to explain the forces behind the supply of social spending we need to find
exogenous factors affecting demand for social spending.
I use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to capture exogenous variations in the
demand for social spending in each Brazilian municipality. The fact that both OLS and
instrumental variable models show the same overall pattern in the results is a strong
indicator of the reliability of my findings. A valid instrumental variable must satisfy the
exclusion restriction. That means that its effect on the dependent variable should operate
exclusively through the potentially endogenous independent variable. In this case, the
instrument must be correlated with the dependent variables of vote share in a first-stage
regression but not correlated with the error term of the second-stage regressions where
the dependent variables are vote share for each election.
It stands to reason that demand for social spending is affected both by short-term
processes – such as variations in economic growth or fiscal policy – as well as by long-
term historical developments. Unfortunately, most of these short-term factors will be
strongly connected with the same political variables that I am interested in. So the best
place to start looking for exogenous sources of variation should be in long-term trends
affecting the evolution of poverty in Brazil. My instrumental variable is the distance
between each municipality and the closest slave settlement that existed at the end of 19th-
century Brazil.
Slave settlements (quilombos) were safe heaven villages formed by runaway slaves
that would protect each other in order to evade capture by their former masters. They
existed mostly in areas were slave work was the dominant form of labour. In regions
23Cox and McCubbins (1986).
24The control variables for the incumbent party’s vote share in 1998 – before my analysis starts –
captures part of this variation in the OLS models.
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where colonisation was less intense, these settlements were rarer. Institutionalised
slavery existed in one form or another in the country since the beginning of Portuguese
colonisation in the early 16th century. At first, the colonisers attempted to enslave the
native population, much like the spaniards had done to the west in what is today Peru,
Bolivia, and Colombia. But Brazil was not home to large native civilisations before the
arrival of European expeditions.25 The Portuguese eventually preferred to bring slaves
from their colonies in Africa and the practice continued for centuries, even after Brazil’s
independence. Slavery was finally abolished in Brazil in 1888.26
One year after the abolition of slavery was signed into law, the government was
overthrown by a military coup and the new government signed a law requiring a national
census. This would be the first time the state would identify slave settlements and issue
their inhabitants formal documents as free citizens. That census was effectively
conducted in 1890 and its data would provide the first picture of slave settlements
throughout Brazil’s territory.
My argument for the use of this instrument is built upon the fact that development of
colonial institutions, such as slavery, had a significant impact on the evolution of patterns
of poverty and inequality in large European colonies and that Brazil is no exception.27
However, this influence is not equally felt throughout the territory. In some regions,
colonial exploration was more significant than in others and, as a result, there is
significant variation across the territory in terms of the degree to which colonial
institutions influenced later developments.28 and that variation creates institutional
differences that persist over time.29 Yet, their effects on day-to-day politics after such
long periods of time is only possible through their impact on institutions.30
To compute the instrument, I use data collected by the Palmares Foundation, an
organisation of the Brazilian federal government that works to preserve the history and
memory of communities of slave descent. I geocode all slave settlements identified in
the 1890 and 1900 censuses. With that data, I calculate a matrix with the distance of
each municipality of Brazil to the closest slave settlement identified in these historical
censuses. My claim is that this distance satisfies the exclusion restriction from a
statistical perspective and is therefore a valid way of capturing the exogenous variation
in the demand for social spending that drives all my independent variables. To further
25Archeological estimates put the number of natives living in Brazil when the Portuguese arrived in
1500 at roughly 5 million people. See Simonsen (1971), p. 271.
26Bethell (1970).
27Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001); Nunn (2009); Engerman and Sokloff (2012).
28For a full analysis, see Naritomi, Soares and Assunção (2012).
29North and Thomas (1976); Engerman and Sokloff (1997); Sokoloff and Engerman (2000).
30Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001).
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boost confidence in the validity of the instrument, I use a series of overidentification tests
using measures of distance to the Equator and distance to Lisbon for all Brazilian
municipalities to exclude a direct effect on voting.31 In all those tests, the overidentifying
restrictions never fail to reject the hypothesis that the instrument is valid – orthogonal to
the error term in the second-stage least squares regression in the Sargan-Hansen tests.
I conduct a series of IV estimations following the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
method. My main objective is to estimate:
Yi = ρS i + Xiβ + ci + υi (1)
where Ti denotes municipality i outcome for the election in question, S i indicates
spending in a given social policy in municipality i, Xi is a vector of municipality
characteristics that vary across space, like population, ci is a state fixed effect, and υit is a
random shock. This is the same estimators identified in the OLS regressions above.
The first stage of the just-identified 2SLS estimator is of the following form:
S it = γ1Mi + Xitγ2 + ci + i (2)
where Mi denotes the instrument that is the distance matrix between the centroid of i
to the nearest slave settlement, and i indicates the error term.
The over-identified 2SLS used to check the robustness of the instrument is the
following:
Tit = ζ1Mi + Xitζ2 + Ziζ3 + Eiζ4 + ci + ωi (3)
where Zi is a distance matrix with the shortest distance between the centroid of i and
Lisbon, Ei is another matrix, with the value of each municipality’s distance to the closest
point in the line of the Equator, and ωi indicates the error term.
The tables below display the results of the second stage of 2SLS regression for each
policy of interest between 2002 and 2014, with the results of estimations for presidential
vote-share displayed first.
31Distance to the Equator serves as an instrument for income and has been used before by McCleary and
Barro (2006) to show an inverse causal relationship between religiosity and economic growth. Distance to
Lisbon is an instrument associated with the intensity of colonisation.
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Table 7: Effects of CCT spending for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2SLS
models (2002-2014)
Dependent variable:
2002 pres. vote share 2002 parl. vote share 2006 pres. vote share 2006 parl. vote share 2010 pres. vote share 2010 parl. vote share 2014 pres. vote share 2014 parl. vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2002 CCT spending p.p. 0.117∗ −0.148
(0.060) (0.086)
2006 CCT spending p.p. 0.372∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.005) (0.011)
2010 CCT spending p.p. 0.180∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.003) (0.006)
2014 CCT spending p.p. 0.117∗∗∗ 0.055
(0.006) (0.347)
Constant −0.033 0.194∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ −19.956
(0.063) (0.019) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (0.016) (13.171)
Observations 4,901 5,471 5,420 5,472 5,420 4,901 5,062 4,571
R2 −2.192 −0.022 0.487 −0.004 0.562 −0.001 −3.823 −0.100
Adjusted R2 −2.193 −0.022 0.487 −0.004 0.562 −0.001 −3.824 −0.101
Residual Std. Error 0.228 (df = 4898) 0.183 (df = 5469) 0.128 (df = 5418) 0.099 (df = 5470) 0.105 (df = 5418) 0.119 (df = 4899) 0.439 (df = 5060) 13.373 (df = 4568)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 8: Effects of Saúde da Família spending for presidential and parliamentary
elections in 2SLS models (2002-2014)
Dependent variable:
2002 pres. vote share 2002 leg. vote share 2006 pres. vote share 2006 leg. vote share 2010 pres. vote share 2010 leg. vote share 2014 pres. vote share 2014 leg. vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2002 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 0.3304∗∗∗ −3.712
(1.042e-09) (2.6614)
2006 Saúde da Família spending p.p. −1.699e-07 0.2510
(1.566e-07) (0.2309)
2010 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 0.7554∗∗ 1.14922
(0.3180) (1.0813)
2014 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 0.3527∗ −2.1961
(0.1462) (2.5260)
Constant 0.905∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 1.801 −0.071 3.788∗∗∗ −0.004 4.328∗∗∗ 14.363∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.112) (1.189) (0.175) (0.438) (0.143) (0.359) (0.596)
Observations 5,247 5,245 5,394 5,393 4,840 5,352 4,431 4,428
R2 −0.491 −44.645 −2,493.807 −177.045 −18.844 −77.694 −5.714 −0.047
Adjusted R2 −0.491 −44.653 −2,494.270 −177.078 −18.852 −77.709 −5.717 −0.047
Residual Std. Error 0.160 (df = 5244) 1.226 (df = 5243) 8.921 (df = 5392) 1.318 (df = 5391) 0.697 (df = 4837) 1.054 (df = 5350) 0.516 (df = 4428) 12.981 (df = 4426)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 9: Effects of FNAS spending for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2SLS
models (2006-2014)
Dependent variable:
2006 pres. vote share 2006 leg. vote share 2010 pres. vote share 2010 leg. vote share 2014 pres. vote share 2014 leg. vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2006 FNAS spending p.p. −1.1517 3.1161∗∗
(8.1071) (1.1402)
2010 FNAS spending p.p. −4.7464 1.0006∗
(3.777) (0.5910)
2014 FNAS spending p.p. −2.4136 3.0764∗
(2.6511) ((1.4360)
Constant 1.704∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 1.384∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 1.114∗ 6.070∗
(0.840) (0.013) (0.665) (0.011) (0.662) (3.671)
Observations 5,394 4,879 5,354 4,838 4,951 4,902
R2 −1,405.868 −3.588 −1,173.309 −1.001 −367.032 −15.119
Adjusted R2 −1,406.129 −3.589 −1,173.528 −1.001 −367.106 −15.122
Residual Std. Error 6.699 (df = 5392) 0.210 (df = 4877) 5.437 (df = 5352) 0.168 (df = 4836) 3.828 (df = 4949) 51.138 (df = 4900)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 10: Effects of land reform spending for presidential and parliamentary elections in
2SLS models (2006)
Dependent variable:
lulavs2006 ptvs2006
(1) (2)
2006 FNAS spending p.p. −0.001 1.971∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.152)
Constant 0.923 0.090∗∗∗
(1.378) (0.003)
Observations 5,394 5,353
R2 −5,551 −0.372
Adjusted R2 −5,552 −0.372
Residual Std. Error 13.310 (df = 5392) 0.116 (df = 5351)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Interpretation of the OLS and 2SLS results
Some of the IV coefficients in the 2SLS models are notably different in magnitude from
OLS coefficients in the equivalent models. In some programmes, such as Saúde da
Família, we see a pattern of different results, with all OLS models showing a smaller
coefficient for the expenditure variable than the 2SLS regressions. A similar pattern can
be observed for the CCT expenditure models.
A likely explanation here is that the measures of social spending are endogenous,
but that direction of bias is not the same for every policy. One possibility is that there
are unmeasured factors affecting the dynamics between social spending and voting that
could not be accounted for in the OLS models despite the many controls included in
the regressions. Or it could be that measurement errors in control variables are affecting
the result in some systematic way. In any case, the results of the IV models potentially
eliminate biases that exist in the OLS regressions. Despite these differences, even in the
simpler OLS models the potential bias created by endogeneity is not large enough to
change the results save for one case. The association between 2006 FNAS spending and
and the incumbent president’s vote share becomes significant in the 2SLS model and thus
consistent with the broader pattern of results.
The one result that still is an anomaly in the 2SLS models is the 2006 spending on the
Saúde de Família programme. On that election, neither the presidential candidate running
for reelection nor his party appear to have benefited systematically from spending public
money on that programme. This result is intriguing and not consistent with any of the
standard theories of the political economy of income distribution.32 One possibility is
that this is a result of measurement error that affected the 2006 data in a way that did
not happen in other years. However intriguing, this remains an exception to the broader
pattern identified here.
It is also worth noting that a few of the coefficients for the programmes that afford
politicians with more discretion are very large. The OLS coefficient for the effects of land
reform spending in 2006 is 1.522, which is implies a considerable return for each real
spent in land reform to the Workers’ Party candidates. In the 2SLS regression for land
reform, the large is maintained and it remains statistically significant coefficient. There
are many possible explanations for this. The most obvious is that land reform was indeed
a very powerful way for the Workers’ Party to gain legislative votes in 2006, the only year
for which data was available. This interpretation would be consistent with the importance
32However, see Imai, King and Rivera (2016) for a recent work that found no connection between a
rules-based anti-poverty programme and voting behaviour in Mexico using experimental data. That result
is not consistent with any previous works on CCTs referenced throughout this thesis and is at odds with the
findings reported by De La O (2013) and De La O (2015) for the same policy.
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of landless movements within that party, which has been a vocal proponent of large-
scale land distribution for decades.33 It is also possible that 2006 was an anomaly, since
it was the first time a Workers’ Party president was running for reelection. However,
we cannot rule out the possibility of measurement error or even misreporting of land
reform spending. Obtaining desegregated data on land reform was particularly difficult
as the government denied a series of administrative freedom of information requests filed
between 2014 and 2016 and a judge is yet to rule on my request to have that full dataset
declassified.
Changing Names, Claiming Credit
One final issue of interpretation that must be addressed is how presidents are able to claim
credit for programmes nominally created by their predecessors. Wouldn’t the same party
always gain credit for a programme that they created?
The simple explanation as to why the incumbents have always managed to claim
credit for spending on election year is simple: rebranding. Both Bolsa Família and
Saúde da Família when through significant rebranding over their histories. Bolsa
Família actually started its life as Bolsa Escola under the Cardoso government. The
ATM-style cards issued under the programme were designed with the government’s logo
and included Cardoso’s campaign slogan ("Working throughout the country"). Once the
Lula administration took over, they renamed the programme as Bolsa Família and
reissued ATM cards to include the new government visual identity and Lula’s campaign
slogan ("Brazil: A country for everyone"). While Rousseff, Lula’s chosen successor, did
not rename the programme, she did reissue the cards under her own campaign slogan
("Brazil: A rich country is a country without poverty"). The issue of who actually
pioneered CCTs became a politically contested and was raised in each election since
2002. But, as the evidence in this country shows, the incumbent has always managed to
keep the advantage.
The same rebranding strategy is true of every other programme, including Saúde da
Família. When it was first created its full name was Programa Saúde da Família. Under
Lula it was renamed Estratégia Saúde da Família. As governments changed, new
uniforms were issued to health agents to comply with the incumbent administration’s
visual identity and slogan.
Similar strategies can be seen in other countries. For example, in Mexico a successful
CCT programme was renamed every time a new administration came to power. This
33Robles and Veltmeyer (2015).
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suggests that presidents do believe that they can capture the benefits of government social
spending with rebranding. The analysis in this chapter corroborates this assumption.
Conclusion
The models above provide robust statistical evidence for the theoretical argument
developed in the previous chapter. This is done using an original dataset on anti-poverty
expenditure in Brazil between 2002 and 2014. During this period, different governments
of centre-left and centre-right parties occupied the presidency, providing robust evidence
that the patterns observed here are not a function of the ideology of the governing
president. The findings remain consistent both in OLS models with state fixed-effects
and when I employ an instrumental variable estimation. As expected, more complex,
rules-based policies favour presidential incumbents running for reelection or their chosen
successors, but have no systematic effect on the incumbent’s party vote share in the
federal legislative elections. On the other hand, anti-poverty policies that have simpler
legislation and are known to provide politicians with significant discretionary powers to
reward clients and punish detractors significantly increase the incumbent party’s vote
share in the elections for the federal Chamber of Deputies, but have no systematic effect
on the presidential elections.
In the next chapter I elaborate on the mechanisms that link presidents to rules-based
policies and legislators to clientelistic arrangements and discuss in depth why recent
Brazilian presidents managed to gain enough power to push for the creation of the kinds
of policies that benefit them, but why they still must tolerate clientelistic spending in
order to build working majorities in the country’s fragmented legislature.
Chapter Four will show that the reality that presidents benefit from rules-based
policies and legislators prefer discretionary programmes is well understood by all
players. When elected in free and fair elections, presidents pushed for reforms that
would make social spending more rules-based. They sought opportunities to expand
their powers and consolidate a role for the federal government in income redistribution.
Conversely, legislators are sceptical of rules-based social spending. Their preferred
strategy is to invest in decentralised programmes that give them and their allies in local
politics significant discretion.
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Chapter 4
Taming Clientelism: the Rise of Rules-Based Policy
Making in Brazil
Like many other institutions, clientelism is path dependent. Once politicians and voters
start to develop connections based on trading political support for privileged access to
public resources, it is hard to get them to change their ways. Indeed, clientelism often
appears to be so entrenched that observers cannot be blamed for thinking that only
wholesale political change can bring about the emergence of programmatic social
policies. Yet, in the previous chapter I show that some politicians in Brazil do benefit
from programmatic social spending. Legislators running for reelection may not benefit
from rules-based interventions, but presidents and presidential candidates supported by
the incumbent did enjoy an electoral bounce, and a rather substantial one at that. As for
federal spending on clientelistic programmes, here I found legislators enjoying a
significant boost in their vote shares, while the vote shares accrued by presidential
candidates barely budged. Did presidential contenders from the centre-left fare better
than candidates from the centre-right? When it came to clientelistic programmes, it
made no difference: clientelism is a legislator’s game.
This finding helps us understand how programmatic policies made it on to Brazil’s
political agenda: they were put there by the presidents. When the executive branch had
the upper hand, programmatic, rules-based interventions were introduced (by presidents)
onto the legislative docket and enacted into law. But of course, this just moves the analysis
back a step to the prior question of how presidents came to be so powerful. How did they
get the upper hand? And are they likely to keep it? For how long? This chapter asks these
‘prior’ questions and suggests two simple answers.
First, Brazil’s presidents were historically weak and their choices deeply constrained
by powerful local oligarchies. President’s inability to cater to their national constituency
and to address national problems such as macroeconomic imbalances were seen as
having contributed to the economic and political instability in the 1950s and 1960s that
in turn opened the way to decades of military dictatorship. The framers of Brazil’s 1988
constitution were eager to move away from that system and drafted a constitution that
consolidated electoral democracy and significantly empowered presidents to respond to
the demands of their constituencies.
While Brazilian presidents were always directly elected elected, the significant change
created in 1988 is that voting in Brazil is not only for the first time a right enjoyed by every
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adult regardless of their income or their ability to prove a minimum level of education, it
is also compulsory for those between the ages of 18 and 70.1 This is a massive change
from the previous system in which presenting a school certificate or passing a reading and
writing examination was required for those wishing to register to vote.
The new rules quickly put enormous pressure on successive presidents to address the
crucial issues of poverty and inequality. In the 2010 Presidential Elections, more than
135 million voters showed up, many of whom lived well below the poverty line. To be
successful in such a contest at the national level, a candidate must find ways to improve the
lives of tens of millions of people. In this scenario, local clientelistic networks demanding
privileged access to state resources for just a handful of voters just get in the way.
The crucial moment in this process of presidential empowerment came in the
mid-1990s, when the country struggled enact structural reforms in order to control
inflationary pressures and to bring public sector deficits under control. Presidents used
these emergency reforms to gain even more control over public resources and to enact
federal legislation that limited the ability of local governments to issue debt and to create
state-owned monopolies that could be used to raise capital for the maintenance of
clientelistic machines. Since presidents managed to force fiscal responsibility measures
on local administrations, they have actively worked to take over the control over
distributive policies that once rested squarely with mayors and governors.
Second, even though Brazilian presidents are powerful, they still need to work with
congress to govern. Having been written mostly by regional leaders, the constitution of
1988 put congress and local officials in control of much of social social spending. Since
then, presidents have used every opportunity created by exogenous shocks – financial
crises, corruption scandals and even impeachments – to gain more leverage in social
policy design and implementation. Over time presidents have learned how to bring
clientelistic legislators on board. They did this not by threatening them (i.e., twisting
their arms) but by bribing them. These presidents were engaged in a delicate balancing
act. They were giving legislators what they wanted: the control of the resources
necessary to maintain and expand clientelistic networks. In exchange, however, the
legislators had to support the president’s rules-based policies, the passage of which
helped the president’s cause.
The reason why rules-based innovations never completely replace clientelism is that,
while the role and the power of presidents changed significantly over the last decades,
legislators and local officials continue to work under the same institutional framework
created in the early 20th century. As a result, while a new generation of presidents
1It is also optional for those aged 16 and 17 and for those over 70.
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gradually realised the potential benefits for themselves of reforming Brazil’s traditionally
inefficient distributive policies, congress has remained a natural ally for the clientelistic
networks that have traditionally dominated local politics. The problem is that the 1988
constitution continued a system in which Brazilian legislators are elected primarily as a
result of their deep connections with local clientelistic networks. These networks are
important because they mobilise voters to support a candidate in exchange for access to
state resources, not programmatic platforms. Putting together party lists that combine
representatives with access to various special interest groups and clientelistic networks
remains an effective strategy for parties running for legislative or local office. While not
all candidates will be successful, all votes matter when the time comes to compute the
proportion of votes that the party list receives. That is why it is often the job of those
who are elected to safeguard the interests of those who were not, normally by securing
them political appointments in government bureaucracies or budget amendments that
favour their clients. Party lists which mobilise a large collection of special interests and
clientelistic networks with enough brokers on the ground do well. Those concerned with
abstract causes or ideas, very often do not.
This chapter is organised into three sections. First, I provide a brief analysis of how the
Brazilian political system got to the point where it is now. Here, I explain how clientelistic
networks came to matter so much for local politics2 and why previous presidents did not
pose a credible threat to their power and influence. Second, I analyse in depth the system
created by the 1988 Constitution, explaining why consolidated presidents’ incentive to
fight for the interests of the majority – and, most notably, the poor – while maintaining
the role of legislators as natural allies of clientelistic networks ope- rating at the local
level. I also show why this very system created political stability by forcing Congress
and the president to compromise over their different spending priorities, resulting in the
current reality where resources have to be split between programmatic and clientelistic
initiatives, neither decisively defeating the other. Finally, I look at how presidents from
all parties since the mid-1990s have used their power in practice to gain control over the
design, funding, and on the ground implementation of key rules-based social programmes
from Congress, carving the space for action in the federal government that more recently
resulted in the creation of the world’s largest conditional cash transfer programmes and
significant reductions in the levels of inequality.
2To be sure, my goal is not to tell a history of clientelism in Brazil, only to contextualise its importance
for local politics dynamics in the country.
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Clientelism and Politics in Brazil
The tension I described in the previous chapters between a central government
responsive to a majority of voters and legislators and local officials accountable to small
groups has been a permanent feature of Brazilian politics. For most of the country’s
history, powerful local elites had the upper hand, keeping the central government weak
and resisting efforts of centralisation that would curb their control over taxation and
mobilisation of voters. Over time, however, presidents managed to assert some
independence over them, creating national policies, strengthening the role of technical
civil servants, unifying the tax system, and creating independent electoral courts. The
process was slow and filled with coups, rebellions, and authoritarian takeovers.
From the early days of independence in the early 19th century the first framers of the
country’s political system attempted to grapple with the issue of how to hold together a
vast and sparsely populated territory roughly the size of the continental United States with
little in the way of infrastructure connecting the different regions. Always present was
the danger of post-independence fragmentation and civil war exemplified by the former
Spanish colonies to the west and to the south.
Avoiding such a fate was the main priority of the country’s elites after independence.
To this end, they set out to emulate as best as they could the political institutions of their
former colonial masters – to the point of making a Portuguese prince their independence
hero and turning him into a monarch.3 The result was a hyper-centralised monarchy that
virtually replaced Lisbon with Rio de Janeiro as the ruling centre and where state
governors4 were nominated by the ruling Cabinet in Rio. While the arrangement was
successful in helping Brazil avoid the instability that plagued its Spanish-speaking
neighbours5, it proved to be unpalatable to many regional leaders in the long run,
especially after the end of slavery in 1888 eliminated the main reason local rulers had to
support the centralised monarchical regime. Local elites found that calls for a federal
system were a convenient way to push for the reforms they thought would enable
3Indeed, unlike in the former Spanish colonies, most of the immediate post-independence political elite
was drawn from the Portuguese ruling class and bureaucracy that had fled Lisbon in 1807 after Napoleon’s
invasion of Portugal. These men were trained and socialised in Portuguese universities and most had had
extensive previous experiences working for the Portuguese bureaucracy either in Rio or in Lisbon. For a
discussion of their backgrounds and how this affected the post-independence quest for stability and unity,
see Carvalho (1980).
4Until the end of the monarchy in 1889, provinces were ruled by the President of the Province (O
Presidente da Província). The Constitution of 1891 established the republican regime and renamed the
provinces as states (os estados). Presidents of provinces received the American-inspired title of Governor
of the State (O Governador do Estado). Here, for simplicity I always refer to the current names of those
offices.
5Merquior (1992).
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powerful local groups to remain in power in their states regardless of which party or
political group happened to hold office in Rio de Janeiro at the moment.6
A military coup in 1889 replaced the monarchy with a federal republican system
where governors and mayors were directly elected. A new constitution was enacted in
1891 giving governors and mayors ample political and economic powers and severely
limiting the ability of the newly established presidency to intervene in local affairs. Now,
for the first time, every adult male that could read and write would be allowed to vote.
However, the law gave control over voter registration and election monitoring to local
authorities, in effect limiting suffrage to numbers even smaller than during the monarchy
when only male citizens above a certain income level could vote. With nearly total
control over the voting process resting in the hands of local elites, presidential elections
were usually decided by agreements where political leaders from the two most powerful
states (São Paulo and Minas Gerais) took turns naming one of their leaders to occupy the
office. Control over local politics by small hegemonic groups was so tight that all
political groups in office in 1898 – the year when the first elections were held under the
new regime – remained in power until a new military coup overthrew the system in 1930.
A paradigmatic case, governor Antônio Borges de Medeiros stayed in office himself for
25 years straight without any opposition in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul.
From this point on, control over local clientelistic networks became one of the most
important tools politicians had to hold on to power. Governors stood at the apex of a
complex network of clientelistic arrangements throughout their states. To remain in
power, governors needed votes, which came mostly from the overwhelmingly rural
population that worked in large plantations in the countryside. Landowners could make
sure peasants living in their land showed up to vote and, through a mixture of vote
buying and coercion, make sure they would do so in the desired way – a task made
simpler by the fact that the secret ballot was only introduced in 1932. At the same time,
landowners depended on governors to secure access to government subsidised credit,
place their political protégés in well-payed government jobs, and to use government
police forces in local conflicts in the violent countryside. This alliance between rural
bosses, mayors, and governors for the control of regional politics became known as
coronelismo because of the widespread practice of governors awarding powerful local
bosses the honorary rank of colonel in the state-controlled National Guard corps.7 The
early republic took decentralisation to extremes and set the stage for many of the deep
rooted clientelistic practices that still persist today.
6Torres (1961).
7Leal (1948).
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To this day this remains the longest period of political stability in Brazil’s republican
history, but it did not last forever. The economic decadence of landowners, progressive
urbanisation and rising popular resentment with the established oligarchies eventually
proved too much. As the Wall Street crash of 1929 wreaked havoc in Brazil’s commodity-
dependent economy, a military coup in 1930 brought down the regime and established a
dictatorship that would last until 1945.
While the fall of the República Velha (Old Republic) – as the 1889-1930 regime has
been named by historians – is largely credited to economic factors, it provides some
lessons that are relevant to my analysis. First, it shows that vote-buying and patronage
systems tend to be centred around local political actors, even when the system empowers
politicians in higher levels with the control over the tools to make such arrangements
work. The 1898 constitution gave mayors almost no power over taxation or nominations
for public jobs – the very tools they required to make the coronelista system described
above work. Yet the literature consistently points to the crucial role played by mayors
and aldermen in organising voter coercion, both for their own benefit in local elections
but more crucially in the much more competitive gubernatorial and federal legislative
ballots.8 Second, it shows how such systems depend on keeping the number of voters
relatively small. The graph below shows the evolution in the number of registered voters
in Brazil from 1910 to 2010, with the dotted line representing the end of the República
Velha. For the 1910 election only 1.1 million people were allowed to register to vote,
representing 4.8% of the population of Brazil at the time. While the 1891 constitution
provided for universal male suffrage, it ruled that the illiterate could not register to vote,
a relevant consideration given that in the 1920 census 75.54% of respondents answered
that they could not read or write a small note. In the absence of independent monitoring,
mayors and local police used vague rules to to their advantage, registering and
de-registering people – both the literate and the illiterate – as they pleased.9
That logic is even clearer if we look at the numbers of voters in each state. In 1910
only four states had more than 100.000 registered voters (Bahia, Minas Gerais, Rio
Grande do Sul, and São Paulo), yet only five states had a population that was below
100.000 inhabitants on that year. The numbers of registered voters do go up, but only in
absolute terms, remaining roughly stagnant as a proportion of the country’s fast
increasing population throughout this period. As we approach the end of the 1889-1930
republic, reports of voter fraud and violence against those attempting voter registration
become more common in the press, replacing the traditional complains of vote buying
8Faoro (1958); Abrucio (1998).
9Leal (1948).
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Fig. 5: Proportion of citizens who are registered voters in Brazil, 1901-2010. Dotted line
marks 1930 coup d’etat
through the distribution of food and money to voters as the main concern of opposition
groups.10 Once powerful governors that had ruled their states directly or indirectly for
decades now faced credible challengers. One such challenger – a man called Getulio
Vargas – in 1928 defeated the quintessential coronelista governor of the state of Rio
Grande do Sul that had held office for 25 years by adopting a populist platform of
opposing the ‘old ways’ and modernising the state. After winning the governorship of
his home state on the back of the urban vote, Vargas ended up running for president in
1930 and, when he was defeated, organised a coup that brought down the regime and
installed him as a dictator from 1930 to 1945 with the support of the military.
As the República Velha collapsed, Vargas sought to build a new support base among
the emerging urban middle classes and reform-minded young officers in the military,
increasing the presiden’s power vis-à-vis the traditional rural bosses in the process. For
the first time, the central government sought to play a decisive role in poverty alleviation
and welfare provision, inaugurating Brazil’s version of what scholars later named a
‘truncated’ welfare state.11 Such early distributive policies would not be designed to
10Nicolau (2012).
11Lindert, Skoufias and Shapiro (2006); Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (2009).
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reach everyone, or even the poorest that lived mostly in remote rural areas and almost
exclusively made a living by working and trading in informal markets (as many still do)
and could not vote. Rather they would provide social insurance benefits to a small
number of urban middle class Brazilians that worked in the formal economy. They
encompassed old-age pensions, sickness and disability insurance, maternity and family
benefits, unemployment insurance, limited health insurance, and subsidised housing
loans. Vargas sought first to extend such policies to his most crucial supporters after the
coup: the armed forces. After that, civil servants, the judiciary and members of key
workers’ unions that supported the president were awarded similar privileges. Despite
the fact that the primary focus of Vargas’ efforts was in creating rights extensive to
formal sector workers, he also inaugurated a long tradition of the federal government
funding New Deal-inspired emergency public works programmes administered by
municipalities, mostly in irrigation and road construction designed to alleviate difficult
conditions in the dry areas of the northeast of Brazil that suffered with the decline in
cotton and sugar exports after 1929. In effect, these were the first systematic anti-poverty
programmes created in Brazil – more than a hundred years after independence.
This expansion in the federal government’s distributive role coincided with a limited
but significant expansion of voting rights.12 Women were awarded the right to vote in
1934, but the illiterate were still disenfranchised. A new open-list proportional electoral
system was introduced to curb the role of governors in each state in organising electoral
lists that included trusted allies on the top and punished detractors by placing their
names at the bottom. The party system was also restructured to eliminate regional
one-state parties that were controlled by local leaders. Instead, the new system called for
national parties that had to nominate candidates in at least seven states (out of 21) in
every election. A system of electoral courts was also established to provide independent
oversight of candidates’ compliance with the law and to register voters independently of
local governments.
Those reforms represented significant changes in terms of the role of the central
government had in the provision of welfare and in the power of the president to enact
policies independently of local leaders in general. However, they did not change the fact
that Vargas did not deliver on the promise to subject his own rule to popular elections.
The regime eventually proved unstable in the face of growing democratic aspirations and
the economic decline after decades of populism. It eventually collapsed in 1945 giving
way to a brief experiment with limited democracy between 1945 and 1964, which
12Legislative and local elections continued to exist under the Vargas dictatorship. Even though Vargas in
effect governed without seeking consent of the legislature, congress remained opened and some opposition
groups were allowed representation.
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eventually saw Vargas himself democratically elected and dying in office in 1954. The
authoritarian aspects of the Vargas regime were mostly abolished in 1945, but the
bureaucratic structure that was created to curtail the power of governors and mayors was
largely kept in place. Even so, presidents still had to rule by circumventing a very
powerful legislature populated mostly with representatives of rural elites13 and the
heavily politicised armed forces that opposed any expansion of the role of government in
welfare provision as ‘socialism’, something of a taboo after the Cuban Revolution of
1953.14
After Vargas, presidents could not be treated as mere puppets of the political elites of
powerful states anymore. They had began to slowly build their own constituencies and
to cultivate some independent powers to cater to them. Growing presidential power was
primarily a result of how Vargas managed to use the extraordinary powers of a dictator
and his vast personal popularity to give the federal government a role in programmatic
welfare provision that locked in the support of the urban middle class. Yet, all presidents
that came after him still depended heavily on local elites to gain support in vast rural
areas of Brazil. The result was not only felt in the political instability and deadlock
that marked the 1945-1964 regime, but also in the economic life of the country at that
time. In 1962 inflation reached 59% and was on the rise, the GDP was stagnated, and the
government was running a deficit of 452,7 million US dollars. In 1961 socialist leader
João Goulart became president and vowed to push for income distribution policies. He
envisioned a role for the federal government in providing social housing, redistributing
land to the poor, nationalising key industries, and what was then considered a ‘radical’
electoral reform that would give the illiterate the right to vote.
Of Goulart’s ambitious plans for social and electoral reforms, the only limited
success was in a pension reform that that was designed primarily to extend rights to rural
workers and those in the urban informal sector. His ability to get approval for those
reforms in congress has largely been credited to a surge in countryside mobilisation of
rural wage labourers, sharecroppers, landless families, and small farmers.15 Discontent
was particularly acute among sugarcane workers in the northeast of the country, where
the Communist Party – even though it was at the time an illegal organisation – was
successful in organising peasant leagues16 Goulart used the apprehension that this wave
of mobilisation caused to push for concessions. These came in the form of the Statute of
13Souza (1976); Nunes (1997); Santos (2000); Amorim Neto and Santos (2001).
14Stepan (1971).
15Chilcote (1974), esp. pp. 155-160; Novaes (1991); Maybury-Lewis (1994); Pereira (1997); Houtzager
(1998).
16Chilcote (1974), p. 156; Pereira (1997); Houtzager (1998), p. 107.
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the Rural Worker (Estatuto do Trabalhador Rural), which was approved by congress in
1963. The Statute extended labour regulations approved under Vargas for urban workers
to those working in the countryside and gave them the right to unionise. At the same
time, Goulart passed social-security legislation creating the Fund for the Assistance of
the Rural Worker (Fundo de Assistência ao Trabalhador Rural, or FUNRURAL), which
extended non-contributory pension benefits to rural workers above the age of 65 funded
by taxes levied on large agricultural producers. While congress indeed approved
FUNRURAL, its most conservative members managed to change the text to make sure
that the scheme would require implementation through additional legislation, which was
not passed until 1973, after a massive strike of sugarcane workers.17
Growing discontent with the shift towards left-wing populism at the hight of the Cold
War drove a wedge between the president and the most powerful political force that had
favoured centralisation since Vargas: the military. Goulart was eventually overthrown by
a military coup in 1964 with the backing of key regional leaders and a large share of the
urban middle class. The military would end up staying in power until 1985 and, during
that period they would have the opportunity to shape much of the political landscape with
effects that are felt today.
At first, the military coup was endorsed by most legislators, governors, and mayors
of key cities, especially in the rural north. But this alliance between the centralist
military establishment and regional oligarchies became unstable as the civilian leaders
realised that the armed forces would not relinquish the presidency after the arrest of
leftist politicians and activists as it had been promised to them.18 The armed forces
leadership was conscious of the role played by local politics in constraining the powers
of Brazilian presidents and that – even if repression against the left-wing groups could
bring elites together in the short-run – they would need to find an accommodation with
the traditional oligarchies to stay in power in the long term. When considering this
problem, the generals soon realised that the instability of the 1945-1964 regime had a lot
17See, for example, Houtzager (1998), p. 108 and Garay (2010) p. 37-38. Indeed, a few years after the
implementing legislation passed, the Supreme Court declared FUNRURAL unconstitutional. Final approval
for a new rural pensions scheme only came in 2001, under a new constitutional regime.
18It should be clear by now that for most of Brazil’s history the armed forces were a powerful political
actor. In total they intervened in politics five times, either to support or to overthrow the established
order. However, the only time the generals did not immediately relinquish power after overthrowing the
government of the day was in 1964. In the beginning the leaders of the 1964 coup promised presidential
elections in 1965, the year when Goulart’s term of office would officially end, but hardliners in the Army that
favoured a longer period of military rule in order to wipe out the ‘threat of communism’ ended up winning
the day. For most of their history, the military supported efforts of successive presidents to centralise
political power and curb patronage and clientelism, but concomitantly opposed an expansion programmatic
of welfare provisions to the poor. For more on the relationship between the military and Patronage, see
Jenks (1979), pp. 79-92.
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to do with the fact that legislators relied mostly on the support of governors and mayors
to mobilise voters and stay in office. Local leaders not only controlled the clientelistic
machines that brought the votes, but also had fiscal authority to fund their clientelistic
operations by creating new taxes and raising loans through state-owned banks. The
result was they could easily rebel against the president with no serious consequences.19
In some limited instances, the dictatorship worked to undermine patron-client
linkages. They unified and centralised the social security payments system and placed
the federal government firmly in charge, extending some benefits to every worker with a
formal contract, including sick leave and unemployment insurance.20 A new system of
semi-contributory benefits for the elderly and the disabled was also instituted.They also
extended healthcare benefits to some sectors of the formal economy that were left out of
the Vargas reforms in the previous decades through the creation of US-style private
healthcare insurance firms that would be awarded a mixture of government subsidies and
tax breaks to provide healthcare coverage for workers in certain sectors. Finally, the
government also instituted the first permanent national programme of universal and
mandatory vaccination in 1974, reaching close to 80% of the target population.21 Some
in the Army even proposed extending the vote to the illiterate in the legislative and local
elections that still existed in order to limit the influence of clientelistic groups in the
electoral process.22
But inside the regime there was enormous resistance to the expansion of the role of
the federal government given the importance of the support of the traditional oligarchies
to the dictatorship and the fact that the military had established its legitimacy as the
country’s rulers on fierce opposition to leftist groups.To solve this puzzle the generals
moved decisively to strike a new compromise designed to bring about both political and
economic stability and to consolidate their political role in the long run. On the one hand
they knew that the real challenge to the power of the presidency in Brazil came from
elites in local offices that had the loyalty of the overwhelming majority of legislators in
Congress and who opposed any reforms that limited local autonomy. They also knew
that an independent president would have incentives that were quite different from those
of more parochial legislators in Congress and that this conflict would result in
instability.23 Their policy for the most part was not to go after the clientelistic machines
that dominated local and state politics directly. Nor would they seek to accomplish the
19Figueiredo (1987).
20Malloy (1979).
21Garay (2010), p. 39.
22Jenks (1979), p. 50.
23Abrucio (1998), Chapter Three.
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nearly impossible task of controlling them directly.24 Instead, they aimed to create a
relationship of interdependency between clientelistic networks operating at the local
level and the federal government that would be given primary control of the tax revenues
needed to make clientelism work.
The generals would never subject their own rule to elections directly, but they allowed
for some electoral competition between local elites in each state, provided they did not
push too hard against the regime itself or did not stray too far into what they considered
‘leftist’ platforms. For this, they created a system of two political parties: one party fully
supporting the government and another serving as the sanctioned opposition. This served
as the testing ground for the new arrangement. The main goal of the reforms was to
make all political groups – both those in government and the ones that opposed – heavily
dependent on the president for resources.
Now only the federal executive would be able to create and collect taxes, and it
would later send a portion of the revenue to states and municipalities. While these
federal grants would keep most of the regional administrations afloat, extra resources to
expand local government programmes would have to be negotiated on a case-by-case
basis with Brasilia.25 As part of this new compromise, local leaders gradually managed
to re-gain control over key parts of the new federal welfare policies and transfer some of
the implementation powers to local administrations. The ever-increasing bureaucracy
established to handle social security was a particularly sought after prize, with regional
leaders in both parties working to nominate directors of a newly established web of
social security regional agencies that would process retirement requests, sick leave
payments, unemployment insurance. The new bureaucracy would enjoy flexible rules
that gave political appointees high degrees of discretion to decide who could benefit
from non-contributory policies. The same happened to the Department of Public Works
Against Drought (DNOCS), created to run irrigation public works programmes in the
dry areas of the northeast of the country, as well as the Institute of Land Reform
(INCRA). The most significant exception to this rule was probably the Movement for
Brazilian Literacy, or MOBRAL, a programme to provide free classes to eliminate adult
illiteracy throughout the country. Created in 1967, it was for decades the largest
centralised social policy in Brazil that was explicitly targeted at the poor. For reasons
mostly related to political propaganda, the military sought to make this policy work well
by creating a specialised bureaucracy within the Ministry of Education to design and
implement MOBRAL, insulating it from the influence of local authorities.
24See Chapter Two.
25Diaz-Cayeros (2006), Chapter 8.
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By keeping clientelistic networks in the hands of local leaders and at the same time
making a large share of resources for their functioning conditional on good relations with
the federal government, the military created the basis for the system that took shape after
they relinquished power. In effect, they gave the presidency the means to co-opt and
arbitrate disputes between the different regional political groups, a job that used to belong
to state governors. This did not fundamentally change the logic by which local elites
operated, but it created the basis for the system that was established after the military left
office. Presidents would never again be puppets of local elites as they were during the
República Velha, nor would they be at the mercy of local interests, fighting for survival
in an unstable arrangement like during the 1945-1964 limited democracy. The centre of
gravity of Brazilian politics had definitively changed from the myriad of parochial forces
represented in the legislature to the federal executive and a new generation of presidents
would now use these powers to tame the forces of clientelism.
Taming Clientelism
When it became clear in the late 1980s that the military were on their way out and that
the establishment of a true democracy – with voting rights for all and every political force
able to compete in free and fair elections – was all but unavoidable, the main concern
expressed by observes and leading figures in the country’s political class was that Brasília
could not repeat the mistakes of the 1945-1964 system.26 The fear of political instability
would deter the regional elites that gained prominence after the end of the military regime
from returning to a weak presidency system, but their desire for more independence would
lead them to partially reverse the fiscal centralisation of the military regime, forcing the
federal government to transfer a fixed portion of its revenue to states and municipalities.
Writing in 1990 – two years after the promulgation of a new constitution – political
scientist Juan Linz lamented that the Brazilian post-dictatorship political system was
‘unorganised and volatile’ and ‘not accommodating to a presidential institutional
format’. He warned that a return to a combination of proportional representation and
presidentialism, both in Brazil and in many other parts of newly democratic Latin
America, had made presidents once again hostages to fragmented legislature that had
more incentives to pander to clientelistic networks and vested interests than to support
the executive’s majoritarian agenda:
It is only natural that once a president is elected, parties are likely to turn to
their distinctive partisan agendas in their congressional elections and, even if
26Figueiredo (1987); Figueiredo and Limongi (1999).
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they were part of the president’s electoral coalition, assert their distinctiveness
by criticizing the president. It is also natural that, not having responsibility for
national policy, they would turn to to the representation of special interests,
localized interests, and clientelistic networks in their constituencies. There
is no reason for them to care about the success of a president of a different
party or to support unpopular policies because there is no reward for doing so
and, in fact, a great likelihood of being penalized. There are no incentives for
party responsibility or party discipline. In fact, often a president has to turn
to pork barrel and clientelistic policies to neutralize the opposition.27
In hindsight, it is clear that Linz’ skepticism about the stability of multi-party
presidentialism was premature: these systems have endured throughout much of Latin
America to this day. But how did the post-dictatorship system succeed in promoting
stability when previous attempts at reconciling a fragmented congress bound by
parochial interests and committed to clientelistic relationships with presidents’
majoritarian impulses had failed? The key here is presidential power. Since the
enactment of a new constitution in 1988, Brazilian presidents have extensive powers that
give them the upper hand when it comes to the design of government programmes and
bureaucracies. Take for example their powers to fast-track legislation through congress.
Instead of just sending proposed bills for legislators to debate and vote, they can issue
medidas provisórias (provisional measures) that have the power of law while they are
being debated in congress. While legislators can decide to eventually vote down a
president’s medida provisória, this often imposes an additional cost of explaining to the
country why a programme or policy ended after a few months on the books. In 1994, for
example, President Itamar Franco issued a medida provisória that completely rewrote
Brazil’s monetary system overnight, changing the country’s currency and pegging the
new one to the US dollar in order to curb a four-digits inflation rate. It took eleven
months for legislators to approve that particular piece of legislation and during that
period inflation rates fell from a yearly rate of 2.477% in 1993 to 5,91% in 1994. In
cases such as this, it is not difficult to understand why few legislators have the hubris to
vote down medidas provisórias after their effects have been felt. This shows how
unimaginably costly it is for legislators to go against a president when it comes to policy
design.
The constitution of 1988 gives presidents other tools to intervene in the legislative
process. For example, they can dislodge pending legislation from congressional
committees and force Congress to vote on what they classify as urgent measures before
27Linz (1994), p. 63.
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legislators can vote on anything else. In theory, these two powers to intervene in the
workings of the legislature could be interpreted as a recipe for instability, as legislators
would resist the executive’s agenda and attempt to push forward their own interests. But
if a legislator’s main electoral strategy is the distribution of privileged access to the state
to his clients on the ground, his interest in most legislative initiatives will be marginal.
After all, not being bound to support a strong party platform, a legislator can feel free to
negotiate his vote with the president or any group that has a vested interest in some piece
of legislation. This brings us to what is probably the most important tool that presidents
possess: their control over the budgetary process.
The 1988 constitution continued the practice adopted under military rule of giving the
preeminence to the president in all budgetary negotiations. They alone submit budgetary
proposals to congress, where legislators can vote them down and propose amendments,
but not replace the proposed budget with a new draft of their making. If for some reason
the president’s proposal is not approved in time for the new fiscal year, spending continues
as if the Executive’s proposal had been accepted until legislators come to an agreement.
Even congressional amendments are limited in scope and can mostly be applied to social
spending and to shift a limited portion of total revenues.
But even if the president is not happy with all the extra spending on pet projects
that legislators regularly attach to the bill, they do not have to worry too much. This is
because budgets are merely an authorisation to spend, not an obligation. After the bill
is approved, presidents will issue a decree freezing all the expenses they do not consider
essential – usually those placed there by legislators’ amendments – in order to maintain
fiscal discipline. They will then issue other decrees authorising the spending previously
frozen as part of their bargains with legislators, governors, and mayors.
Presidents also control the powerful civil service bureaucracies who are responsible
for actually implementing any government policies on the ground. While most civil
servants today are admitted through competitive exams, mid-level and senior
management positions are normally at the gift of the president. In 2016 there were
100.313 jobs that the president could freely distribute to allies in congress and local
politics as part of their political bargains. This represented roughly 16% of all civil
servants in the federal administration and does not include tens of thousands of sinecures
that the president can distribute in the management of state-owned enterprises, the
Central Bank, and a myriad of regulatory agencies with oversight over key sectors of the
economy. The distribution of patronage plays three key roles in the workings of
clientelistic networks. First, they are well-payed rewards to efficient brokers who are
able to mobilise a large contingent of voters for his or her political masters. Second, they
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provide such brokers with a privileged position from which they are able to control the
execution of government programmes on the ground. The more discretion the rules
allow, the more these political appointees can strategically use state resources to the
benefit of political machines. For example, a well-positioned broker explained to me
why legislators pushed so hard to nominate the superintendents of the Social Security
Administration agencies in different municipalities. I expressed to him my puzzlement
given the strict rules governing social security contributions and age limits for those
wishing to retire. This did not appear to fit my theory about how more rules-based
policies would not be of much interest to legislators.
This [position] had more power in the old days, when we did not have the
computer systems interlinked [with data on contributions]. In the
countryside there’s a lot of people with problems, that cannot prove
everything [necessary to get a pension]. They go there thinking that they
have 30 years of contributions28 and discover that their boss twenty years
ago did not fulfil his obligations and he did not know. In these situations we
could help. Today it is not like this anymore, because everything is linked
with the Caixa database.29 What we can do is to help with other kinds of
benefits, like disability retirement or temporary sick leave. In these cases it
depends a lot on the doctor that conducts the examinations and the
superintendent has a lot of influence, do you understand?30
Finally, some political appointment jobs such as directorships in state-owned
companies or regulatory agencies are important as sources of revenue for political parties
that can later be used by politicians to provide goods or favours to clients or to buy votes
on the spot. Once appointed to these posts, party officials (usually former legislators or
very high-level brokers) gain a say over which companies will receive lucrative
government contracts. And many of them have proved all too happy to make those
decisions based on bribes, which they then share with their patrons in Congress.31
28the current necessary minimum to retire
29Caixa Econômica Federal is the state-owned bank that collects compulsory social security
contributions and controls the system’s investment funds.
30Interview with broker in Rio de Janeiro, 04 dec 2015. Original in Portuguese: Isso tinha mais poder
antigamente, quando não tinha os sistemas de computador interligados. No interior tem muita gente com
problema, que não consegue comprovar tudo. Chega lá achando que tem 30 anos de contribuição e descobre
que o patr ao lá vinte anos atrás nã cumpriu a obrigação e ele não sabia. Nessas horas, a gente podia dar uma
ajuda. Hoje não é assim, porque está tudo ligado com o banco de dados da Caixa. O que a gente pode fazer
é ajudar com outros benefícios, tipo aposentadoria por invalidez ou auxílio-doença. Nesses casos depende
muito do médico que faz a perícia e o superintendente tem muita influência, tá entendendo?
31On the investigations concerning contracts based on bribes, see Mello and Spektor (Forthcoming).
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Investigations by federal prosecutors over the last three years have exposed how such
deals work to fund the electoral machines. According to prosecutors investigating
misdeeds that happened in the state-owned oil concern Petrobrás, executives appointed
by party officials saw their main job as charging illegal fees on deals with private sector
contractors and later channeling those fees to their backers in government, after
pocketing a portion for themselves. Estimates released by the attorney general’s office
suggest that since 1997, the companies involved in the graft scheme secured some $20
billion in subsidised credit from the Brazilian Development Bank, which is underwritten
by taxpayers. To ensure continued access to this gold mine, the companies lavished gifts
and other favours on cooperative politicians and contributed large sums, both on and off
the books, to party coffers.
One such operators was a former legislator named Pedro Corrêa. He was arrested in
2015 and later convicted to spend 20 years in jail for his participation in schemes to
defraud Petrobrás. Corrêa was president of Partido Progressista (Progressive Party),
which despite its name is a small right-wing party founded after the end of the military
dictatorship by politicians that had ties with the regime but that wanted to support
redemocratisation. Their stated ideology and historical ties with the military did not stop
them from joining the left-wing Workers’ Party in a coalition to support Luiz Inácio Lula
da Silva in Congress in 2003, as it had done with every other president before him.
When caught, Corrêa signed a plea agreement with federal prosecutors detailing how
nominations to key posts were used to raise money to fund political machines.
In mid 2004 a businessman in the field of oil distribution that had a company
[REDACTED] of oil distribution, had an ethanol distillery and several
fuelling stations under the name [REDACTED], he sought a meeting with
me saying that he knew that I had a strong relationship, that I had nominated
doctor Paulo Roberto Costa to be Director of [Oil] Supply [at Petrobrás]. He
was trying to make a deal with Petrobrás to buy 45 million litres of ethanol
that Petrobrás had. This ethanol was nicknamed inside Petrobrás as
"infected ethanol"because it was anhydrous ethanol that had been used to
clean ducts of diesel and gasoline. When this happens [the ethanol] turns
yellow, but can still be used [as fuel] (...). He bought the 45 million litres
from Petrobrás for 40% below the production costs. Of this discount, he
offered to our collaborators 4.800.000,00 reais in undue advantages, in
kickbacks (...). These 4.8 million reais were divided in the following way:
1.440.000,00 reais, which was 30%, was for Paulo Roberto da Costa. A
further 10% was payed to Genú [a broker that had organised the deal]. As a
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facilitator he was entitled to 10%, that was 480.000 reais. And the remaining
60% [actually, 40%] were payed to the Partido Progressista: 2.800.000,00
reais. (...) Now what did a party like the Partido Progressista want with a
directorship at Petrobrás, which was a technical department that no one
knew nothing about? What we were interested in was in appointing the
director to sell services to businessman and receiving resources. And those
resources – kickbacks – were used in elections.32
Corrêa goes on to detail how it was important for his party not to support anyone in
presidential elections. His policy was to let each regional boss choose which presidential
candidate or governor was more popular in their regions and support them. He knew
that after the election was over he would negotiate his support to whoever had won the
presidency in the legislature. In his own words, his party was a ‘party of deputies and
senators’.33 He details his negotiation for patronage positions in the government after the
2002 elections:
In my case, I supported [defeated presidential candidate José] Serra, because
I was an ally of Jarbas Vasconcellos, who was at the time the governor of
Pernambuco [and a member of Serra’s party] and so we voted for Serra. In
2003, part of the party had voted with Serra and we had a meeting of the
parliamentary party (...) and decided that we would join the Lula
Administration. (...) They authorised myself, Deputy Pedro Henry, who was
chosen as party whip, and Deputy José Janene who was chairman of the
party. We were chosen to set up our negotiating position so that we could
32Statement by former legislator and President of the Partido Progressista, Pedro Corrêa to the Federal
Prosecutors of the State of Paraná as part of a plea agreement, 1 set 2016. Original in Portuguese: Em
meados de 2004 o empresário do ramo de distribuição de petróleo, tinha uma empresa [REDACTED] de
distribuição de petróleo, além de ter destilaria de álcool e vários postos de bandeira [REDACTED], ele
me procurou dizendo que sabia que eu tinha relacionamento forte, tinha feito a indicação do doutor Paulo
Roberto Costa para a Diretoria de Abastecimento [da Petrobrás]. Ele me procurou na tentativa de fazer um
negócio com a Petrobrás em cima de 45 milhões de litros de álcool que a Petrobrás tinha. Esse álcool era
denominado dentro da Petrobrás de "álcool infectado", porque era álcool anidro, que tinha sido utilizado
para limpar os dutos de óleo disel e de gasolina. Ele ficava amarelo, mas era próprio para o consumo (...).
Ele comprou esses 45 milhões de litros da Petrobrás com um desagio de 40%. Desse desagio ele ofereceu
ao colaborador uma contrapartida de 4.800.000,00 reais de vantagem indevida, de propina. (...). Esses
4.8 milhões foram divididos da seguinte maneira: ficou R$1.440.000,00, que era 30% para Paulo Roberto
Costa. Foi pago a Genú, 10%, ele como operador teria direito a 10%, que seriam R$480.000, e o restante,
os 60%, foram pagos ao Partido Progressista: R$2.800.000,00.(...). O que um partido como o PP [Partido
Progressista] de administrar uma diretoria da Petrobrás? Não tinha nenhum interesse em administrar a
Petrobrás, que era área técnica que ninguém sabia como funcionava? O que nós tinhamos interesse era em
nomear o diretor para prestar serviço aos empresários e receber recursos. E esses recursos – propina – era
para se gastar em eleição.
33Um partido de deputados e senadores.
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make [political] appointments to join the Lula government supporting
coalition. Our first conversation was with José Jenoino, who was president
of the Workers’ Party at the time (...) So he set up a meeting with Minister
José Dirceu [Chief of Staff to the President] and he asked us to come up with
a list of the appointments that we wanted to make and he set up meetings
with his staff. We filled the requests. We wanted to make a number of
appointments. We wanted a directorship in the [Reinsurance Institute of
Brazil], a directorship at the [National Sanitary Surveillance Agency], the
secretariat of Strategic Affairs in the Ministry of Health, which purchases all
drugs for the entire Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Cities, we wanted the
[National Department of Roads], the Directorship of Supplies at Petrobrás,
the [National Urban Rail Company], the Federal Revenue Service, the vice
presidency of the [state-owned bank] Caixa Económica, [one] directorship at
the [state-owned bank] Bank of the Northeast, the presidency of
[INAUDIBLE], the management of the Treasury Operations of the
[state-owned] Bank of Brazil and some directorships of [civil servants’]
pension funds.34
The extensive wish-list shows how powerful the presidency has become but at the
same time how the resources that the executive has at its disposal are there to be used in
negotiations with legislators. Since the Vargas years, presidents have realised that
expanding the economic role of the state in the name of developmentalist policies could
provide them with ideal justifications to create more state-owned companies and political
appointment positions that can be distributed in exchange for political support. Pedro
34Statement by former legislator and President of the Partido Progressista, Pedro Corrêa to the Federal
Prosecutors of the State of Paraná as part of a plea agreement, 1 set 2016. Original in Portuguese: No
meu caso, eu fiquei com o [José] Serra, por que eu era aliado político de Jarbas Vasconcellos, que era o
governador de Pernambuco e nós votamos em Serra. Em 2003, parte da bancada tinha votado com o Serra
e nós tivemos uma reunião da bancada (...) e acertamos que nós íamos participar do governo Lula (...) e
aí fomos autorizados eu, como presidente do partido (...), Pedro Henry, que foi escolhido líder do partido
e o deputado José Janene, que era o presidente de honra do partido. Fomos escolhidos para montar a base
de negociação para que a gente pudesse fazer as indicações dos cargos e participar da base do governo de
Lula. No início nós tivemos a primeira conversa com o deputado José Jenoino, que era líder e presidente
do PT (...). Então ele marcou uma conversa com o ministro José Dirceu (...) e ele pediu que fizéssemos
uma lista dos cargos que petendíamos e marcou para que a gente começasse a fazer essas reuniões com os
assessores dele de gabinete (...). Nós entramos com os pedidos. Nós queríamos uma série de órgãos e aí
pedimos a ele. Nó queríamos uma diretoria do IRB, uma diretoria da ANVISA, a secretaria de Assuntos
Estratégicos do Ministério da Saúde, que era a secretaria que comprava todos os remédios do Ministério da
Saúde, queria o Ministério das Cidades, queria o DENATRAN, a Diretoria de Abastecimento da Petrobrás,
a CBTU, a Receita Federal, a vice-presidência da Caixa Económica, [uma] diretoria do Banco do Nordeste,
presidência da [INAUDIBLE], gerência da Mesa de Operações do Banco do Brasil e algumas diretorias de
fundos de pensão.
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Corrêa and others who signed plea agreements with federal prosecutors after the
Petrobrás corruption scandals detail why making such deals with presidents is vital to
party machines. The distribution of patronage represents a source of personal income for
brokers, elected party officials, and well-connected businesspeople.
But as Corrêa’s statement above as well as other evidence given in the course of the
prosecutors’ investigations show, most of the proceeds from these arrangements did not
go to support individuals, but rather party machines. Not only do the proceeds pay for
the day-to-day operations of outfits with no deep-seated ideological commitments – and
thus no ideological grassroots supporters willing to donate time or money – but they also
provide crucial resources that can be (re)distributed to potential voters in exchange for
their support. One example of how party contributions are used as clientelistic
distribution during campaigns was shown to me by a party broker in the municipality of
Penapolis, in the state of São Paulo. This particular broker took pride in her
organisational skills and how her services gave the family that has for decades
dominated local politics an edge over the competition. At each rally for her candidate
she would informally take attendance, writing down the names (usually nicknames) of
everyone present and later organising the information in a computer spreadsheet. Once
she was convinced that someone was a regular supporter she would occasionally award
them vouchers for free gasoline that could be redeemed at a local fuelling station such as
the ones displayed in the picture below.
This well-funded ground game was only possible, I was told, because her boss’s
brother had connections ‘with a minister in Brasília’ (she would not tell which one) and
thus could secure funds to maintain the office active for most of the year, collecting
information, awarding small gifts to loyal clients, and crucially, retaining talented
brokers such as the one organising this particular distribution system. The importance of
public funding for such schemes is evidenced by the fact that, when I used one of the
vouchers that the broker gave me in a show of friendship, I not only managed to get 20
reais worth of gas (minus taxes), but was also given – after some bargaining with the
fuelling station attendant – an invoice showing that the gas was billed to the public grant
account, not to someone’s private account (see Fig. 3). Essentially, the power of
presidents to hand out patronage is the power to distribute opportunities for clientelism
and corruption among different political groups.
With such powers it would be easy to imagine that presidents would always be able
to subdue the parochial interests of legislators and impose their majoritarian preferences
on disorganised and weak legislators. Indeed, the Brazilian system is not plagued by
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Fig. 6: Voucher for 20 reais to be used at a fuelling station.
Fig. 7: Invoice showing clientelism ‘gift’ billed to a public grant account.
polarisation or gridlock such as the United States’, South Korea’s and other presidential
democracies. With the immense powers they have been granted since 1988, Brazilian
presidents do indeed get a lot of legislative activity out of Congress. In the three decades
since its existence, the current Brazilian constitution got amended a whopping 91 times
and most new laws do indeed come to the floor straight out of the presidential palace.
Many start their lives as presidential medidas provisórias.35 Presidents managed to do
this even if none of them ever enjoyed a majority in congress. In fact, no elected president
ever came from the party with the largest number of legislators in congress. Yet, in the
last two decades congress has agreed to pass major reforms that among others changed
the pillars of the country’s macroeconomic policy, privatised state monopolies, and, as I
discuss below, restructured the country’s redistributive framework to create and fund the
first generation of rules-based social policies designed to reach the poorest Brazilians.
But much of this power comes at a significant cost. This is because even a reactive
legislature like the one that exists in Brazil has significant powers to modify proposals
that presidents send when crucial interests are at stake. A long review of legislative
proposals by Barry Ames shows that, while the overwhelming majority of legislative
bills approved by congress originated in the executive, almost none of them passed the
legislature without significant modifications in the original text.36 Cox and Morgenstern
argued that the optimal response of a strong president when negotiating with reactive
legislatures is to seek the support of programmatic parties first and then distribute
clientelistic opportunities to the more parochial elements of the legislature as needed.37
In theory, if a president could put together a large enough coalition of programmatic
parties in support of a compromise agenda, clientelism could be treated as only a
complimentary strategy in the grand scheme of things. Presidents would set the agenda
and legislatures could react to it seeking to force the executive to take their concerns into
account at least in part. Yet, as Cox and Morgenstern point out, Brazilian and Argentine
presidents have a particularly difficult life in this regard because the electoral system
makes it hard for such programmatic parties to emerge in the first place. In their words
‘the PT in Brazil, which currently has only eleven percent of the legislative seats, is the
only significant class-based party’38
The framers of the 1988 constitution took the lessons of Brazil’s history of political
instability under weak presidents seriously enough to give the new executive the powers
35Figueiredo and Limongi (1999), Chapter Two presents detailed descriptive statistics.
36Ames (2002).
37Cox and Morgenstern (2001).
38Idem, p. 175. Interestingly enough, in 2016 the Workers’ Party still has 10% of the legislative seats in
the lower house, where it is the second largest party.
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to broadly shape the legislative agenda and the control over the discretionary resources
coveted by legislators in order to help them build working coalitions in congress. But
they also partially reverted the fiscal centralisation enacted by the military regime. Under
the new constitution the federal government would continue to enjoy a monopoly of tax
collection powers and local administrations would still be forbidden from creating new
contributions. But with the new constitution mandatory transfers would increase
dramatically in order to support more decentralised public healthcare, education, and
antipoverty programmes that the new constitution created. States and municipalities also
regained some power to issue their own debt and further leeway to manage regional
state-owned banks that they could use to increase access to capital markers and thus
decrease their dependency from the central government. In the next section I describe
the negotiation process that lead to presidents keeping significant formal powers under
the 1988 constitution and what this new document meant in terms of social policy
development. I also detail how the pressure to increase spending in both local and
national redistributive programmes eventually contributed to an inflationary spiral that
got out of control as the Latin American debt crisis deepened. As successive presidents
struggled to get the economy back on track, they used the deep structural reforms of the
mid-1990s to regain control over fiscal policy from local governments. With new
regulations imposing fiscal responsibility, the resources available to municipalities and
states dwindled and this eventually opened the door to a new generation of federal,
rules-based social programmes.
Social Policies after 1988
Like in many other Latin American countries, social policies in Brazil traditionally failed
to benefit the poor. The efforts to build welfare institutions before 1988 described in the
previous sections were to some extent inspired by developments in industrialised
countries throughout the twentieth century.39 However, those efforts were shaped by the
tension between clientelistic interests that favoured social policy control by local
governments and a high degree of discretionary powers on the one hand, and centralist
forces that a pushed for significant role for the federal government on the other. The
overall result, as one analyst put it, is a set of ‘fragmented, uncoordinated, and
intermittent initiatives’.40 Local governments often run anti-poverty programmes
targeted at key supporters and administered by trusted officials that enjoy vast
discretionary powers. Popular programmes adopted by several municipalities throughout
39Huber and Stephens (2012).
40Arretche (2000), p. 169.
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the country include food handout initiatives, public works programmes, cash giveaways,
or even partnerships to fund NGOs run by close political allies of some local boss.
Similarly, patrons routinely intervene to help poorer voters have access to federal public
services that on paper are universal, but which in practice are at the gift of local
authorities due to long waiting lists or lack of appropriate regulation to clarify the
powers of political appointees, including the power to schedule medical appointments or
to find children a place in a public school.41
On the other hand, as I pointed out in the two previous sections, the federal
government over time has created and expanded what experts have labelled a ‘truncated
welfare state’, meaning that even though many services are theoretically accessible to
anyone, they are either only available to wealthier workers in the formal sectors of the
economy or somehow provide more generous benefits for historically powerful groups
connected with the authoritarian governments that created such institutions, like the
military. These can include access to one of a number of free colleges and universities
that cater mainly to privately educated sons and daughters of urban middle classes,42
generous rules for the social security system for the formal sector, the national land
reform programme that favours organised, wealthier farmers over the unorganised poorer
peasants, as well as a number of other, smaller policies.
As discussed in the previous chapter, presidents have for decades created a number of
‘decentralised’, highly discretionary social policies on top of the existing ‘truncated
welfare state’ and control over funding for these programmes has become coveted by
legislators in political bargains with the executive. The expansion of such policies has
been consistent with the compromise reached in the 1960s and later reinforced in the
1980s that made clientelism at the local level more dependent on the financial support
from the federal government. Numerous federal funds and initiatives provide additional
resources for local governments from the federal purse that can be used on more
discretionary social policies. In Chapter Three I discussed at length some of the largest
and most politically relevant of such initiatives, including the National Social Assistance
Fund (and the corresponding Social Assistance funds), the National Health Fund (and
the corresponding Municipal Health funds), the Education Development Fund (and a set
41Samuels and Mainwaring (2004), for example, discuss how the 1988 constitution budget rules gave
mayors significant resources so that they no longer had to rely on ad hoc transfers from the central or state
governments to start their own programmes.
42Indeed, as Gruber and Kosack (2014) point out, Brazil is one of the countries in which public
spending on education is more skewed towards tertiary education, something that likely exacerbates income
inequality in the long run. This is to a large extent a result of the prevalent political arrangement in which
local governments have responsibility over primary and secondary education systems, while the role of the
federal government is limited to the administration of professional colleges and universities.
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of other smaller funds related to education, such as subsidies for school lunch and for to
eliminate illiteracy), federal agencies to support irrigation works in dry areas of the
northeast of the country, and Brazil’s decades’ old land reform programme.
The new constitution written after the military relinquished power in 1985 further
reinforced local government’s control over most of the federal government’s anti-poverty
spending. When this new constitution was being written, presidential power was at an
all-time low as a result of Brazil’s tumultuous transition to democracy. The first civilian
president in decades was not elected by the people, but by the legislature in the form that
had previously been established by the military to rubber-stamp their own chosen
candidate.43 A compromise had to be reached between listening to the voice of the
streets that demanded a fast transition to democratic civilian rule and the concerns of the
traditional groups that had worked with the military regime (oftentimes in the
government-sanctioned opposition) that had historically been wary of too much
centralisation under a powerful and popular head of state.
The first civilian president appointed by congress after the military left office was
Tancredo Neves, a popular leader from the rich state of Minas Gerais that had been Prime
Minister of Brazil during the 1961-1963 experiment with semi-presidentialism and who
had established himself as a prominent name in the social-democratic opposition to the
military dictatorship. Days after being appointed by congress, he passed away before even
formally taking office. His unpopular vice-president was José Sarney, an oligarch that had
dominated the political scene in Brazil’s poorest state of Maranhão since the 1950s and
who now unexpectedly rose to power. Sarney had been chosen for the ticket as part
of a compromise to ensure the support of northern regional factions that had previously
supported military rule. His original job was to lend credibility to Neves’ promise of no
abrupt break with the forces that had supported the previous regime. As Sarney’s most
eminent biographer put it, this was a man who had become president ‘because of his flaws,
not [because] of his qualities’, whose original function was to serve as an intermediary
between powerful local oligarchies entrenched in the poorest parts of the country and a
newly established democratic presidency.44
Imposing a social policy agenda was not one of Sarney’s priorities during the first
half of his term in office (which lasted from 1985 to 1990). The constituent assembly
43Formally, the generals that came to power during the military dictatorship were elected by an electoral
college formed by all members of congress. In practice, however, only one name was submitted in each
election, and choice was made by the armed forces. When the military decided to relinquish power these
rules did not change immediately and the electoral college was free to elect a civilian of their own choosing.
Popular sentiment against a continuation of the authoritarian regime ensured that the electoral college
choose a candidate committed to a transition to democracy.
44Echeverria (2011), p. 7-8.
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was openly hostile to the weak president and threatened even to shorten his term in office
from five to four years. They not only denied his requests to limit public spending in
order to curb a rising deficit and an inflation that reached 235% in 1985, but approved a
budget for 1986 that included a tenfold increase on government spending on top of
adjusting all government spending for inflation. In response, Sarney issued a number of
emergency presidential decrees to freeze spending and to enforce price controls
throughout the economy. With congress threatening not to ratify the emergency decrees
after the mandatory 90 days and with local governments continuing to automatically
adjust public sector salaries and contracts according to the preceding month’s inflation,
economic expectations undermined the price control measures and the system collapsed.
Sarney quickly learned that, despite his enormous presidential powers, he would have to
defer control over a large share of the executive in order to form alliances that would
ensure that he could finish his term in office. He continued the time honoured practice
invented by his military predecessors of buying support with political appointments in
federal bureaucracies and state-owned enterprises that could be awarded to allies of
governors and legislators. When criticised once by journalists about awarding all
positions in the board of the state-owned mining monopoly Vale to former legislators
with no previous experience in the sector, he stated that Vale was not a business, but a
‘regional development agency for the Northern states’.45
Sarney ended up fighting to save what he could of his presidency, constantly under
siege by a hostile constituent assembly and an unfriendly public. He convinced legislators
to preserve a strong presidency so as to avoid political instability and he managed to keep
his seat for five years, even though the new constitution reduced his successors’ terms
to four. To win these battles he had to give ground on most other important issues. The
constitution forced the federal government to cede a large share of its revenue to state and
municipal governments as well as to return their right to raise capital in domestic (but
not international) financial markets. Most legislators in the new constituent assembly also
anticipated the need to significantly expand social spending after the extension of voting
rights to the poorest citizens of what was then the third most unequal country in the world.
And expand they did. With a weak president in charge, the new constitution
transferred control over much of social policy spending to local levels of government,
despite the fact that most of the spending would continue to come from the federal
government.46 The new constitution created a unified public health system that is
entirely free at the point of delivery, modelled after the British National Health Service.
45Affonso (2000), p. 133.
46Arretche (2000), p. 172-173.
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The system is funded mostly by mandatory transfers from the federal government and
administered by municipalities and, to a lesser extent, by state governments that run
specialised hospitals responsible for more complex procedures. Another key reform
introduced in 1988 was the unification of rules for pensions for rural workers. For the
first time, a unified set of rules was created allowing women to retire as rural workers as
well as man, and making sure that all rural workers would indeed be able to retire at the
age of 65 regardless of their past contributions. The combination of local control with
federal funding was designed to force the executive and the legislature to come together
and support each other’s interests. If legislators refused to give the president a large
majority, he could cut spending to programmes that legislators needed in order to
maintain the alliances they dependent on in their home states. But if a president pushes
legislators too hard, they deny him any support and work to undermine the executive’s
authority.
Since the enactment of the 1988 constitution, successive presidents have worked to
use their powers create rules-based programmes so that they could cater to their own
large constituency, while at the same time using influence over discretionary spending to
gain support for their broader political agenda in the legislature just as the framers of the
new constitution intended. In 1989, Brazilians elected a president and a legislature for
the first time since 1961. This was the first time in the country’s history in which all adult
Brazilians could go to the polls and choose their representatives. They saw the victory of
Fernando Collor de Mello, the conservative governor from the small state of Alagoas,
who received over 35 million votes, against 31 million received by his main opponent,
the left of centre union leader Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The new president identified
himself as a ‘neoliberal’ and proceeded to enact reforms that would open Brazil’s
economy and reduce government spending in an effort to control inflation, which had
reached 1.476,56% in 1990. He attempted to delay the implementation of social policy
reforms that the constitution required and to create national standards for all social
spending, especially healthcare. His main concerns were to delay healthcare and pension
expansion that were provided for in the new constitution and to impose productivity
criteria for federal transfers to each municipality. In 1990 and 1991 he vetoed two
healthcare bills that provided for the implementation of federal transfers with no strings
attached. Without any specific rule to govern the implementation of the new healthcare
system, Collor benefited from a certain strategic ambiguity. The federal government
began setting up separate deals with different municipalities that would agree to abide by
healthcare targets and therefore would receive a larger share of transfers, while others
who did not agree to such deals earned only the legally minimum transfers defined by
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the constitution and subsequent judicial decisions. Not only this enabled him to favour
allies who would support him in congress but also he could push for the implementation
of his electoral promise of nation-wide healthcare improvements.47
But Collor’s hardline approach towards local leaders would soon lead to his political
demise. As a presidential candidate, he presented himself as a modernising populist,
fighting against privileges and corruption in public administration. When his economic
stabilisation measures failed to bring down inflation – the main index reached 1.119,10%
in 1992 – measures to cut costs and delay the implementation of social programmes were
seen as contrary to the interests of the majority. Having made enemies in congress and
in the majority of public opinion, while at the same time facing serious allegations of
corruption, the president was impeached in 1992. Successive leaders took notice of his
mistakes, as former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003) told me in an
interview:
Collor made basically three mistakes that no president can make. First, he did
not bring inflation under control. With inflation over a thousand percent there
is no economic planning, no growth, the income of the poor evaporates. His
second mistake was that he picked fights with everyone at the same time. He
thought he could rule without making alliances in congress, cutting the kinds
of spending that they need the most. And no one rules without congress! And
with that comes the third mistake: he let corruption reach the presidential
palace.48
With its first president elected by universal suffrage impeached from office after only
two years in the job, Brazil could be headed for a period of deep political instability. But
as the next section describes, his successors quickly realised that the enormous powers
that the president maintained on paper did not allow the executive to ignore the will of
congress.
47On health policy under Collor de Mello, see Arretche (2005) and Rodrigues and Zauli (2002).
48Interview with F. H. Cardoso, 01 jul 2014. Original in Portuguese: O Collor cometeu pelo menos três
erros que nenhum presidente pode cometer. O primeiro foi que ele não conseguiu controlar a inflação como
ele tinha prometido na campanha. Com inflação de mil porcento n ao tem planejamento econômico, não
tem crescimento, vai se corroendo o rendimento do mais pobre. O segundo foi que ele brigou com todo
mundo o tempo todo. Achou que podia governar sem fazer alianças com o congresso, cortando o tipo de
gasto que eles mais precisam. E ninguém governa sem o congresso! E com isso vem o terceiro erro: deixou
a corrupção chegar no Planalto.
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Structural Adjustment and the Consolidation Presidential Power
Collor’s demise highlighted that Brazilian presidents – and possibly Brazilian democracy
– would only have success once hyperinflation could be brought under control.49 This
would happen under his vice-president, Itamar Franco, whose short term in office from
1992 to 1994 saw the enactment of a structural adjustment plan that greatly enhanced the
president’s effective control over the budgetary process.
The design and implementation of the Plano Real (‘Real Plan’) – as the adjustment
strategy later came to be known – broke with a long tradition in the country of
attempting to control inflation by forcing general price and wage freezes throughout the
economy. According to the new plan’s designers, Brazil’s persistently high inflation was
a result of massive public deficits run by the federal and local governments that were
later eroded by seigniorage. To solve the problem, the new plan relied on the
de-indexation of economic relations, which was accomplished in part by converting
salaries and a number of other prices in the months preceding the implementation of the
Plano Real into the a new currency – the Real – which was then linked to the United
States dollar, but traded at a premium in the open market. The government created
constitutional limits on the issuing of paper currency based on the Central Bank’s foreign
currency reserves. The Central Bank, in turn, was given significant autonomy and a low
inflation target, so it proceeded to sharply increase interest rates to bring in capital that
could support the strong currency. At the same time, the government radically reversed
Brazil’s barriers to external trade, lowering the average tariffs on imports from 33,3% to
12% overnight using the president’s emergency decree powers. With an overvalued
currency and a more open economy, the domestic market was flooded with foreign goods
and the country ran successive trade deficits. To compensate, it had to attract massive
amounts of foreign capital by increasing interest rates.
The plan succeeded in controlling inflation in the short run. The main index fell
from 2.477,15% in 1993 – the last year before the Real – to 22% in 1995 and hit a low
of 1,65% in 1998. On the back of this success, Franco’s Finance Minister, Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, was elected president in 1995. Once in power, he knew that this plan
would not be sustainable without structural reforms to lower the country’s dependency
on short term capital flows and make the economy more competitive. At the same time,
states and municipalities had accumulated massive debts which were unplayable with the
high interest that were now in place. Cardoso used this opportunity and his unparalleled
personal popularity to force local governments to agree to reforms that transferred control
49On how the hyperinflation crisis played a role in the impeachment process, see Weyland (1993) and
Landim (1998).
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over fiscal policy back to the federal executive and imposed strict spending limits on all
levels of government.
This process first started with an ambitious privatisation programme that eliminated
many of the opportunities for patronage that existed in federal, state, and municipal
state-owned companies.50 Crucially, Cardoso also forced state governments to
restructure or sell the heavily indebted state-owned banks that local governments
controlled and used to raise capital for the state treasuries’. He also criminalised the
usual practice of local governments creating anti-poverty policies that would be payed to
beneficiaries through local state-owned banks but later failing to transfer money from the
state or municipal treasury to cover the cost of the programme. In effect, these practices
used state-owned banks to fund clientelistic policies. Cardoso imposed limits on how
much local governments could spend on salaries – once again curtailing their power to
dispense patronage – and created laws allowing for the prosecution of politicians who,
after their terms ended, left office passing on too much debt to their successors.
Reforms enacted under Cardoso were largely successful in controlling public
spending and adjusting public finances to an environment of high interest rates.51 The
nominal public deficit for all levels of government combined went from 43,7% of the
GDP in 1994 to 7,2% of GDP in 1995. Much of this reduction was achieved by
reductions in spending that was later directly or indirectly channelled to clientelism.
Once popular make-work programmes in northern states quickly became a thing of the
past. Social centres controlled by politicians became rarer as their patrons lacked
funding from the National Social Assistance Found to sustain them. Food handout
programmes practically ground to a halt in the poorest parts of the country, and so did
the federal government’s land reform programme. Universal services suffered too, as
funding for public health and education by local authorities declined as a share of GDP
in the first four years of the Plano Real.
In effect, the economic strategy adopted by Franco and later intensified by Cardoso
further exposed the divide that existed between the executive and the legislature since the
enactment of the new constitution. On the one hand, legislators wrote a charter that
provided for a massive expansion of government social spending at all levels. The
reasoning behind this position is not difficult to understand: Brazil was then – as it still is
– one of the most unequal countries in the world. And for the first time the poorest
50Freed from obligations to spend on patronage many of these companies went from being a drain in
the public purse to becoming successful private enterprises, like aircraft manufacturer Embraer and mining
giant Vale.
51It is worth noting that since 1995 Brazil has consistently had one of the highest interest rates in the
world.
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Fig. 8: Proportion of population classified as ‘extremely poor’ per state, 1991-2010.
citizens were made part of the electoral process. Indeed, not only they were given he
right to vote, but are now also obliged to do so. On the other hand, presidents after 1988
inherited a country in deep economic crisis. Annual inflation reached four digits in the
1980s and the government – having defaulted on its debt in 1987 – could only remain
solvent by printing more and more currency.
On the face of tragic levels of poverty and inequality, it would be reasonable, in
principle, to think that presidents would not only be worried about structural adjustment,
but would also be eager to push for more income redistribution (see figure 8).52 But the
evidence presented in the previous chapter makes it clear why all three post-1988
presidents resisted congressional appeals for more social spending: the clientelistic
schemes that existed could not drive presidential elections in the same way that they did
with legislative and local votes.
By clever use of their presidential powers, Franco and Cardoso imposed their own
agenda of adjustment and used the structural reforms of the 1990s to force rigid controls
on local government spending. As Franco’s chosen successor and perceived mastermind
behind the plan that put an end to Brazil’s decades’ long inflation problem, Cardoso
clearly benefited from this choice. But he was also under pressure to address issues of
poverty and inequality once the consequences of the plan became apparent. To his left,
52Meltzer and Richard (1981).
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the Workers’ Party proposed a number of initiatives during the 1990s designed to
capitalise on the policy vacuum in the issue of income redistribution left by the Plano
Real. Eduardo Suplicy, a moderate Workers’ Party senator from the state of São Paulo
began a campaign to push for a universal minimum income scheme. Defeated
presidential candidate Lula da Silva travelled the country to raise awareness of hunger
amongst Brazil’s poor and calling on the government not to cut local food handout
programmes, but to regulate them as well as to develop initiatives to support family
agriculture and to reignite land reform. More conservative groups in the legislature that
depended on the distribution of benefits to help elect allies in their home states pushed
back against the reforms as well.
Both Franco and Cardoso worked to pass regulation on social policy in order to
dispel criticism that their policies were anti-poor. But with limited resources, Franco
limited himself to attempts to issue regulation to cut some of the discretionary power of
local authorities and Cardoso had to adopt the same posture for the first years of his term
in office. Franco’s most noteworthy accomplishment here was a Law of Social
Assistance, issued in December 1993 – his last month in office – to regulate disability
benefits and non-contributory rural pensions created in the 1960s by João Goulart but
never implemented. Franco also revoked regulation issued by his predecessor creating
productivity targets for municipalities to receive healthcare grants from the federal
government as part of his grand bargain to approve the Plano Real’s most urgent
measures.
Unlike his predecessor, Cardoso enjoyed the legitimacy of an elected president and
the popularity brought on by his role in drafting Plano Real. But during his entire period
in office he was under pressure to deliver more social spending to compensate for the
austerity measures imposed to control inflation. As the cycle of big structural reforms
and privatisations ended and the economic situation stabilised in the late 1990s, Cardoso
began to turn his attention to welfare reform. In 1996 he created a new tax on financial
transactions and in the next year he used the revenue from the new levy to fund a new
federal primary healthcare programme, Programa Saúde da Família (Family’s Health
Programme or PSF). The new policy sought to address the chronic lack of public hospitals
in the poorest parts of the country by training health agents to provide basic, preventive
care in poor neighbourhoods.
To a large extent, PSF was a response to pressure from civil society groups and
activists that had been pushing the government to shift investment towards preventive
medicine and to define rules for a myriad of health outreach programmes that existed
throughout the country. The implementation of PSF followed a model that would be
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repeated in many other future rules-based policies: it started by looking at both national
and international low-cost social policy experiments that had a proven track record of
results. Here, the inspiration was a similar programme adopted in Cuba to reduce
pressure on emergency rooms and specialist doctors’ surgeries by empowering trained
health professionals that were not full fledged medical doctors to dispense health advice
and the most basic level of care to the poor. And because infrastructure is often lacking
in poorer areas and patients in zero-hour informal contracts often only seek medical care
as a last resort to avoid missing work, health agents would go to them instead of waiting
for patients to come to them.
Some comparable initiatives also existed in Brazil. In 1996, the mayor of São Paulo
had adopted a similar programme in his city after hearing about the Cuban experience
in a conference. One year later the mayor of Rio de Janeiro did the same, emulating
his counterpart. Some smaller municipalities also followed this example. According to
one former official from the Ministry of Health that had a prominent role in designing
the federal version of PSF, the government saw an opportunity in these local experiences.
These were, according to him, very good policies, but the implementation happened at
the pleasure of the mayor or his health secretary. Specific neighbourhoods would often
be targeted to be visited by health agents because of political considerations. The hiring
process for health agents was fraught with political considerations. He describes one
municipality where journalists found that health agents would punch the time clock at
City Hall in the morning and then go run errands for members of the municipal assembly.
According to him, only a minority of agents actually worked on healthcare related issues
and the rest were political brokers.53
The federal programme, however, had to be different. A new bureaucracy would be
established within the Ministry of Health to oversee recruiting and training standards for
health agents. Objective rules based on each neighbourhood’s human development index
measures were be established to avoid political favouritism when determining which
area had priority in the assignment of health agents. Independent audits would be
regularly conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General and by the Federal Court
of Audits. And because the federal government could not set national rules on this topic
of healthcare policy, states and municipalities were invited to accept the programme’s
rules-based characteristics in order to receive extra funding.
But limited initiatives to expand existing programmes and to reform them to take away
politicians’ discretionary powers did not placate demands for more welfare spending.
Cardoso ended up being reelected for a second term in office in 1998, again defeating
53Interview with Hésio Cordeiro, 22 May 2016.
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the Workers’ Party candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on the back of his track record
stabilising the economy. But both the president and his allies in congress worried about
the effects that that the Asian financial crisis in that same year would have in popular
support in the short run. After securing his second term, Cardoso ended the real’s peg
with the US dollar that had been a cornerstone of his government’s anti-inflation strategy
and that provided much support from those that benefited from cheap imports. As the
currency devalued in the wake of the financial crisis, the government had to adopt further
austerity measures to keep inflation under control. While campaigning, Cardoso had told
voters he would keep the peg, and so his popularity began to decline sharply after that
promise was broken. His approval ratings went from 54% just after the beginning of his
second term to 25% three months after the floating of the currency was announced.54
In 2000 the government decided to bring forward plans to set up a national income
support scheme targeted at the poorest citizens of the country. Again, the inspiration
came from international experiences. In 1997, the Mexican government had set up a
conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme called Progresa, some years after that
country had faced its own financial crisis and implemented a package of long-term
austerity measures. Because Progresa had been adopted using a method in which some
municipalities were randomly chosen to be included in the programme first, the Mexican
government and a number of independent experts and international organisations were
able to credibly assess the policy’s significant impact on the levels of poverty.
This success first inspired a number of political entrepreneurs in local governments
in Brazil willing to adopt the same policy. The most important such case happened in
the capital, Brasília. The governor of the capital was Cristovam Buarque, a development
economist that had made a name for himself as the rector of the University of Brasília and
that had ties with the social democratic left and hopes of one day running for president.
Buarque set up a CCT programme in 1995 called Bolsa Escola (School Stipend) with only
a few hundred families in one heighborhood, awarding 15 reais a month to each family
if they agreed to send their children to school. The rationale here was simple: experts
estimated that 15 reais was more than a child could get begging in the streets of Brasília,
and so parents would stop sending their children to beg for money and instead keep them
enrolled in a school. As a member of the Workers’ Party, Buarque had hoped that this
scheme would be a first step towards a universal income scheme, which at that time was
that party’s moderate wing’s platform.55 One must see these efforts in light of the internal
politics of the Workers’ Party at the time. Party leader Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was a
54IBOPE’s Survey data taken from Veja, 4 April 2001.
55Interview with Cristovam Buarque 23 May 2014.
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presidential candidate in every election since the enactment of the 1988 constitution and
had lost every time. After the enactment of the Plano Real, he pushed his party to the
fringes by denouncing the plan and proposing instead a radical distributive agenda only
to suffer the biggest defeat ever in 1993. Moderates like Buarque hoped they could defeat
Lula in a party primary and push the party to the centre, embracing the adjustment policies
adopted in the previous years. While he ended up defeated in the primary, he later left the
Workers’ Party and indeed ran for president as a member of the Democratic Labour Party.
While the Brasília sui generis experience was the result of the presidential ambitions
of a relative outsider, it was not the only such programme created in Brazil during the
Cardoso years. Cities such as Campinas, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, Rio de Janeiro and
hundreds of other smaller municipalities adopted their own versions of Bolsa Escola at
some point between 1996 and 2001. Some lasted for a few years, others – like the one
created in Rio – appeared only in election years and quickly disappeared afterwards. Few
survived the administration of more than one mayor. Even Brasília’s pilot programme
was dismantled after Buarque left office in 1998 and his successor Joaquim Roriz branded
Bolsa Escola as a programme designed to enable laziness. ‘Many use the Bolsa Escola
money to buy liquor’, he declared after winning the election. The programme was later
replaced with a food and clothes distribution programme for schoolchildren that scrapped
targeting formulas in favour of self-enrolment waiting lists.56
But thinking of all these policies as precursors to the now-famous rules-based federal
CCTs that exist in Brazil is misleading. First of all, labelling a policy as a CCT
programme does not mean that it cannot be manipulated for clientelistic purposes. In
Chapter One, for example, I briefly describe an attempt by mayoral candidate in the
municipality of Campos dos Goytacazes to create a CCT policy in that city that had lead
to her impeachment amid allegations of vote buying. The case involved Rosinha
Garotinho, wife of Anthony Garotinho, former governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro
that had created a CCT programme in that state that was later scrapped by judicial
authorities amid allegations of corruption. At the time, auditors looking at the
programme in the state of Rio spotted several irregularities, including the distribution of
membership cards only through churches where pastors had connections with the
Garotinho family and social centres supported by the governor and his political allies.
Similar cases involving manipulation of membership in CCTs have been reported in
municipal programmes throughout Brazil. Some resulted in criminal prosecution, but
more resourceful policy designers escaped such fate by writing rules that enabled them
56Mônica Bergamo, Fim do Bolsa-Escola Ameaça Frequência, Folha de São Paulo, 22 Nov. 1999.
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to manipulate programme waiting lists for their political advantage.57
Like any type of policy, CCTs are amenable to political manipulation if they are not
carefully designed to prevent abuse. The creation of a federal initiative would have to
involve creating instruments to get around opportunities for political manipulation that
were known to exist in municipal programmes.58 To set up a federal Bolsa Escola,
Cardoso had to create an entire new bureaucracy within the Ministry of Education and
insulate it from the political bargaining process. These bureaucrats in turn had to create
several rules to take away the discretionary powers that implementing authorities on the
ground had in most municipalities that had implemented CCTs in previous years. They
had to make sure politicians could not make it difficult for potential beneficiaries in
certain areas to enrol in the programme for purely political reasons. To estimate a
family’s income in the absence of formal labour contracts and bank accounts, objective
techniques were developed based on regular visits to the households and an evaluation of
their possessions by social workers who would have to undergo specific training to
accomplish this task. To eliminate waiting lists – one of the most traditional
discretionary powers that politicians use to control enrolment – a system whereby in
years when there was not enough budget allocation to pay Bolsa Escola to every eligible
beneficiary the income threshold for eligibility would automatically go up, ensuring that
resources would always be preferentially allocated to the poorest individuals.
Yet complex legislation is only effective if officials on the ground actually follow the
rules when implementing the programme. To make sure they would not be tempted to
provide favours to local clientelistic networks, a special auditing unit was set up in the
Federal Court of Accounts to make sure municipalities actually followed the rules.
Mayors that used Bolsa Escola funds in other activities could be convicted of
malpractice in court and become ineligible for public office for up to eight years. An
unprecedented (for Brazil’s standards) transparency initiative put all statistical data and
yearly audit reports online so anyone could see. Regulations also specified who would be
responsible for implementing the policy on the ground. To this day only career civil
servants – and not their politically appointed bosses – can certify a request for inclusion
in the federal conditional cash transfer programme. If city hall officials somehow denied
someone the right to become a beneficiary, they could now turn to local bank branches or
even to the local post office to enrol and these officials would send the documents
straight to Brasília for assessment. By implementing all these measures, officials in
57Polêmica na Cesta do Cidadão. O Globo, 20 Dec 1999. Corrupção da área social é nojenta. Folha de
São Paulo, 13 Feb 2001. Bolsa Escola só para quem precisa, Folha de São Paulo, 01 Oct 2001. Cheque
cidadão em troca de votos em Campos gera rombo de R$ 3,5 milhões, O DIa, 15 Set 2016.
58Interview with Wanda Engel, 10 Set 2014.
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Brasília in effect bypassed local authorities and insulated the programme from
clientelistic practices.
Passing the Bolsa Escola bill through congress proved to be difficult. Legislators
insisted on more traditional forms of income distribution and many resisted cash
transfers with the now familiar idea that it would be an incentive for people to leave the
job market. While Cardoso pushed for his federal CCT, prominent members of
Cardoso’s ruling coalition in congress started to pressure for more devolution of social
policy funding to municipalities. President of the Senate Antonio Carlos Magalhães, a
powerful leader of the more conservative faction in the legislature lead the charge,
proposing the Poverty Eradication Fund, an initiative to earmark up to 10% of the federal
government’s revenue with the Industrial Products Tax for poverty reduction. Magalhães
proposed that the new initiative should provide funding to projects developed by local
governments and NGOs and would be managed by a board composed of representatives
of all levels of government and civil society that would select which proposals would
merit funding. The bill creating the fund was approved by the legislature in 2000, as
Magalhães used his influence to put together a coalition of legislators concerned with the
long-term effects of the government’s adjustment policies and that still resented the
government for its use of fiscal reforms to curb the spending powers of local
administrations.
Meanwhile, Cardoso was facing tough resistance from legislators that were suspicious
of funding his new federal Bolsa Escola programme. His solution was to partner up with
international organisations, which could both offer part of the funding for an experimental
expansion of Bolsa Escola in the form of development aid and at the same time provide
technical assistance that was independent from the traditional clientelistic machines to see
the programme through. For two years the federal Bolsa Escola was partially funded and
managed by Unicef, Unesco, and the World Bank. The president’s break came in 2001,
when Magalhães was forced to resign his seat following allegations that he had used his
position as president of the senate to manipulate that house’s electronic voting system.
Using the opportunity afforded by the disorganisation within the coalition that resisted
his social policy proposal, Cardoso forged an alliance with the biggest opposition group
in congress, the Workers’ Party, in order to amend the regulation creating the Poverty
Eradication Fund to shift its resources to fund the federal Bolsa Escola until the end of
his term in office.
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The Consolidation of Rules-Based Distribution under the Workers’ Party
The federal Bolsa Escola ended up supplanting all existing municipal cash transfers and
becoming one of the major issues of the 2002 presidential campaign. The number of
beneficiaries jumped from 1 million in 2001 to an estimated 6.07 million in 2002.59 As
the government continued its adjustment agenda, eliminating subsidies that existed in the
economy even in an electoral year, it created add-on benefits to Bolsa Escola to
compensate the poorest. Only some months before the election, the government created
Auxílio Gás (Gas Aid) to compensate Bolsa Escola beneficiaries for the end of
government subsidies to liquified petroleum gas bottles that are widely used in rural
Brazil for cooking.
Cardoso’s chosen successor José Serra experienced a significant boost in his share of
votes in places where a large number of families were beneficiaries of the programme.60
Despite the incumbent’s support, Serra lost the runoff ballot to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,
the Workers’ Party candidate. Lula had attempted to win the presidency thrice before
and had always came second. After decades proposing radical shifts to the left and
vigorously opposing Cardoso’s adjustment programme, Lula embraced a moderate
platform, expunging more radical elements of his party from key positions and
promoting moderates who had opposed him for years, such as Bolsa Escola creator
Cristovam Buarque and longtime advocate for a national minimum income Eduardo
Suplicy. To consolidate his new image he invited José Alencar, a multimillionaire owner
of a textile conglomerate that had in the past expressed some progressive views, to
become his vice-presidential candidate. Lula was the first self-identified leftist and the
first person without a university degree to ever win the presidency in Brazil and he had a
mandate for a moderate expansion of income distribution under an atmosphere of fiscal
responsibility.61
Interestingly enough, this mandate was not secured with an overwhelming vote of the
poorest, but by a combination of support of lower and middle classes (see Table 4.1). After
winning the election, Lula made an expansion of pro-poor social policies a cornerstone
of his presidency. In his first day in office, he created the Ministry for the Fight Against
Hunger and soon after launched what he intended would be the cornerstone of his new
social agenda: the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) Programme. Fome Zero was intended as
a food handout programme in which the government would buy foodstuffs from small
farmers – mainly from those that had benefited from a land reform grant – and distribute
59The numbers are from the database used in Chapter Three.
60See Chapter Three.
61Boas (2009); Hunter and Power (2007).
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Table 11: Vote Share in 2002 Presidential Election by Income
Family Monthly Income Share of the Electorate Lula (% of votes) Serra (% of votes)
Up to 1 minimum wage 18 60 18
1-2 minimum wages 27.2 59 24
2-5 minimum wages 39.9 61 24
5-10 minimum wages 13 54 31
10+ minimum wages 4.2 46 40
Source: IBOPE pool n. PP172.
them to beneficiaries. The stated goal was that no Brazilian would ever go without at least
three meals a day. This kind of policy appealed to powerful sectors of the Workers’ Party,
especially those that had connections with the Christian left and rural cooperatives, both
of which had overwhelmingly supported Lula in his internal party struggles against his
primary contenders who had favoured some kind of universal minimum income scheme.62
The implementation of Fome Zero was fraught with problems from the start. In part
this happened because of accusations that the intended design would favour clientelism.
For decades, food handouts have been synonymous with vote buying and corruption in
poorer parts of Brazil and virtually every municipality has had one such programme in
place at one time or another. Many within the Workers’ Party representing urban
constituencies as well as technocrats within the government and in academia that had
collaborated with the creation of Bolsa Escola resisted the idea that food handouts would
be and efficient way to bring people out of poverty. Instead of naming a team of
technocrats to run the new ministry in charge of designing the programme, Lula
appointed political activists from his party to design the new programme. After a few
months the team was disbanded as the president feared that they failed to come up with
measures to address the criticism that Fome Zero would be plagued with problems of
clientelism. The Ministry was also accused of overestimating how much food they could
buy from small – mostly subsistence farmers in poorer regions and for not at first taking
into account that most of these farmers operated only in the informal economy and could
not present the documents necessary to sell their surplus to a government agency.
But the main problem to many in the executive was the oversized role the programme
appeared to give to grassroots organisations on the ground. Because social activists had
such a prominent role in drafting the first Fome Zero proposals, it reflected their desire
to serve as intermediaries between beneficiaries and the government. This suited many
in the Workers’ Party who desired to expand their grassroots organisational advantage in
62Rocha (2004).
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poorer regions which they considered as natural supporters of their agenda but that had not
decisively voted for their presidential or local-level candidates. It did not, however, suit
the president himself and his closest advisors. This was because giving social movements
such discretionary powers would also mean that the programme could be an asset in the
hands of faithful party activists but a hindrance in the hands of not-so-faithful clientelistic
brokers.
Faced with a potential failure of his flagship initiative, Lula abandoned Fome Zero
after 6 months in office. At that time, the government had brought in a number of
left-leaning experts who had worked to create Bolsa Escola and were willing to support
an expansion of the model under the new government. A team was put together to revise
Bolsa Escola, this time under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance.63 The result was a
drastic expansion of the conditional cash transfers scheme, with add-on benefits created
under Cardoso to replace market subsidies now incorporated into the main benefit to
further curb discretion and choice at the local level. New conditionalities were created:
now all beneficiaries would be require not only to send their children to school but also
to schedule yearly medical check-ups and to participate in all federal vaccination
programmes. The new scheme was named Bolsa Família (Family Stipend), to reflect the
shift in focus from education alone as well as to create a brand that could be associated
with the new administration. When Cardoso left office the number of Bolsa Escola
beneficiaries was a little over 6 million people. The new Bolsa Família would reach 12
million people after its first year of operation.64 Instead of dismantling Fome Zero, the
government argued that Bolsa Família would be the flagship programme in a broader
effort to eliminate hunger. Over time, however, the former brand ceased to be used.
Early Fome Zero initiatives designed by social movements to increase grassroots
participation through local ‘social assistance councils’ were scrapped in favour of a
top-down, rules-based system.
Bolsa Família quickly expanded to became the most important and well-known anti-
poverty programme in the country. The result, as I detailed in the previous chapter, was a
major boost in Lula’s vote share among the poor when he ran for reelection in 2006.
After experiencing the electoral payoffs from Bolsa Família and with government
revenues on the rise at the hight of the commodities boom of the 2000s, Lula dedicated
much of his second term to expand rules-based income redistribution programmes
63It is worth mentioning that, by the time Lula takes office, the Ministry of Finance had become the
bureaucracy more closely controlled by the executive. This was mainly a result of the need that successive
presidents had to form a bureaucracy capable of designing and implementing anti-inflation plans during the
1990s.
64CB 10/20/2003
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Fig. 9: Bolsa Família disbursements. Means by month over time, 2004-2016 (each line
one municipality).
targeted at the poor. His administration created electricity subsidy schemes to benefit the
poorest half of Bolsa Família beneficiaries, reaching over 11 million people in 2010.65 In
that same year, the government prepared a list of essential medications that would be
provided for free for those above the age of 65 and who received a conditional cash
transfer benefit. And, fulfilling a longtime party promise, Lula enacted regulation
expanding non-contributory rural pensions to virtually anyone who could prove at least
twenty years working in agriculture and were over 65 years of age, a decades-long issue
that had been raised in the 1960s and for years had remained unresolved. At the end of
his second term in office, 10 million people were recipients of one of three kinds of such
non-contributory rural benefits.
Yet Lula’s government was also marked by a marked expansion of highly
discretionary social spending. This happened particularly after a massive corruption
scandal erupted in 2005 involving key figures in the president’s inner circle. At the time,
the press found out that the powerful Chief of Staff to the President José Dirceu had been
paying monthly stipends to over a hundred members of congress so that they would
support the government. The scandal became known as the Mensalão, or ‘Big Monthly
Stipend’ case. After that, Lula lost support from many in the left and in the middle
classes that had embraced his new image as a moderate progressive politician. A splinter
65See Chapter Three for sources.
147
outfit to the left of the Workers’ Party was created by those who were either disgruntled
after the Mensalão case or with Lula’s shift to the centre. Key figures who had helped
design and run Bolsa Família left the administration to save their reputations.
Over time, Lula became more dependent on alliances with clientelistic groups in
congress and the support of the poor. The Workers’ Party lost space in the Cabinet to
make room for regional leaders who now demanded a steeper price for their support to a
fragile president. In order to pay the cost, the government in 2006 more than doubled
expenditure on the three key decentralised social policy funds that represent the bulk of
federal discretionary social spending: the Social Assistance Fund, the Educational
Development Fund and the National Health Fund, providing mayors with more resources
to conduct their own programmes with fewer legal controls attached. Eventually, Lula
escaped an impeachment trial as his closest advisors took the blame for the scheme.
Taking advantage of fast rising government revenues and sustained economic growth at
the hight of the commodities boom, Lula worked to please both his new allies in the
traditional elites and his own presidential constituency formed by the poorest.
Alternative Explanations
My theory of the emergence and consolidation of rules-based redistribution emphasises
the importance of presidential power in the design, funding, and implementation of
social programmes. I have argued that successive presidents on the left and on the right
used the powers granted to them by a new constitution enacted in 1988 to create policies
designed specifically to cater to their large constituencies. Because Brazilian presidents
have to cater to such a large and diverse constituency, they have rejected traditional
forms of income redistribution through clientelism which require the formation of
expensive networks of brokers.
This chapter has shown that potential alternative explanations linking the emergence
of rules-based income redistribution to the rise of the left, to changes in the economic
conditions of voters, or even to the rise of democracy fail to explain much of the existing
evidence about how these programmes came to be designed and implemented in Brazil or
even to give a reason for why clientelism continues to thrive at the local level.
Policies such as conditional cash transfers or community healthcare in Brazil have
had little to do with which party happened to occupy the presidency or hold a majority in
congress. As I discussed in this chapter, these benefits have been launched as pilot
programmes by ambitious governors wishing to run for president and were later turned
into more traditional, clientelistic schemes to favour incumbents’ supporters. Large scale
rules-based policies, however, started to appear under a centre-right administration, with
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little support from the left in congress at first. Indeed, attempts by presidents to curb the
discretionary powers that politicians enjoyed when implementing social programmes at
the local level existed under all presidential administrations. For example, under
Fernando Collor de Mello – possibly the most right-wing person elected to the
presidency in Brazil’s modern history – significant progress was made in attempting to
regulate healthcare spending, a sector where clientelism is rampant. The government at
that time also attempted to curb the discretionary powers of political appointees in
granting non-contributory pensions and disability benefits. Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
who became well-known by adopting harsh austerity policies in order to curb inflation
and was supported by a decidedly right-wing coalition in congress, was instrumental in
the creation of key policies such as Bolsa Escola and Saúde da Família. On the other
hand, the left-wing Workers’ Party came to power supported by activists who first
wished to transfer discretionary powers from local governments to social movements,
not to expand rules-based policies. It was only through presidential intervention that the
administration shifted course to expand and consolidate the reforms undertaken under
Cardoso.
Similarly, the movement towards rules-based policies had little to do with the
economic growth that Brazil experienced in the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s.
Under Sarney and Collor, successive economic stabilisation plans had only short term
success. It was after the 1994 Plano Real that inflation was brought under control and
growth started to pick up. However, the Cardoso administration, which began in 1995,
only seriously invested in the creation of large-scale rules-based social programmes in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. At the same time, this variable does not explain why
clientelistic policies have remained a consistent feature of the social policy landscape
despite significant economic development in recent decades.
The connection between declining poverty and inequality and the rise of
non-clientelistic policies also needs to be assessed carefully. Brazil has historically been
an unequal society, with large segments of the population living below the poverty line.
Most indicators show that levels of poverty began to decline fast in the mid 1995s, with
crucial indicators such as life expectancy showing significant improvements throughout
the period as a result of economic stabilisation. This happened many years before the
large scale expansion of programmatic social policies.
The same could be said about the connection between this new generation of social
programmes and the transition to democratic rule. Democracy, indeed, appears to have
been a necessary condition for the interests of the poorest Brazilians to be taken into
account by policy makers. But limited experiences with democracy in the 1950s and
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Fig. 10: Life Expectancy per state in Brazil, 1991-2010.
1960s did not result in a significant expansion of rules-based social programmes. Nor
did the post-1988 democratic regime in Brazil ensure that all politicians favour
programmatic policies. Instead, what we have seen is a consistent alliance between a
majority of legislators and local leaders who prefer to design policies that give
politicians significant discretionary powers under the guise of decentralisation.
Social movements that emerged as key political in the new democratic regime have
also played only a limited role in shaping the emergence of such policies. Key
organisations representing the poor, such as the landless workers movements and unions
strongly advocated for other types of policies, such as land reform and food distribution.
In most cases, their favoured design was not a rules-based policy, but a replacement of
discretionary powers awarded to local politicians and their brokers with similar
prerogatives to be given to participatory councils formed by their own representatives.
Nevertheless, when a government supported by these movements came to power, such
ambitions were quickly quashed in favour of a continued expansion of policies based on
more objective rules.
Conclusion
In this chapter I described the process by which presidents gradually secured the powers
to design social policies that favoured their own electoral priorities. The result has been a
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gradual expansion of the number of beneficiaries of rules-based social policies designed
to target the poor, regardless of which party happened to occupy the presidential palace.
The key to understanding why presidents that held office since the 1990s have
managed to create policies that favour their own electoral interests, while their
predecessors failed systematically lies in two key reforms. First, a new democratic
constitution enacted in 1988 dramatically increased the powers of the presidency as well
as the number people eligible to vote. The new charter gave successive presidents
control over the key tools that local politicians need in order to make clientelism work:
access to the public budget and control over appointments to the government
bureaucracy. By cleverly using these powers, presidents managed to force legislators to
support their agendas in a number of areas, including social policy. As one analyst put it,
the post-1988 system is one where local politics is all about ‘the dispute for the privilege
of supporting the central government’.66 With their new toolkit, presidents are now able
to cater to their large, national constituency and have been doing so by gradually
expanding rules-based social programmes targeted at the poor.
While many have tried to explain how these rules-based policies came to exist,67 a
much less-studied phenomenon has been the continued relevance of clientelism. If
presidents have incentives and the power to create rules-based policies, why is it that
they did not work to extinguish clientelistic schemes in order to further increment
funding for their programmatic policies? The answer is quite simple: while the reforms
mentioned here did indeed create a powerful presidency with a steak in programmatic
distribution, they did not change the fact that local politics remains dominated by
clientelistic networks. And because in this new arrangement presidential power is
heavily dependent on the executive’s ability to co-opt legislative support through the
distribution of opportunities for clientelism and corruption – discretionary politics
continues to take up a large share of the government’s budget.
66Marcus André Melo, Disrepresentação Política e Reforma, O Estado de São Paulo, 14 Nov 2016.
67See previous section and Chapter One.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Politicians in much Latin America have historically engaged in clientelistic redistribution,
using government resources to reward loyal supporters and punish detractors. This thesis
has recounted how – under the right circumstances – democratically-elected presidents
may have the incentives to create programmatic distributive policies that depart from the
traditional logic patron-client relationships. It has done so by looking in detail at the case
of Brazil, a country where a succession of presidents from across the political spectrum
have worked to strengthen the federal executive and thus create the conditions for the
rise of a new generation of social policies that are based on objective rules, not personal
connections.
The question of why societies transition from clientelistic distribution to rights-based
social policies is one of the most important puzzles in political economy. Where
politicians and their agents have discretionary powers to reward their loyal supporters
with preferential access to social protection, democratic accountability suffers.
Democratic governance rests on the principle that voters can reward or punish politicians
based on their performance while in office. Clientelistic relationships turn the logic on its
head: in patron-client relations, it is the politician who makes the decision to reward or
punish the voter based on the latter’s behaviour.1 But this is not just a matter of
principles. The lack of proper accountability means that politicians no longer have
incentives to work to create public goods or to effectively fight the root causes of poverty
and inequality. In extreme cases, the lack of proper accountability can become a threat to
democracy itself.2
But how can countries remedy these problems? My theory is that presidents have
every incentive to abandon clientelism and invest their political capital in programmatic
income distribution. Presidents tend to design universalistic distributive policies. Their
position as the only elected official in the country that is accountable to a large and
heterogeneous constituency forces them to think in terms of national goals. The policy
design most likely to favour presidents’ political goals are rules-based social
programmes.
But it is not just that presidents are the elected officials most likely to benefit form
a transition from clientelism to programmatic redistribution. Presidents also pay much
1Stokes (2005) aptly named this degeneration of democratic principles perverse accountability.
2Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (2009).
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higher cost than legislators and local officials when they engage in clientelistic networks.
The reason for this is that clientelism’s personalistic nature makes it an inefficient strategy
for politicians who must cater to very large numbers of voters in national elections. It is
in essence a political exchange: politicians who exercise control over public funds or
services promise voters in their districts that, in exchange for their support in the next
election, they will receive preferential access to public resources. Voters for their part
evaluate if they prefer to choose a candidate who better represents their policy preferences
or to abdicate from making a programmatic choice in order to gain the special treatment
that a patron can offer.
The problem is that politicians who desire to make clientelistic promises must find
ways to make their commitments credible to potential clients. After all, potential clients
know that the bargain is only possible because politicians have enormous discretionary
powers and can decide to withdraw access to public resources from clients at any
moment. Politicians are also wary of of cheating by clients who take benefits from the
clientelistic network and use the secrecy of the ballot box to vote for someone else. For
this reason, patrons must hire brokers, who manage clientelistic networks, but also create
inefficiencies in the process. Broker-based clientelism is a costly strategy that does not
scale well, and presidents’ large constituency makes the cost of engaging in such
activities prohibitively high.
As we have seen in this dissertation, the emergence of rules-based policies is not the
result of deep-seated ideological commitment held by the individuals who occupy the
office of the president. Nor is it a consequence of some deep structural transformation in
Brazilian society or of its economy. Rather, it is a product of institutional changes that
have been building up since the late 1980s and early 1990s, changes that have
significantly strengthened the hand of presidents vis-à-vis legislators and local officials.
For the first time in Brazilian history, presidents are democratically elected by all adult
citizens and thus have to cater to a large electorate. For them, clientelism is not a realistic
option. As I discussed in Chapter Four, voting became compulsory for Brazilians over
the age of 18 and under the age of 70 in 1988. Massive efforts to register citizens and to
enforce compulsory voting throughout the country by the judiciary made the usual
strategies of stopping voters from going to the polls essentially useless. Coercing voters
is also much less common. The illiterate were given voting rights for the first time in the
country’s history and presidential and gubernatorial elections would now be decided in a
runoff system, which forces candidates to broaden their appeal despite the significant
party fragmentation that the country has traditionally experienced. The combination of
these reforms means a lot more votes are required to elect a president than it was
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previously the case. The closest presidential election to date saw Dilma Rousseff beat
opposition candidate Aécio Neves by 3.28% of the popular vote. Although a slim
margin, that difference represented 3.4 million votes, highlighting how presidential
candidates must always deal in thousands or even millions of votes.
Having to cater to such a large and diverse constituency, successive presidents have
seized each and every opportunity – from constitutional reforms to corruption scandals
to global financial crises – to assert control over the design and the implementation of
social policies in Brazil. Instead of building networks of party brokers and give them
discretionary powers to award clients with preferential access to public resources,
presidents will prefer to tie their own hands in order to make credible commitments to
millions of people all at once. When presidents have done this, the results have been
positive – not only for them, politically, but also for the poor. Investments in a
rules-based system of social protection have benefited millions of families in Brazil over
the last decade. The positive effects of the new wave of social policies are real. Studies
on Bolsa Família indicated that the programme helped keep 5 million people out of
extreme poverty and reduce the overall poverty rate in the country by 8 percentage
points3 Other works have shown it has increased school enrolment by 5.5 percentage
points in grades 1 to 4 and by 6.5 percentage points in grades 5 to 8.4
But clientelism has not disappeared. Although weakened, it remains a potent force
throughout the country and now exists alongside rules-based social policies. This is
because – despite the dramatic changes in the electoral incentives faced by presidents –
the logic of legislative elections has not changed significantly since the 1940s. Brazilians
continue to choose their legislators in an open-list proportional representation system
with very large districts and with generous public funding for small parties. This
strongly favours fragmentation. In such a system, a few hundred votes can significantly
improve a candidate’s position in the party list. Clientelism thus becomes an important
part of each politician’s toolbox. In search of extra votes, members of Congress work to
create the kinds of discretionary social policies that empower party brokers at the local
level to reward loyal clients and punish dissenters. And for the same reason, legislators
pass laws that give individual members of congress and local officials the discretionary
powers they need to make clientelism work.
At the same, the fragmented system with weak parties makes presidents’ connection
with party leaderships much weaker. Presidents cannot rely on a centralised party
3Fultz and Francis (2013). On the effects of Bolsa Família on poverty in Brazil, see also Soares, Ribas
and Osório (2010) and Campello and Neri (2014).
4Glewwe and Kassouf (2012). For more on Bolsa Família and education, see Cacciamali et al. (2010)
and Melo and Duarte (2010).
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structure to make alliances in order to take advantage of clientelistic network. This
further strengthens their commitment towards universalistic policies.
In the rest of this concluding chapter I shall briefly explore how my ideas about the
expansion of rules-based social policies can be applied to a number of other presidential
democracies in Latin America. I am interested here in learning whether similar
initiatives have existed in these countries and whether the argument in this study can
help us account for such transformations. I then revisit a few alternative explanations
that other analysts have put forth to explain these innovations. Finally, the last section of
the chapter discusses some implications of this study for the scholarly debates about the
political economy of clientelism and outline questions raised in this dissertation that
require further work.
Extending the Argument
The main contribution of this thesis is to highlight two key features of clientelistic
bargains that make them attractive to legislators and local officials, but not to presidents.
First, politicians wishing to strike clientelistic deals with voters face a time inconsistency
problem. Therefore, clientelistic networks depend on personal connection between
brokers and voters in order for credible commitments to be possible.5 Second, presidents
national and heterogeneous constituencies makes them uniquely averse to particularistic
designs such as clientelism and drives them towards universalistic policy designs that
strengthen their profiles as national leaders capable of delivering effective solutions to
national issues such as poverty and inequality.
A critical question is whether the specific argument I have developed to make sense
of Brazil’s experience might also characterise and explain programmatic social policy
expansion in other countries. In Chapter One I reviewed the broader literature on
clientelism and its demise in developed and developing countries. Most historical
analysis suggest gradual abandonment of broker-based clientelism by politicians as mass
democracy consolidated. These works in general deal with transformations that
happened (or that started) much before the creation of national welfare states. The
literature also touches on cases of developed countries with deep histories of clientelism,
such as Italy and Greece, where consistent growth, industrialisation, and urbanisation
over the past decades have not brought about the end of traditional forms of
redistribution. All these cases suggest that the rise of rules-based policies does not
5Although the idea that politicians relinquish their discretionary powers and adopt rules-based policies
to solve time inconsistency problems is not new – see Kydland and Prescott (1977) for example – my work
is the first to apply this insight to the study of clientelism.
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follow a predetermined path. Some countries gain significant wealth and consolidate
democratic institutions before doing away with clientelism. Others appear to have done
away with the practice very early in their democratic histories.
As my theory predicts, institutional incentives appear to play a significant role in
each case. My analysis helps distinguish two important elements of clientelistic
networks – their personalistic nature and the problem of dynamic inconsistency faced by
their leaders. This in turn suggests possible solutions to deeply entrenched patron-client
relationships: institutional designers must find creative ways to make credible
clientelistic commitments difficult or impossible. In Brazil the framers of the 1988
constitution did this – inadvertently, it should be said – by giving unprecedented powers
to the office of the president and at the same time by dramatically expanding the size and
the diversity of presidential candidates’ constituency. The job of creating an institutional
system that would be incompatible with clientelism remains incomplete because
legislators and politicians in most local-level offices do not face the same difficulties that
presidents do.
In this dissertation I have also pointed out that Brazil’s weak party structure, open-
list electoral system, and unique rules about campaign finance that empower individual
candidates over party leadership serve as a further incentive for presidents to push for
universalistic policies that they can control from the top, instead of getting entangled in
thousands of complicated alliances with local leaders.
As we see in other cases, where the rules provide for a much more powerful and
centralised party oligarchy, presidents can become more dependent on their connections
with their parties. Yet, even in such cases, presidentialism fundamentally drives presidents
to seek independence from their own parties in the electoral arena.6
Although my study focused on Brazil’s experience, that country’s partial transition
towards programmatic social policies is not in any way unique. A preliminary analysis
suggests other middle income countries such as Argentina and Mexico have been going
through similar processes. Below, I briefly analyse each of these cases as a way of probing
my theory’s broader empirical reach.
Argentina
Like Brazil, Argentina has a deep history of clientelism and vote buying that has shaped
how governments design income redistribution. Argentine presidents, however, have
been historically much weaker and dependent on powerful governors of provinces to
6See, especially, Samuels and Shugart (2010), as well as my discussion of their argument in Chapter
Two.
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stay in power. The centralised party structure created by the Argentine electoral rules has
historically made presidents’ ability to push for universalistic policies much more
limited. Presidents in Buenos Aires have also been vulnerable to coups and have
struggled to finish their terms in office for most of the country’s turbulent history.
Social policies in Argentina were first created for workers in the formal sector – those
that had labour contracts and were unionised. For most formal sectors of the economy,
benefits such as old age pensions and health insurance were first created in the 1920s
and were consolidated in the 1940s. The rise of urban-based populist movements under
the presidency of General Juan Perón (1946-1955), who sought to build a large popular
base to support his regime, created strong incentives for formalisation and unionisation
of workers and a modest expansion of social welfare beyond the formal sectors as the
president attempted to use popular pressure to discourage cup plotters.7
The government shifted from a free trade policy orientation that favoured rural elites
in the provinces to support import substitution industrialisation. Perón also encouraged
migration from rural to urban areas and full employment policies. Social security was
expanded and legislation extended rights of access to the self-employed and rural workers
if they could afford to pay the contributions out of their own pockets. In practice, however,
few could and so access to pension benefits was restricted to roughly half of the adult
population in 1954.8
To those left outside, Perón organised limited anti-poverty policies at the national
level for the first time by setting up the Eva Perón Foundation (named after his wife).
This was in no way an attempt at creating rules-based policies, but instead to build a
clientelistic base for the president that mirrored the kinds of initiatives that existed in the
provinces and that were routinely used by governors. The Eva Perón Foundation
embraced the model of social policy as charity, encouraging business owners receiving
subsidies from the government to donate to the Foundation, which in turn would give
away foodstuffs, clothing and provide basic services to voters. There were rampant
allegations of corruption in the press.9
Attempts by Perón and many that came after him to build a clientelistic following
mirrored what happened in Brazil under Vargas between 1930 and 1945. As in Brazil,
Perón could engage in attempts to build his own clientelistic networks because he did not
preside over a democracy. Checks on executive power by an independent judiciary or
the legislature were all but absent. Voting rights were restricted and the use of violence
to coerce voters and even outright fraud were commonplace. Perón’s real goal was not
7Horowitz (1990); Di Tella (2003); Doyon (2006).
8Feldman, Golbert and Isuani (1988).
9Horowitz (1999).
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to establish clientelistic networks to win an open election, but instead to build a loyal
following that would strengthen his position within the selectorate that could overthrow
him, especially the military and provincial governors.10
The Argentine centralised system of powerful parties controlled by regional leaders,
however, created a situation that was different from that of Brazil. Unlike Perón, Vargas
managed to greatly weaken Brazilian regional bosses by adopting an open-list
proportional representation system. As a result, party oligarchies became much more
fragmented and this weakened their influence over the president. As I show in the
previous chapter, Vargas’ electoral reforms greatly contributed to strengthening
presidents’ independent position in Brazil. Unable to rely on alliances with a myriad of
local bosses, all presidents that came after Vargas used their powers to establish an
independent position vis-à-vis legislators and impose rules-based distributive policies.
In Argentina, however, clientelistic networks have remained dependent on a
centralised party structure for resources, and this in turn created a much closer
relationship of mutual dependency between presidents and regional oligarchies.
Presidents, therefore, have been largely unable to solve their ambiguous position as both
the only national elected officials that must develop universalistic and effective policies
to establish themselves in a position of leadership and as agents of a constellation of
parochial forces that sustain their parties on the ground.
Perón was overthrown by a military coup in 1955. Few social policy reforms were
undertaken between 1955 and the establishment of democracy in 1983. The military
closed down the Foundation set up by Perón to run charitable programmes and focused its
efforts on the expansion of benefits for workers in the formal sector. Purchasing private
health insurance was made mandatory for all formal workers and pension benefit rules
were standardised across different sectors of the economy. Elections were held in 1958
and the elected president Arturo Frondizi, was ousted by a military coup in 1962. A
new election was called in 1963 in which Peronists were not allowed to run for office.
Arturo Umberto Illia, a member of the centre-right Radical Party was elected and duly
became president on that same year, only to be overthrown by a military coup in 1966
after promising modest increases in social protection targeted at the poor. There was a
brief opening in 1973 that saw Perón returning to the presidency and dying in office. He
was succeeded by his wife (and vice-president) Isabel, who was in turn ousted by a fresh
military coup in 1976. The military would stay in power until 1983, making this the
longest period of uninterrupted military rule in modern Argentine history.11
10On the comparison between Perón and Vargas, see Groppo (2013).
11On the causes of political instability in Argentina during this period, see Portantiero and Mora y Araujo
(1989).
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The end of the military regime in 1983 after the country’s defeat of the
Falklands/Malvinas War brought hopes of true democracy in Argentina without military
intervention. Presidents, however, remained week and overly dependent on the support
of regional leaders, who in turn maintained their influence in the legislature. In a sense,
Argentine democratisation is the counterpoint to that of Brazil: while Brazilians decided
to rewrite their constitution to strengthen the presidency in order to avoid the kinds of
political instability that most countries experienced throughout the second half of the
20th century, the Argentine transition saw a return to the order established in the 1853
Constitution, which strongly favours decentralisation and limits the powers of presidents.
It is not surprising that most social programmes created in the immediate period after
democratisation gave significant discretionary powers to politicians and put local
officials – especially governors – firmly in control. Raul Alfonsín (1983-1989) was the
first president elected after the end of the dictatorship. During his tenure in office the
federal government returned to the traditional practice of funding food handout
programmes ran by provincial governments. The policy was first called Programa
Alimentario Nacional (National Food Programme, or PAN) and was put in place in 1983.
It was first a presidential initiative designed by Alfonsín’s team and modelled after the
US Food Stamps system. The law that created PAN provided for the collection of data by
the central government to produce a ‘map of poverty’ in order to locate eligible families.
The PAN’s rules-based nature was a political gamble by Alfonsín. A member of the
centre-right Radical Party, he sought to reach out to the poorest Argentines that
traditionally supported the many Peronist parties. Yet the implementation of the
programme was marked by clientelism and PAN was quickly taken over by political
appointees in the local bureaucracies. When the programme was announced it was met
with severe criticism by provincial officials who condemned it as a violation of their
constitutional autonomy and an overreach by the federal government. Facing pressure
from the senators – who were at the time appointed by governors, not directly elected –
Alfonsín allowed changes in the PAN’s rules that effectively took the federal government
out of the programme’s management. Specifically, the changes imposed by the Senate
allowed governors to appoint PAN agents in each municipality and gave them
discretionary powers to nominate beneficiaries when data from the ‘map of poverty’ was
deemed ‘incomplete or incoherent’. Because the information necessary to complete the
‘map of poverty’ had to come from provincial statistical agencies and the federal
government could only collect limited data through the decennial census, this gave PAN
agents – in effect, clientelistic brokers – immense power.12
12On the difficulties of creating a ‘map of poverty’ and the conflict between governors and the president
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As a result of the political pressure exerted by the Senate, the federal government was
limited to funding the acquisition of food boxes that would immediately be shipped to
each provincial office and, from there, to agents in each municipality. Alfonsín’s attempt
to use this as a way to appeal to his own national constituency failed as the opposition
seized on the opportunity to denounce PAN as a clientelistic manoeuvre by the president.
Alfonsín’s party lost the 1987 midterm election and the Peronist candidate Carlos Menem
won the 1989 presidential elections.
Menem scrapped PAN in 1990, intending to replace it with his own programme:
Bono Solidario (Solidarity Bonus, BS). Again, Menem faced resistance from the Senate,
which blocked BS and challenged the government to send a bill for a decentralised social
programme. Unable to force his own social policy agenda through Congress, Menem
effectively left the issue at the hands of governors as he focused his political capital on
an unprecedented liberalisation and privatisation programme that was happening in the
country at the time.13
Menem finished his term in office in the midst of a deep financial crisis. One of the
important outcomes of the crisis, however, was a constitutional reform enacted in 1994.
While this reform is usually interpreted as having weakened Argentine presidents
because of a provision that reduced their terms from six years to only four, it in fact
strengthened their hands and paved the way for a moderate expansion of the role of the
federal government in social policy. The Senate – a longtime bastion of governors that
worked to block federal social policies under Alfonsín and Menem – would be directly
elected instead of appointed by provincial governors. Most importantly, however,
presidents gained the authority to issue emergency decrees (officially Decretos de
Necesidad y Urgencia, or Necessity and Urgency Decree) that would come into force
immediately after promulgated and remain valid while they were debated in Congress.
The instrument is similar – and based on – Brazil’s medidas provisórias, which
presidents in that country used effectively to force through many important social policy
reforms. The reader will recall, for example, that Bolsa Família, Brazil’s signature
rules-based conditional cash transfer, was created by President Lula in 2003 using his
emergency decree powers. That decree was only approved by Congress in 2004, months
after beneficiaries started receiving their cards. The same is true of its predecessor, Bolsa
Escola, that was created by an emergency decree in 2001, but ratified by Congress on
that same year.14
Menem’s successor, Fernando de la Rúa (1990-2001) had to implement unpopular
for the control of PAN, see Garay (2010) p. 45-49.
13Levitsky (2003).
14See previous chapter.
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austerity measures that meant cuts in all forms of government spending to deal with the
acute financial crises that that Argentina experienced at the time. Following what was
happening in Brazil and Mexico, the Argentine government considered creating a
conditional cash transfer programme in 2001 as part of a broad strategy to deal with
social unrest and rising poverty that resulted from the successive financial crises that
happened in Argentina between the early 1990s and early 2000s. Under De la Rúa, the
government finally decided on a programme called Jefes de Hogar (Heads of
Household), which did not follow the traditional CCT model, but instead provided
income support for the unemployed. A pilot was launched by the government with 3.000
beneficiaries in 2001. Politically weak and faced with dismal approval ratings, De la Rúa
did not follow through with his Jefes de Hogar design but instead issued an emergency
decree in 2001 setting up what he called the ‘Argentine Plan’ to significantly boost social
spending and fight poverty. It consisted primarily of a series of initiatives to extend
family allowances, school grants and other benefits payed to formal sector workers to the
unemployed and to those in the informal economy and would mean a significant boost in
social spending reaching the poorest in Argentine society.
The emergency decree was quashed by the courts in months and De la Rúa resigned
the presidency in December 2001, unable to transform the role of the federal government
in anti-poverty programmes as he intended. After the next three men in the presidential
line of succession declined to take office, Eduardo Duhalde, governor of Buenos Aires,
was elected by Congress to finish De la Rúa’s term.
Duhalde would govern until 2002 and one of his first measures was to issue an
emergency decree extending Jefes de Hogar to the entire country. Under this programme
the government would provide a cash transfer of 150 pesos a month to each eligible
individual, which at the time represented about half of the mean household income per
capita in Argentina in 2002. Those deemed eligible to participate were unemployed
household heads with children under age 18 or with people with disabilities. Unlike his
predecessors, Duhalde managed to use his emergency powers to resist appeals by
Congress to decentralise the programme. For the most part, his proposed design was
accepted by the legislature and the programme remained under the federal government’s
control.15 Still, weakened by the ongoing financial crisis and by his unpopular decision
to revoke the longstanding peg between the Argentine peso and the US dollar, Duhalde
resigned in 2003, paving way for early elections that saw Nestor Kirchner, the Peronist
governor of the province of Santa Cruz, chosen as president.
When Kirchner took office, Argentina was undergoing a period of great political
15Garay (2010), pp. 69-70.
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instability. Brazil had already consolidated stable democratic institutions at that point,
and the presidents in Brasília had accumulated great power. In Buenos Aires, by
contrast, presidents were weak and their hold on what little power they enjoyed was
tenuous. Several presidents were forced to resign amidst social protests, unable to make
structural reforms. Of the seven presidents that preceded Kirchner, only two had finished
their terms in office (namely Alfonsín and Menem). On the one hand, these presidents
faced strong pressure from organised groups that resisted economic reforms. On the
other, they faced pressure from regional leaders that confronted presidents when they
attempted to strengthen their political position in order to cater to their national
constituencies. Their ambiguous position as national leaders that were at the same time
dependent on parochial interests of strong parties worked to further undermine their
political position.
Kirchner, however, was much more successful in appeasing his opposition by giving
it exactly what it wanted: resources for clientelistic deals. Taking advantage of the first
years of the commodities boom and the fiscal adjustment already undertaken by
Duhalde, Kirchner shifted from confronting regional leaders to appeasing them. He
greatly expanded public sector jobs in the federal government and used them to give
patronage to leaders of social movements that had organised mass protests against his
predecessors. Provincial governors were allowed to do the same with resources from
increased federal transfers.
With increased revenue from the commodities boom, Kirchner worked to please both
the powerful groups that demanded patronage and clientelism spending as well as to
boost policies that favoured his own political goals. Jefes de Hogar was greatly
expanded to become the largest anti-poverty programme of the federal government and
the federal government invested heavily on universal subsidies. The process of social
spending increases continued after Kirchner’s death in 2010, when his wife Cristina took
over the office.16
Argentina’s story shows how the evolution of rules-based policies can be much more
difficult with weaker presidents. Unlike in the case of Brazil’s transition to democracy,
Argentine reformers chose not to give the presidents the power to cater to their large,
national constituency. Instead, they created a political system that was a return to the past,
one that put provincial governors back in a position to effectively block any initiatives by
the federal government they disliked. Both the economic crises of the 1990s and the
commodities boom of the 2000s helped create the conditions for presidents to appease
demands for clientelistic spending and patronage and for a limited expansion of rules-
16For in-depth analysis of Jefes de Hogar and its effectiveness, see Kostzer (2008) and Rabi (2011).
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based income redistribution.
As stated above, the case of Argentina is particularly relevant to my argument because
of its electoral system. In Argentina, the political system is in many ways similar to
that of Brazil – a presidential federation with proportional representation. Unlike Brazil,
however, Argentina uses a closed-list proportional representation system. This voting
method greatly empowers parties and thus allows us to examine to what extent strong
party brands can change legislators’ incentives.
Unfortunately, closed-list proportional representation appears to do little to dissuade
clientelistic behaviour. Argentine legislators are greatly dependent on local politics
dynamics to gain a good position on the party list in their home districts. To gain favour
with their local parties, legislators must work with governors and other local officials to
secure resources for clientelistic arrangements.17 The main difference is just that
Brazilian legislators must do much of the work individually, while their counterparts to
the south have stronger incentives to work together to build and maintain the same
clientelistic networks.
Mexico
Like Brazil and Argentina, Mexico only first developed welfare programmes for some
politically important groups. Some powerful labour unions managed to secure
government subsidised pensions in the 1930s18 Other industrial workers were later
contemplated with pension and healthcare services with the creation of the Mexican
Institute of Social Security in 1943. Civil Servants gained the same benefits in the 1960s.
But just like in the rest of Latin America, the rural sector represented the vast majority
of the population and was not covered by existing welfare schemes. Mexico was an
exceptional case in the region in the sense that it created a vast land reform programme in
the 1930s.19 In fact, the Mexican constitution of 1917 – a document designed to mark the
end of a civil war and to consolidate Mexico’s one-party oligarchy – established that all
land belonged to the state and that the government would be in charge of redistributing
it. Land grants were made in the form of ejidos – communal land tenure arrangement.
When the land reform programme ended in 1991, 52% of the territory of Mexico had
been redistributed.20
Mexico’s land reform was famously clientelistic and played a key role in the regime
17See Spiller and Tommasi (2009) on the importance of alliances between governors and legislators.
18Mesa-Lago (1989).
19Uruguay, Colombia, Chile, and the Dominican Republic had some land reform in the early decades of
the 20th century, but not in the same scale as Mexico. See Albertus (2015).
20Binder (2015).
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established around the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI, which ruled the
country uninterruptedly from 1929 to 2000. Kevin Middlebrook describes the enormous
discretionary powers that politicians had and how they used the programme as a tool to
maintain political control of peasant organisations:
Federal regulation of land tenure arrangements (including the promise/threat
of land expropriation and distribution under the terms of post-revolutionary
agrarian reform legislation), management of extensive credit and marketing
facilities, and the hierarchical organization of rural producers (especially
agrarian reform beneficiaries) through ‘official’ party-affiliated associations
[...] all provided governing elites with strong political controls –and for
several decades a reservoir of real popular support in the countryside.21
Clientelistic distribution of land happened mainly through local governments. Those
wishing to be allocated to a communal plot had to petition their local governments, who
in turn submitted the paperwork to the federal government in Mexico City. Local
governments had significant discretion over which requests they would recommend to
the federal government and when, while the central authorities had their own
discretionary power to grant the requests they wanted and deny those they did not.
Mexico’s land reform programme was part of a broader system of rural clientelism
that itself was an integral part of the ruling party’s strategy to remain in power. Local and
national governments also exercised great discretion over agricultural credit22 or irrigation
projects. While the oligarchic political systems of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile in the
early decades of the 20th century allowed the political elite to exercise control of the
countryside through a mixture of violence, voter fraud, and distribution of patronage to
the landed elites, in Mexico, clientelism played a much more important role.23
Similar to what happened in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina during periods of
authoritarian government, distribution in Mexico under the PRI system tended to
privilege powerful interest groups. Depending on the nature of the regime, different
sectors tend to be privileged by autocracies: public sector employees, labour unions, the
military, and other powerful groups have historically gained access to resources that
were not available to the mass of poor citizens in Latin American autocracies. Shifts in
social spending towards the poor tended to use highly discretionary policy designs and
21Middlebrook (2004) apud Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni (2012), p. 51.
22It is important to note here that land could not be used as collateral, as it was not owned by the peasants
themselves.
23Albertus et al. (2016).
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be a result of the elite’s fear of revolt. Mexico’s land reform programme is possibly the
best example of this phenomenon.24
The single-party clientelistic system began to break up in rural areas in the 1980s
and 1990s.25 By then, Mexico was mostly an urban nation and a smaller proportion of
the population depended on the networks created by the regime in the rural areas. After
nearly loosing two elections, the PRI shifted its distributive strategy. President Carlos
Salinas (1988-1994) created the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (National Solidarity
Programme, or Pronasol) with the stated goal of fighting poverty. Yet, Pronasol’s real
goal was to strengthen the PRI’s clientelistic hold over poor voters.
Pronasol was a highly decentralised programme. The federal government sought to
provide funds directly to municipalities based on proposals submitted by local
governments and civil society organisations. In practice, both at the local and the
national levels, politicians enjoyed a lot of discretionary power to choose which projects
would receive funding and which would not.26 But Pronasol was only the last grasp of
the single party system set up by PRI. After nearly loosing the election, President Salinas
struck a deal with the main opposition party, PAN, to enact electoral reforms that would
boost transparency and curb widespread voter fraud.27
The creation of Pronasol illustrates how the emergence of rules-based social policies
depends on presidents being able to cater to their national electorates independently of
party structures dominated by local political leaders. In Mexico, presidents were able to
focus on large-scale clientelistic programmes when they could focus on winning
competitive elections, instead of devoting their energies to quashing revolt and keeping
their selectorates satisfied. The evidence from Brazil laid out in the previous chapter
shows that a similar reality existed in that country as well. Brazilian rulers between 1889
and 1964 embraced patronage and clientelism because their concern was not with
winning elections, but with preserving the integrity of the machines that held real power
in the country. In these systems, the president’s most important job is not to cater to a
national constituency, but rather to maintain stability by balancing the often conflicting
demands of the powerful corporations and regional bosses that are part of the selectorate.
The combination of electoral reforms and economic crisis in the 1990s dramatically
changed the incentives faced by Mexican presidents. Salinas’ successor as head of state
was Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000). Zedillo knew that the PRI system was unsustainable
24Albertus (2015).
25Bruhn (1997); Magaloni (2006).
26Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez and Magaloni (2016), Chapter Four.
27Most significantly, the reforms guaranteed the independence of the Electoral Federal Institute. See
Magaloni (2006), esp. Chapter 9.
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after the reforms enacted by his predecessor. The PRI had lost regional elections in the
more populous states and did not have a majority in the lower house of Congress
anymore. Faced for the first time with real electoral competition, Zedillo dismantled the
clientelistic Pronasol and created the Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación
(Programme for Education, Health and Feeding), or Progresa), the first large-scale
conditional cash transfer programme in the world. Progresa was fundamentally a
rules-based anti-poverty programme that changed the logic of poverty alleviation in
Mexico and created an example that would be emulated in many other countries,
including Brazil.28
To open the way to the creation of rules-based redistribution, Mexico did not need
to award more formal powers to presidents. Instead, it required a transformation in the
political system to make them more independent of parties’ localistic leaderships. Once
Zedillo was forced to choose between doing what was best for the PRI leadership at
the local level and his own political position as a national leader, he chose the latter.
Likewise, his successors continued to reform and expand this system even after the PRI
was defeated in the ballot box and succeeded by the centre-left PAN. This change marked
the dissociation between the political future of presidents and that of local leaders. Once
only available to those living in rural areas, Progresa was later expanded into a nation-
wide programme and renamed Oportunidades by Zedillo’s successor, Vicente Fox (2000-
2006) and later again had its name changed to Prospera after the PRI returned to power
democratically with the election of Enrique Peña in 2012.29
Assessing alternative explanations
The expansion of rules-based social policies is not just a hallmark of Brazil. The same
historical dynamic can be found in countries throughout Latin America and indeed in the
rest of the developing world. My theory is that what is driving much of this innovation is
presidential power. Powerful national leaders, lacking the ability to enter into
individualised clientelistic bargains, have an incentive to adopt programmatic distributive
programmes based on objective rules, not personal connections. Democratisation and
economic growth are important factors as well, but they tell us only part of the story.
Furthermore, I have not found any evidence to support the view that left-wing parties are
the driving force in this process. In what follows, I will discuss each of these arguments
and explain why previous theories are insufficient to fully explain recent transformations
28De La O (2015) provides the most comprehensive analysis of Progresa and how it evolved into a
national programme under the name Oportunidades.
29The name of the programme changed only in 2014.
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in social policy.
Clientelism as a legacy of authoritarianism
The argument that the transition towards democracy forces countries abandon
clientelistic practices in favour of programmatic policies is simple. The proponents of
this theory have argued that clientelism is so prevalent in Latin America and in other
parts of the developing world because these countries have a strong institutional legacy
of authoritarianism. Authoritarian leaders do not have the need or the inclination to tie
their own hands with rules-based distributive policies. In fact, discretionary social
programmes can be a powerful tool that autocrats use to gain the support of key actors
that sustain the regime: the military, regional leaders, religious groups, and so on. After
all, dictators are not subject to elections – or, at least not to the kind that is free and fair.30
Once democratic institutions are created and take root, politicians will depend on the
support of the mass of (mostly poor) voters to remain in office. Democratic
accountability will diminish the power of groups and eventually force leaders to replace
wasteful clientelistic spending with either rules-based targeted programmes designed to
reach the poor or with universalistic systems that create public goods.
My argument in this dissertation is not that this democracy is irrelevant to explain the
creation of rules-based social policies, but rather that it is not sufficient. Many countries
of Latin America began a slow transition towards democracy in the 1980s and the 1990s,
yet clientelism continues to be a persistent phenomenon throughout the region. Indeed,
the same is true of other regions of the world that have experienced a shift towards
democracy in recent decades, such as Eastern Europe. We have seen in previous chapters
how clientelism remains an important tool for Brazilian politicians and how it has shaped
most political institutions in that country.
Those elected to the Brazilian Congress and for many local offices in the country will
quickly find out that they have discretionary powers over a significant share of social
spending and that they can use those resources to build a loyal following of voters. In the
previous chapters we saw evidence of how effective this can be for legislators in Brazil
and of how these networks function in practice. I have shown that in Brazil – as in
many other similar political systems – institutions are designed in such a way that there is
only one elected official in the country that cannot directly take advantage of clientelism:
presidents. While a small number of loyal voters will make a difference in legislative and
local elections, they are not worth the effort for presidents.
Competitive elections are a necessary condition for countries to move away from
30Blaydes (2011).
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clientelistic policies, but their are not sufficient. For rules-based policies to emerge the
political system must create the right incentives for politicians to get rid of these
remnants of authoritarianism, instead of continuing to take advantage of patron-client
relations under a democratic system. We have seen how the framers of Brazil’s
post-1988 political system created rules that turned presidents into agents of
transformation and the main opponents of clientelistic systems. However, this system
also ensured that presidents remain dependent on legislators who are often rewarded for
effectively channelling discretionary spending through their own clientelistic networks.
The result is what we see here: an incomplete transition towards programmatic social
policies.
Economic growth as a solution to clientelism
Another theory attributes the decline of clientelism to rising prosperity and economic
growth. Here, too, however, I find little support for this alternative explanation. Fuelled
by an unprecedented commodities boom, Brazil experienced one of the most impressive
periods of economic growth in its history between 2002 and 2014. Yet, the statistical
models in Chapter 3 do not show any evidence that clientelistic policies are loosing their
electoral appeal. Despite their increased wealth, Brazilians are not defecting en masse
from patron-client arrangements and, not surprisingly, legislators have continued to fund
them. The qualitative evidence collected primarily during the 2014 elections largely
corroborates these findings.
There are many possible interpretations for this. First, it could be that voters do not
demand clientelism because their are poor and have no choice, but rather because it is
personally advantageous for them to gain the privileged access to state resources that a
relationship with a patron can provide. It may be that it is more expensive for patrons to
cater to clients as they become wealthier, but if the government funding available for
clientelism rises in the same proportion, voters’ affluence never becomes a problem. Or,
it could be that there is a tipping point at which clients are wealthy enough to rebel
against patrons and it has not yet been reached in Brazil or even in wealthier Latin
American nations, such as Argentina and Uruguay. Another alternative still is that
clientelistic institutions are resilient and, even if they are more likely to appear in poorer
societies, it takes more than economic growth to cause institutional change.
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The rise of leftist parties breaks clientelistic links
Finally, I also found little support for a third alternative theory – the theory that puts
left-wing parties in the driver’s seat, giving them credit for the turn away from
clientelistic policies and towards programmatic redistribution. In fact, there is ample
evidence that centre-right presidents invested their political capital in rules-based
policies and that centre-left parties benefited systematically from clientelistic policies.
As I discuss in Chapter One, it is well-known that the rise of the left had a strong
impact on European welfare institutions. These parties helped mobilise poor voters,
turning them into a political force that could no longer be ignored by conservatives and
liberals. Arguably, one of the consequences of this process was the creation of the
modern European welfare state.31 In Latin America, however, left wing parties were
either outlawed or had a strong populist and sometimes authoritarian base. It was only
after the end of the Cold War and when the military dictatorships fell in many key
countries that one sees a fertile ground for the rise of a left based on bottom-up
mobilisation of the poor around a political platform. The Workers’ Party in Brazil is the
clear example that is pertinent to this dissertation, but others exist in the region. The
Frente Amplio in Uruguay and the Concertación in Chile are instances of the post-Cold
War left groups that are at the same time democratic and non-populist.
Yet it makes sense that left-wing parties will – like all others – behave in ways that are
consistent with the existing institutions of the country. Modern research on clientelism
acknowledges that the link between the rise of the left in Europe and the shift away from
patron-client arrangements is more complex than previously thought.32 In Brazil and
throughout much of Latin America, left-wing parties had strong incentives to replicate
clientelistic practices adopted by other political groups and clientelistic networks.
Recent judicial investigations in Brazil exemplify how left wing parties have reason
to follow the same patterns set by their centrist or right-wing competitors. The so-called
Operation Car Wash started out in March 2014 as a routine investigation into a group of
businessmen who used gas stations with car wash services in the southern state of Paraná
to launder money. But investigators bumped into operators who turned out to be also
involved in a massive corruption scheme inside Petrobrás, the government’s oil
monopoly. As the enquiry progressed, prosecutors began to unearth a trove of evidence
implicating not only high-tiered people inside the oil company, but also construction
sector giants with government contracts and political parties across the board. As
detailed in the previous chapter, their goal was a mixture of personal gain and securing
31See literature review in Chapter One.
32Hopkin and Mastropaolo (2001).
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funds for politicians’ electoral strategies, including maintaining clientelistic networks.
These arrangements brought together Brazil’s most powerful left-wing outfit – the
Workers’ Party – and traditional centrist and even right wing groups that support the
government in congress. The evidence collected by investigators are a strong indication
that the incentives faced by left- and right-wing parties is more similar than they may
appear at first.33
Implications for the study of Latin American politics and future work
I have just explained why my theory does a better job of accounting for the decline of
clientelism than the main alternative theories that exist in the literature. But how does the
argument advanced in this study relate to the broader literature on the politics of social
protection in developing countries? My argument builds on theories of clientelism and
institutional design that have highlighted the role of income redistribution as a tool that
politicians have to gain electoral support. In Latin America, high levels of poverty and
inequality have long been major policy concerns and political elites have often failed to
provide effective answers. This unfortunate reality has often been associated with
phenomena such as populism, violent revolts, lack of popular support for democracy.
Below I point out some implications for the academic literature and for the political
debate that emerge from the findings reported here.
The dangers of decentralisation
Proponents of political decentralisation have often claimed that local solutions can be
more effective because politicians at the local level have better knowledge of the reality
of their constituents and are thus better positioned to create effective solutions.34 The
findings in this dissertation serve as a note of caution, not because I question the ability
of local political entrepreneurs to identify what their communities want. Political
entrepreneurs at the local level are exceptionally skilled at finding out what citizens
want. The problem is when they use that knowledge – their intimate familiarity with
local demands and interests – for their own purposes, and for the purposes of their
patrons as well. Rather than encouraging democratic accountability, decentralisation can
end up preventing it.
33Much of the evidence connecting the Car Wash investigations and clientelism has been leaked to the
press. See, for example, Raquel Landim, A Odebrecht e o desmonte do Estado clientelista, Folha de São
Paulo, 16 Jun 2016; Mino Carta and Rodrigo Martins, Um governo socialista não pode se submeter à lógica
clientelista, Carta Capital, 19 Ago 2016; João Fellet, Política brasileira precisa da corrupção para funcionar,
diz pesquisador, BBC Brasil, 18 May 2016.
34Bird and Smart (2002); Faguet (2004), inter alia.
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The advice here is simple: those in charge of designing social programmes must be
accountable to a large section of the electorate, not to small groups that can easily be
coopted with clientelism. The framers of Brazil’s post-dictatorship political system
chose to balance a weak and fragmented party system with strong presidents. As a result,
instead of delegating the choices about how to use social spending to local communities
as the advocates of decentralisation propose, these presidents effectively centralised
these programmes as much as they could, tying the hands of local officials with complex
rules so as to give them only minimum discretion. Local politics, however, remains
fertile ground for clientelistic arrangements.
The challenge to those proposing more decentralisation in the developing world is to
take account of the long history of clientelism that most developing societies have
endured and of how strong patron-client ties shape local politics. This is not to say that
decentralisation will always result in more clientelism. Some developed nations
managed to do away with large-scale clientelism a long time ago despite having highly
decentralised political systems.35 It is also true that there are drawbacks to centralised
programmes. Following the advice of the technocrats in Brasília, presidents designed
rulebooks that have to be applied uniformly in an incredibly diverse country of 210
million people, taking virtually no account of local specificities. This may not be the
most effective way of addressing issues of poverty and inequality, but it is preferable to
widespread clientelism.
The nature of ‘coalition presidentialism’
One of the fundamental ideas that underpins analyses of contemporary Latin American
political systems is the concept of ‘coalition presidentialism’. According to these
theories, presidentialism can work well with fragmented parliaments in many countries
in the region because these presidents have a diverse set of tools that they can use to
build majorities, much as prime ministers do in parliamentary systems. Much of my own
analysis has been influenced by this idea: Brazilian presidents are indeed powerful and
capable of creating political political stability by coopting members of the nation’s
‘reactive’ legislature.36
Missing from the story, however, is any meaningful debate about what are the costs of
35Indeed, the history of countries such as Switzerland, Spain, and Germany suggests that it is possible
for a rules-based welfare state to emerge in environments where local authorities are powerful and enjoy
significant autonomy. But in cases such as these I suggest that there are strong institutions linking the
electoral fortunes of local leaders to outcomes at the national level.
36On reactive legislatures, see Cox and Morgenstern (2001) The most prominent statement of the
‘coalition presidentialism’ hypothesis is Figueiredo and Limongi (1999).
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presidents giving legislators what they want. After all, coalition presidentialism assumes
that any programmatic agenda that legislators might have will largely be subsumed under
the president’s broader political platform. And because legislators know that they are
too weak to deliver on any substantial policy issue, they will have to find other ways to
differentiate themselves from their many competitors. Clientelistic redistribution is one
of the many things that legislators may demand, but there are potentially many other
situations in which the use by presidents of their tools of coalition formation may have
contributed to sub-optimal policy outcomes. Recent work by Aldo Musacchio and Sergio
Lazzarini, for example, discusses the relevance of state subsidies to firms for presidents’
strategies of coalition building and how this practice has undermined long-term economic
growth in Brazil.37
The quality of governance under ‘coalition presidentialism’ remains understudied
and the literature too narrowly focused on discussing under what conditions such
systems are stable and how effective they can be in delivering governance without
gridlock. Further work on coalition presidentialism could examine, for example, if
presidential systems face a trade-off between having a reactive assembly where
legislators easily relinquish their political agendas in favour of the president’s and focus
all their energy on sub-optimal personalistic pursuits (like clientelism), and a traditional
presidential system where legislators fear compromising and joining the president’s
majoritarian agenda because they have their own party’s national platform to follow and
thus the country faces constant gridlock.
Future Work
There are many questions raised here that deserve further study. In my view, the most
important one is about the extent to which the theory outlined here can be applied to
other presidential democracies. While the the dissertation has provided an in-depth look
at one country, this chapter has also presented shorter case studies of Argentina and
Mexico. As I explained earlier, the evidence from these two additional countries
provided an encouraging robustness check of the main findings presented here. These
outlines only scratch the surface, however, and do not constitute a definitive test of the
theory. Further quantitative and qualitative work needs to be done to determine if
presidential power has been the key driver of the creation of rules-based income
redistribution in these and in other developing presidential democracies.
In-depth study of other presidential democracies would be particularly helpful in
refining the role that different party systems may play in encouraging either clientelistic
37Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014).
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or programmatic distribution. In the case of Brazil, the weak party system provides
incentives for personalistic relations of which clientelism is just one prominent example.
I have argued in this dissertation that stronger national parties and a different electoral
system can make presidents’ role as a champion of universalistic policies more
ambiguous. However, I have also argued here that presidents are never perfect agents of
their parties, and have independent incentives to push for rules-based policies in order to
cater to their national constituencies.
It is also necessary to study whether the tension between politicians who have a
national constituency and those that have their political future tied to local politics also
shapes the dynamics of anti-poverty spending in parliamentary systems. In theory, by
fusing together the executive and legislative branches, parliamentary systems can either
put a weak executive at the mercy of a parliament dominated by political entrepreneurs
whose priorities are rooted to the dynamics of local politics or force legislators to
abandon their parochial agendas to work towards the national priorities of a strong
cabinet. This work would be relevant because many developing countries in places such
as Eastern Europe and Asia have embraced parliamentary democracies and still face the
challenges of curtailing clientelistic distribution. In the case of Brazil, the political
turmoil that has engulfed the country since the impeachment of President Dilma
Rousseff has inspired some proponents of electoral reform to advocate for a return to a
parliamentary system, where heads of government would be able to threaten
parliamentarians with a general elections if too many of them strayed from the
government’s majoritarian mandate.38 Without further study of clientelistic incentives in
parliamentary democracies there is no way to say if this reform could indeed help Brazil
address clientelism and other related issues, like corruption.
I am eager to further explore the role of variables that may affect the likelihood of
voters joining – or rebelling against – clientelistic networks in order to build an even more
complete theory of patron-client dynamics. The model outlined in Chapter Two does not
address this issue directly, stating only that voters make a judgement of whether or not
they value their vote more than they do the offer of privileged access of state resources that
membership in a clientelistic network entails. One could consider, for example, the role
of strong and independent civil society organisations that help voters organise outside
clientelistic networks and thus increase the benefits of remaining outside patron-client
arrangements.
38Isabela Bonfim, Senador tucano apresenta PEC que institui parlamentarismo no Brasil, O Estado
de São Paulo, 09 Mar 2016; Erich Decat, Documento do PSDB a Temer propõe implantação do
parlamentarismo, O Estado de São Paulo, 02 May 2016; Michel Temer não descarta propor implantação do
parlamentarismo a partir de 2018, Zero Hora, 03 May 2016.
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Appendices
Appendix A List of Presidents of Brazil, 1889-2016
Years Name Party Votes Main Challenger’s Votes
1889-1891 M. Deodoro da Fonseca none (military) none (coup d’etat) none
1891-1894 Floriano Peixoto none (military) none (predecessor resigned) none
1894-1898 Prudente de Morais Republican 290.883 (88,38%) 38.291 (11,32%)
1898-1902 M. de Campos Salles São Paulo Republican 420.286 (91,52%) 38.929 (8,48%)
1902-1906 F. Rodrigues Alves São Paulo Republican 592.039 (93,30%) 42.542 (6,70%)
1906-1909 Afonso Pena Minas Gerais Republican 288.285 (97,92%) 4.865 (1,65%)
1909-1910 Nilo Peçanha São Paulo Republican none (predecessor died) none
1910-1914 Hermes da Fonseca Republican Conservative 403.867 (64,36%) 222.822 (35,51%)
1914-1918 Venceslau Brás Minas Gerais Republican 532.107 (91,58%) 47.782 (8,22%)
did not take office F. Rodrigues Alves São Paulo Republican 386.467 (99%) 1.258 (0,45%)
1918-1919 Delfim Moreira Minas Gerais Republican none (predecessor died) none
1919-1922 Epitácio Pessoa Minas Gerais Republican 286.373 (70,96%) 116.414 (28,85%)
1922-1926 Artur Bernardes Minas Gerais Republican 466.877 (59,46%) 317.714 (40,49%)
1926-1930 W. Luiz São Paulo Republican 688.528 (99,70%) 1.116 (0,16%)
1930-1945 Getulio Vargas Liberal Alliance none (coup d’etat) none
1946-1951 Eurico G. Dutra Social Democrat 3.251.507 (55,39%) 2.039.341 (34,74%)
1951-1954 Getulio Vargas Labour 3.849.040 (48,73%) 2.342.384 (29,66%)
1954-1955 J. F. Café Filho Progressive none (predecessor died) none
1955 Carlos Luz Social Democrat none (predecessor resigned) none
1955-1956 Nereu Ramos Social Democrat none (coup d’etat) none
1956-1961 Jucelino Kubitschek Social Democrat 3.077.411 (35,68%) 2.610.462 (30,27%)
1961 Janio Quadros Christian Democrat 5.636.623 (48,26%) 3.846.825 (32,94%)
1961-1964 João Goulart Labour none (predecessor resigned) none
1964 Ranieri Mazzilli Social Democrat none (coup d’etat) none
1964-1967 H. A. Castello Branco none (military) none (coup d’etat) none
1967-1969 A. da Costa e Silva none (military) none (military dictatorship) none
1969 none (Military Junta) none (military) none (military dictatorship) none
1969-1974 E. Garrastazu Medici none (military) none (military dictatorship) none
1974-1979 Ernesto Geisel none (military) none (military dictatorship) none
1979-1985 João Figueiredo none (military) none (military dictatorship) none
did not take office Tancredo Neves Democratic Movement none (appointed by Congress) none
1985-1990 José Sarney Democratic Movement none (predecessor died) none
1990-1992 F. Collor de Mello National Reconstruction 35.089.998 (53,03%) 31.076.364 (46,97%)
1992-1995 Itamar Franco Democratic Movement none (predecessor impeached) none
1995-1999 F. H. Cardoso Social Democrat 34.350.217 (54,28%) 17.112 255 (27,04%)
1999-2003 F. H. Cardoso Social Democrat 35.936.540 (53,06%) 21.475.218 (31,27%)
2003-2007 L. I. Lula da Silva Workers’ 52.793.364 (61,27%) 33.370.739 (38,73%)
2007-2011 L. I. Lula da Silva Workers’ 58.295.042 (60,83%) 37.543.178 (39,17%)
2011-2015 Dilma Rousseff Workers’ 55.752.529 (56,05%) 43.711.388 (43,95%)
2015-2016 Dilma Rousseff Workers’ 54.501.118 (51,64%) 51.041.155 (48,36%)
2016-present Michel Temer Democratic Movement none (predecessor impeached) none
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Appendix B Variables used in Chapter Three
Variable Variable Name Source
codeibge Official municipality identifier code IBGE
mun Municipality name IBGE
state State IBGE
region Macro region IBGE
spentHYEARcct Expenditures per head in CCTs in YEAR MDS
spentHYEARSDF Expenditures per head in Saúde da Família in YEAR STN
spentHYEARFNAS Expenditures per head in FNAS in YEAR STN
spentHYEARPNRA Expenditures per head in Land Reform Programme in YEAR STN
dgdpH1YEAR GDP Growth per head relative to preceding year IPEA
fhcvs1998 F. H. Cardoso’s vote share in 1998 election TSE
lulavs1998 Lula’s vote share in 1998 presidential election TSE
serravs2002 Serra’s vote share in first round 2002 election TSE
lulavs2002 Lula’s vote share in first round 2002 election TSE
serravs20022 Serra’s vote share in second round 2002 election TSE
lulavs20022 Lula’s vote share in second round 2002 election TSE
lulavs2006 Lula’s vote share in first round 2006 election TSE
lulavs20062 Lula’s vote share in second round 2006 election TSE
dilmavs2010 GDP Rousseff’s vote share in first round 2010 election TSE
dilmavs20102 GDP Rousseff’s vote share in runoff 2010 election TSE
distcap Distance from capital IBGE
giniYEAR GINI coefficient in YEAR IBGE
hdiYEAR Human Development Index in YEAR IBGE
incgovYEAR Party of incumbent governor in YEAR IBGE
hdiYEAR Human Development Index in YEAR IBGE
totfamYEAR Estimated number of families in the municipality in YEAR IBGE
validYEAR Total valid votes for in presidential election in YEAR TSE
valid.depfedYEAR Total valid votes for election to the Chamber of Deputies in YEAR TSE
settlement Distance to nearest slave settlement FP & IBGE
distport Distance to Lisbon, Portugal IBGE
latitude Distance to the Equator line IBGE
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Appendix C List of Open Interviews
For this project I relied on information collected in a total of 38 interviews in Brazil
between 2014 and 2017, many of them informal. The majority were conducted with
brokers and clients, who shall remain anonymous.
Below is a list of open interviews used in this dissertation.
• Cristovam Buarque, Senator, former governor of the Federal District. 23 May 2014.
Brasília.
• Ana Peliano, Economist, IPEA. 21 November 2014. Brasília.
• Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, former President of Brazil. 30 May 2015. São Paulo.
• Fernando Henrique Cardoso, former President of Brazil. 11 November 2015. São
Paulo.
• Luiz Dulci, Workers’ Party strategist and former Secretary General of the
Presidency of Brazil. 28 November 2014. São Paulo.
• Patrus Ananias, former Minister for Social Development. 29 November 2016. Belo
Horizonte.
• Wanda Engel, former Minister for Social Assistance. 2 December 2016, São Paulo.
• Ceres Prates, former official at the Ministry of Planning. 21 November 2014. São
Paulo.
• Milton Seligman, former chairman of Comunidade Solidária. 21 November 2016.
São Paulo.
• Carlos Alberto Libânio Christo, former advisor to President Lula. 1 October 2016.
Rio de Janeiro.
• Márcia Lopes, former official at the Ministry of Social Development. 12 March
2014. Brasília.
• Lucio Castro, former research officer at the Brazilian Senate. 11 March 2014.
Brasília.
• Márcio Pochman, former president of IPEA. 28 May 2015. São Paulo.
• Afra Suassuna, former official at the Ministry of Health. 15 March 2014. Brasília.
• Eduardo Suplicy, former Senator. 23 November 2014. Brasília.
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Appendix D Programmes’ Legislation
Bolsa Família
• Law 10.836 of 9 January 2004.
• Decree 5.209 of 17 September 2004.
• Portaria 1, of 3 September 2004
• Portaria 660 of 11 November 2004
• Portaria 660 of 11 November 2004
• Portaria interministerial 3.789 of 17 November 2004
• Portaria interministerial 2.509 of 18 November 2004
• Portaria 737 of 15 December 2004
• Portaria 551 of 09 November 2005
• Portaria 555 of 11 November 2005
• Portaria 344 of 21 October 2009
• Portaria 666 of 28 December 2005
• Portaria 672 of 29 December 2005
• Portaria 148 of 27 April 2006
• Portaria 232 of 29 June 2006
• Portaria 380 of 12 December 2006
• Portaria 40 of 25 January 2007
• Portaria 176 of 18 May 2007
• Portaria 350 of 3 October 2007
• Portaria 416 of 14 November 2007
• Portaria 66 of 3 March 2008
• Portaria 76 of 6 March 2008
• Portaria 87 of 12 March 2008
• Portaria 220 of 25 June 2008
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• Resolution 3 of 3 June 2008
• Portaria 321 of 29 September 2008
• Portaria 376 of 16 October 2008
• Portaria interministerial 2 of 16 September 2009
• Portaria 344 of 21 October 2009
• Portaria 625 of 10 August 2010
• Portaria 617 of 11 August 2010
• Portaria 177 of 16 June 2011
• Portaria 204 of 8 July 2011
• Portaria 271 of 04 October 2011
• Portaria 319 of 29 November 2011
• Portaria 10 of 30 January 2012
• Portaria 251 of 12 December 2012
• Portaria 04 of 24 September 2013
• Portaria 103 of 30 September 2013
• Portaria 360 of 12 July 2005.
• Portaria 454 of 6 September 2005
Saúde da Família
• Portaria 2.488 of 21 October 2011
• Portaria 703 of 21 October 2011
• Portaria 978 of 16 May 2012
• Portaria 2.355 of 10 October 2013
• Portaria 154 of 24 January 2008
• Portaria 648 of 28 March 2006
• Portaria 2.527 of 19 October 2006
• Portaria 750 of 10 October 2006
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• Portaria 822/gm of 17 April 2006
• Portaria 650 of 28 March 2006
• Portaria 1.072 of 04 July 2005
• Portaria 2.513 of 23 November 2004
• Portaria 1.433 of 14 July 2004
• Portaria 1.043 of 01 June 2004
Cheque Cidadão
• Law 7.956/2007 (Campos dos Goytacazes)
Minha Casa, Minha Vida
• Law 11.124 of 16 June de 2005
• Decree 5.796 of 6 June de 2006
• Portaria 595 of 18 December 2013
• Portaria 412 of 06 August 2015
• Portaria 146 of 26 April 2016
PRONAF
• Decree 1.946 of 28 June 1996
• Decree 3.200 of 6 October 1999
• Portaria 38 of 4 July 2014
• Portaria 75 of 8 September 2008
• Portaria 55 of 26 October 2007
• Portaria 60 of 01 July 2008
• Portaria 70 of 4 August 2008
Fundo Nacional de Saúde
• Decree 907 of 31 August 1993
• Decree 1.232 of 30 August 1994
179
• Decree 3.964 of 10 October 2001
• Portaria interministerial 432 of 13 November 2014
• Portaria interministerial 495 of 6 December 2013
• Portaria 2.617 of 1 November 2013
• Portaria 2.135 of 25 September 2013
• Portaria 1.958 of 6 September 2013
• Portaria interministerial 274 of 1 August 2013
• Portaria 412 of 15 March 2013
• Portaria 1.580 of 19 July 2012
• Portaria 2.979 of 15 December 2011
• Portaria 2.707 of 17 November 2011
• Portaria 1.601 of 7 July 2011
• Portaria 1.645 of 24 July 2010
PNAE
• Resolution 6 of 13 May 1998
• Portaria 251 of 03 March 2000
• Provisional decree 2.100-30 of 23 March 2001
• Resolution 29 of 6 July 2001
• Resolution 35 of 1 October 2003
• Resolution 35 of 1 September 2005
• Portaria interministerial1.010 of 8 May 2006
• Resolution 33 of 24 August 2006
• Resolution 25 of 14 June 2007
• Law 11.947 of 16 June 2009
• Resolution 42 of 10 August 2009
• Decree 7.507 of 27 June 2011
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• Resolution 44 of 25 August 2011
• Resolution 25 of 4 July 2012
FNAS
• Law 8.742 of 7 December 1993
• Law 9.720 of 30 November 1998.
• Law 9.604 of 5 February 1998
• Decree 7788 of 15 August 2012
• Resolution 33 of 12 December 2012
PNRA
• Law 8.629 of 25 February 1993.
• Law 13.001 of 20 June 2014
• Decree 8.738 of 3 May 2016
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Appendix E Full specifications of OLS regressions
The tables starting on the next page provide the full specifications of the OLS regression
models discussed in Chapter Three.
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Table 12: Effects of CCT spending on incumbent party’s presidential and legislative
vote share (2002)
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2002 CCT spending p.p. 0.201∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.020) (0.033)
HDI −0.152∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.034) (0.054)
log(population) −0.007∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Cardoso vote share 1998 0.523∗∗∗
(0.010)
PSDB vote share 1998 0.393∗∗∗
(0.012)
Distance from capital 0.004∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Non white population −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002)
log(per capita GDP) 0.017∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.010)
PSDB mayor 0.009∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005)
PSDB governor −0.006∗ 0.002
(0.004) (0.006)
PT mayor −0.001 −0.005
(0.004) (0.007)
PT governor 0.006 −0.025∗∗
(0.006) (0.010)
Constant 0.102∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.052)
Observations 5,402 5,399
R2 0.619 0.439
Adjusted R2 0.616 0.436
Residual Std. Error 0.081 (df = 5364) 0.137 (df = 5361)
F Statistic 235.284∗∗∗ (df = 37; 5364) 113.568∗∗∗ (df = 37; 5361)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 13: Effects of CCT spending on incumbent party’s presidential and legislative
vote share (2006)
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2006 CCT spending p.p. 0.079∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.006) (0.006)
HDI −0.271∗∗∗ −0.071∗
(0.043) (0.040)
log(population) 0.0002 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Lula vote share 1998 0.313∗∗∗
(0.014)
PT vote share 1998 0.437∗∗∗
(0.020)
Distance from capital 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Non white population 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
log(per capita GDP) 0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
PSDB mayor −0.005 0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
PSDB governor 0.008∗ 0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004)
PT mayor −0.014∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
PT governor −0.013∗ 0.003
(0.007) (0.007)
Constant 0.310∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.039)
Observations 3,721 3,712
R2 0.795 0.367
Adjusted R2 0.793 0.360
Residual Std. Error 0.083 (df = 3683) 0.079 (df = 3674)
F Statistic 385.121∗∗∗ (df = 37; 3683) 57.464∗∗∗ (df = 37; 3674)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 14: Effects of CCT spending on incumbent party’s presidential and legislative
vote share (2010)
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2010 CCT spending p.p. 0.084∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.005) (0.006)
HDI −0.465∗∗∗ −0.030
(0.040) (0.045)
log(population) −0.011∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Lula vote share 1998 0.203∗∗∗
(0.012)
PT vote share 1998 0.376∗∗∗
(0.020)
Distance from capital 0.009∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Non white population 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
log(per capita GDP) 0.013∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.007) (0.008)
I(PSDB mayor) −0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
I(PSDB governor) 0.001 −0.005
(0.003) (0.004)
I(PT mayor) −0.018∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
I(PT governor) −0.002 −0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.466∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.041)
Observations 5,400 5,380
R2 0.726 0.344
Adjusted R2 0.724 0.340
Residual Std. Error 0.083 (df = 5362) 0.097 (df = 5342)
F Statistic 383.199∗∗∗ (df = 37; 5362) 75.732∗∗∗ (df = 37; 5342)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 15: Effects of CCT spending on incumbent party’s presidential and legislative
vote share (2014)
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2014 CCT spending p.p. 0.001∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.0004) (0.042)
HDI −1.180∗∗∗ −27.792∗∗∗
(0.039) (4.210)
log(population) −0.030∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗
(0.001) (0.165)
Lula vote share 1998 0.135∗∗∗
(0.014)
PT vote share 1998 33.313∗∗∗
(2.341)
Distance from capital 0.014∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.102)
Non white population 0.002∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.0001) (0.015)
log(per capita GDP) 0.009 0.010
(0.008) (0.905)
PSDB mayor −0.003 0.545
(0.004) (0.444)
PSDB governor −0.180∗∗∗ 6.262∗
(0.031) (3.370)
PT mayor −0.012∗∗ 8.998∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.515)
PT governor −0.005 5.935
(0.047) (5.126)
Constant 1.222∗∗∗ 25.111∗∗∗
(0.059) (6.399)
Observations 5,051 5,030
R2 0.766 0.317
Adjusted R2 0.764 0.312
Residual Std. Error 0.097 (df = 5014) 10.594 (df = 4993)
F Statistic 455.502∗∗∗ (df = 36; 5014) 64.246∗∗∗ (df = 36; 4993)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 16: Effects of Saúde da Família spending on incumbent party’s presidential and
legislative vote share (2002)
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2002 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 7.103e-02∗ 0.0283
(3.681e-02) (0.0612)
HDI −0.285∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.032) (0.051)
log(population) −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Cardoso 1998 vote share 0.521∗∗∗
(0.010)
PSDB 1998 vote share 0.395∗∗∗
(0.012)
Distance from capital 0.005∗∗∗ −0.0005
(0.001) (0.001)
Non white population −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002)
log(per capita GDP) 0.019∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.010)
PSDB mayor 0.010∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005)
PSDB governor −0.007∗ 0.003
(0.004) (0.006)
PT mayor −0.002 −0.007
(0.004) (0.007)
PT governor 0.003 −0.029∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.010)
Constant 0.257∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.048)
Observations 5,229 5,226
R2 0.612 0.441
Adjusted R2 0.609 0.437
Residual Std. Error 0.082 (df = 5192) 0.136 (df = 5189)
F Statistic 227.326∗∗∗ (df = 36; 5192) 113.596∗∗∗ (df = 36; 5189)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 17: Effects of Saúde da Família spending on incumbent party’s presidential and
legislative vote share (2006)
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2006 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 0.0097 0.0098
(0.0234) (0.0220)
HDI −0.567∗∗∗ −0.059∗
(0.033) (0.030)
log(population) −0.001 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Lula vote share 1998 0.337∗∗∗
(0.012)
PT vote share 1998 0.440∗∗∗
(0.016)
Distance from capital 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Non white population 0.003∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
log(per capita GDP) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.007) (0.007)
PSDB mayor −0.005 −0.0003
(0.003) (0.003)
PSDB governor 0.006 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003)
PT mayor −0.010∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
PT governor −0.008 0.011∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.544∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.029)
Observations 5,383 5,364
R2 0.776 0.354
Adjusted R2 0.775 0.349
Residual Std. Error 0.085 (df = 5346) 0.080 (df = 5327)
F Statistic 515.795∗∗∗ (df = 36; 5346) 80.911∗∗∗ (df = 36; 5327)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 18: Effects of Saúde da Família spending on incumbent party’s presidential and
legislative vote share (2010)
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2010 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 0.0298∗∗ 0.0193
(0.0136) (0.0155)
HDI −0.844∗∗∗ −0.053
(0.033) (0.037)
log(population) −0.013∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Lula 1998 vote share 0.216∗∗∗
(0.012)
PT 1998 vote share 0.369∗∗∗
(0.020)
Distance from capital 0.011∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Non white population 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001)
log(per capita GDP) 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗
(0.007) (0.008)
PSDB mayor −0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
PSDB governor −0.001 −0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
PT mayor −0.018∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
PT governor −0.003 −0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.797∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.035)
Observations 5,335 5,313
R2 0.713 0.341
Adjusted R2 0.711 0.337
Residual Std. Error 0.085 (df = 5298) 0.097 (df = 5276)
F Statistic 365.683∗∗∗ (df = 36; 5298) 75.902∗∗∗ (df = 36; 5276)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 19: Effects of Saúde da Família spending on incumbent party’s presidential and
legislative vote share (2014)
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2014 Saúde da Família spending p.p. 0.040∗∗∗ 0.640
(0.015) (1.254)
HDI −0.982∗∗∗ −22.068∗∗∗
(0.041) (4.271)
log(population) 0.010∗∗∗ −0.459∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.178)
Lula 1998 vote share 0.188∗∗∗
(0.014)
PT 1998 vote share 28.865∗∗∗
(2.305)
Distance from capital 0.014∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.106)
Non white population 0.002∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗
(0.0001) (0.015)
log(per capita GDP) −0.029∗∗∗ 1.045
(0.003) (0.934)
PSDB mayor −0.002 0.521
(0.004) (0.457)
PSDB governor −0.203∗∗∗ 5.149∗
(0.024) (2.823)
PT mayor −0.011∗∗ 9.224∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.525)
PT governor −0.0003 6.170
(0.045) (5.166)
Constant 1.088∗∗∗ 19.113∗∗∗
(0.058) (6.656)
Observations 4,886 4,872
R2 0.788 0.301
Adjusted R2 0.786 0.296
Residual Std. Error 0.092 (df = 4847) 10.687 (df = 4835)
F Statistic 474.160∗∗∗ (df = 38; 4847) 57.801∗∗∗ (df = 36; 4835)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 20: Effects of FNAS spending on incumbent party’s presidential and legislative
vote share (2006)
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2006 FNAS spending p.p. 0.1173 0.11070
(0.1993) (0.2121)
HDI −0.567∗∗∗ −0.059∗
(0.033) (0.030)
log(population) −0.001 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Lula 1998 vote share 0.337∗∗∗
(0.012)
PT 1998 vote share 0.440∗∗∗
(0.016)
Distance from capital 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Non white population 0.003∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
log(per capita GDP) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.007) (0.007)
PSDB mayor −0.005 −0.0003
(0.003) (0.003)
PSDB governor 0.006 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003)
PT mayor −0.010∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
PT governor −0.008 0.011∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.544∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.029)
Observations 5,383 5,364
R2 0.776 0.354
Adjusted R2 0.775 0.349
Residual Std. Error 0.085 (df = 5346) 0.080 (df = 5327)
F Statistic 515.807∗∗∗ (df = 36; 5346) 80.917∗∗∗ (df = 36; 5327)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 21: Effects of FNAS spending on incumbent party’s presidential and legislative
vote share (2010)
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2010 FNAS spending p.p. 0.1100 0.2445∗∗
(0.1215) (0.1070)
HDI −0.052 −0.843∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.033)
log(population) −0.002 −0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
PT 1998 vote share 0.370∗∗∗
(0.020)
Lula 1998 vote share 0.216∗∗∗
(0.012)
Distance from capital 0.004∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Non white population 0.0002 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
log(per capita GDP) 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007)
PSDB mayor 0.008∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
PSDB governor −0.006 −0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
PT mayor 0.079∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
PT governor −0.002 −0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.196∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.031)
Observations 5,313 5,335
R2 0.341 0.713
Adjusted R2 0.337 0.711
Residual Std. Error 0.097 (df = 5276) 0.085 (df = 5298)
F Statistic 75.871∗∗∗ (df = 36; 5276) 365.724∗∗∗ (df = 36; 5298)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 22: Effects of FNAS spending on incumbent party’s presidential and legislative
vote share (2014)
Dependent variable:
Presidential vote share Legislative vote share
(1) (2)
2014 FNAS spending p.p. 0.569 0.3197∗∗
(1.0106) (0.082)
HDI −22.127∗∗∗ −1.196∗∗∗
(4.271) (0.039)
log(population) −0.458∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.175) (0.002)
PT 1998 vote share 28.853∗∗∗
(2.305)
Lula 1998 vote share 0.166∗∗∗
(0.014)
Distance from capital 0.475∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.001)
Non white population 0.036∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.0001)
log(per capita GDP) 1.042 0.013
(0.934) (0.008)
PSDB mayor 0.522 −0.003
(0.458) (0.004)
PSDB governor 5.154∗ −0.207∗∗∗
(2.824) (0.025)
PT mayor 9.241∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗
(0.526) (0.005)
PT governor 6.177 0.0002
(5.167) (0.047)
Constant 19.125∗∗∗ 1.234∗∗∗
(6.642) (0.060)
Observations 4,869 4,891
R2 0.301 0.771
Adjusted R2 0.296 0.769
Residual Std. Error 10.689 (df = 4832) 0.096 (df = 4854)
F Statistic 57.797∗∗∗ (df = 36; 4832) 452.728∗∗∗ (df = 36; 4854)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 23: Effects of Land Reform spending on incumbent party’s presidential and
legislative vote share (2006)
Dependent variable:
lulavs2006 ptvs2006
(1) (2)
2006 land reform spending p.p. 0.557 1.522∗∗
(0.708) (0.668)
HDI −0.586∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗
(0.033) (0.031)
log(population) −0.0003 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
PT 1998 vote share 0.341∗∗∗
(0.012)
Lula 1998 vote share 0.433∗∗∗
(0.016)
Distance from capital 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Non white population 0.002∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
log(per capita GDP) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.007) (0.007)
PSDB mayor −0.006∗ −0.0001
(0.003) (0.003)
PSDB governor 0.005 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003)
PT mayor −0.011∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
PT governor −0.008 0.010
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.548∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030)
Observations 5,236 5,218
R2 0.775 0.355
Adjusted R2 0.774 0.350
Residual Std. Error 0.085 (df = 5199) 0.080 (df = 5179)
F Statistic 498.093∗∗∗ (df = 36; 5199) 74.960∗∗∗ (df = 38; 5179)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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